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ARTICLE 
Why Law Now Needs to Control Rather than 
Follow Neo-Classical Economics 
 
JOHN WILLIAM DRAPER 
 
 
 
This article argues that neo-classical economics places an 
emphasis on short-term gain over precaution,1 and in doing so, 
places the lives of a myriad of individual humans—and even the 
species itself—at risk. Given the foreseeable risks, if humanity 
wants to survive longer, we need to rethink our economic 
principles and priorities and the relationship between economics 
and law. 
 
  Reference Librarian, Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania Law 
School. This is to thank Gideon Parchomovsky, David Skeel, Howard Lesnick, 
Matthew Adler, Mitchell Berman, Paul George, Tamara Gaskell, and the late 
Harry Reicher for their inspiration, review of earlier drafts, suggestions, and 
encouragement. Special thanks go to Perri Hom, Drew Levinson, and Wesley 
Dyer of PELR for their edits. All errors are mine. 
1. The “precautionary principle” takes the approach of better safe than 
sorry. There is scientific and legal literature on the topic. See, e.g., CAROLINE E. 
FOSTER, SCIENCE AND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN INTERNATIONAL COURTS 
AND TRIBUNALS: EXPERT EVIDENCE, BURDEN OF PROOF AND FINALITY (2011); 
JOAKIM ZANDER, THE APPLICATION OF THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN PRACTICE: 
COMPARATIVE DIMENSIONS (2010) (discusssing the role played by the 
precationary principle when addressing issues in the EU); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1003 (2003). The 
principle is discussed in writings on environmental law. See, e.g., BÉNÉDICTE 
SAGE-FULLER, THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN MARINE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: 
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO HIGH RISK VESSELS (2013); LUCIANO BUTTI, THE 
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: NEITHER ARBITRARY NOR 
CAPRICIOUS IF INTERPRETED WITH EQUILIBRIUM (2007); Phillip M. Kannan, The 
Precautionary Principle: More than a Cameo Appearance in United States 
Environmental Law?, 31 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 409 (2007). 
1
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Neo-classical economic theory is the basis of the current 
system of law and economics.2  Professor John Mixon explains: 
“The neoclassical model limits its theory of person to two and only 
two characteristics: (1) people are rational, and (2) people are self-
interested.”3  Although the model is purported to employ amoral 
procedures in an effort to objectively explain and predict human 
behavior in a world of limited resources, its focus is on efficiency 
in a utilitarian view of resource use with a market ideal of 
maximum profit. Sadly, as Mixon notes, “There is no assumption 
that people in the market are honest, truthful, fair, or just, except 
to the extent they gain some advantage from such behavior.”4  
What’s more, the neoclassical model, in predicting human 
activity, makes no accommodation for resource conservation, 
pollution abatement, population control, or the recognition of any 
Earthly limits.5 
We build profit-maximization into our law, especially in the 
areas of corporations and securities, through statute,6 
 
2. Neo-classical economics is being increasingly absorbed in legal 
reasoning. John Mixon, Neoclassical Economics and the Erosion of Middle-Class 
Values: An Explanation for Economic Collapse, 24 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & 
PUB. POL’Y 327, 328 (2010). Neo-classical theory is manifested in several ways. 
Consider, for example, the shareholder primacy norm. See Jill E. Fisch, 
Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. 
CORP. L. 637 (2006). 
3. Mixon, supra note 2, at 328. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. at 333. 
6. New Jersey was the first state to relax corporate law in the late 
nineteenth century. In 1913, Governor Woodrow Wilson tightened the standards 
and “provoked a mass corporate migration to Delaware.” Harwell Wells, The 
Rise of the Close Corporation and the Making of Corporation Law, 5 BERKELEY 
BUS. L.J. 263, 282 n.120 (2008). The Delaware chartering and renewal process 
was relaxed to the point of providing no oversight. The doors were opened, and 
Adolf Berle’s notion of shareholder primacy walked in. See Adolf A. Berle, 
Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1051 (1931). 
Theorists followed: Wealth maximization is the acknowledged purpose of the 
firm in the two dominant schools of corporate thought: shareholder primacy and 
the managerialist school that defends management discretion. See William W. 
Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins: 
Adolf Berle and The Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 145–46 (2008). 
There are examples of required profit-maximization at the federal level. See, 
e.g., Employee Retirement Income Security Act § 404(a)(1)(A)(i), 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1104(a)(1)(A)(i) (2012) (requiring ERISA fiduciaries to discharge their duties 
“for the exclusive purpose of . . . providing benefits to participants and their 
beneficiaries”). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol33/iss2/2
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regulation,7 and case law.8  We embed maximization in order to 
support current corporate fiduciary duties and economic growth. 
In this way, economics are changing the law. Instead of being 
driven by economics, law needs to place limits on the theory and 
practice of economics, especially where the use of economic 
principles supports the taking of lives in return for proprietary 
gain. 
I begin with a most brief overview of the various sources of 
risk to the human species and its life support system. Then I will 
move on to look at how neo-classical economics interacts with 
significant risk. 
There are two troubling problems with current applications 
of neo-classical economics (especially visible in the form of cost-
benefit analysis): (1) the placing of property rights above, or even 
on a par, with all other fundamental rights violates moral and 
legal principle and (2) the system of neo-classical economics has 
no built-in brake; by valuing only the racing engine of short-term 
maximization, the system has no means or mechanism by which 
to adequately and consistently slow down to protect the life 
support system of the planet. By utilizing this expression of cost-
benefit analysis, humanity puts itself at risk using neo-classical 
economics to kill that life support system9 largely in the name of 
material well-being. 
 
 What’s more, protection of short-term economic interests crops up in 
procedural law. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), Pub. L. No. 109-
2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1452–1453, 
1711–1715)). This law was sought by big business, and it may serve to insulate 
the profits of big business from some of the public’s pain and recourse) as well as 
in criminal law (exclusive ownership rights and criminal penalties for violations 
thereof). See Digital Millennium Copyright Act § 103(a), 17 U.S.C. § 1204 (2012)) 
(potentially serving to prevent the adoption of new technologies). 
7. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. 
§ 601 (1988) (revoked 1994).  
8. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) 
(discussing that a business corporation is organizaed in a way where its purpose 
is primarily to maximize profit of its shareholders); see also Revlon, Inc. v. 
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (noting that 
a corporation’s primary role is to maximize the profit of its shareholders); eBay 
Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 28–30 (Del. Ch. 2010) (same). 
9. Scientists say human activity has pushed Earth beyond four of nine 
“planetary boundaries.” Joel Achenbach, Scientists: Human Activity Has Pushed 
Earth Beyond Four of Nine “Planetary Boundaries,” WASH. POST (Jan. 15, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/scientists-human-
activity-has-pushed-earth-beyond-four-of-nine-planetary-
3
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To be sure, material well-being is important. But more is not 
always better. When increased consumption causes humanity to 
encounter and exceed the physical limits of the planet, more is 
not better. In fact, it can turn out to be deadly.10 
Neo-classical economics assumes profit maximization as a 
social goal and a property right.11  The law protects our 
fundamental rights,12 including property rights. But when we 
protect the right to property at the expense of lives, even mere 
statistical lives, the world becomes a more deadly and unjust 
place. 
Most people would agree that it is immoral to take lives in 
return for money.13  But that’s what neo-classical economics does; 
it places a value on the lives of people and deems those lives 
 
boundaries/2015/01/15/f52b61b6-9b5e-11e4-a7ee-526210d665b4_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/M3S6-85SF]. 
10. “Rioting in response to soaring food prices recently has broken out in 
Egypt, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Senegal and Ethiopia. In Pakistan and Thailand, 
army troops have been deployed to deter food theft from fields and warehouses.” 
Bob Davis & Douglas Belkin, Food Inflation, Riots Spark Worries for World 
Leaders: IMF, World Bank Push for Solutions; Turmoil in Haiti, WALL ST. J. 
(Apr. 14, 2008, 11:59 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB120813134819111573 
[http://perma.cc/7UPN-SZQ5]. Other countries “at risk of social upheaval . . . 
include Indonesia, Yemen, Ghana, Uzbekistan, and the Philippines. In countries 
where buying food itself requires half to three-quarters of a poor person’s 
income, there is no margin for survival. Id. (internal quotations omitted). For 
another deadly example of exceeding physical limits, consider the effect of 
overpopulation in Rwanda. See JARED DIAMOND, Malthus in Africa: Rwanda’s 
Genocide, in COLLAPSE: HOW SOCIETIES CHOOSE TO FAIL OR SUCCEED 311–28 
(2005). 
11. With the ascendancy of the law and economics movement (based on 
neo-classical economics), the self-interest of maximization won out even over 
non-corporate law. For example, according to Professors Easterbrook and 
Fischel, “Managers have no general obligation to avoid violating regulatory 
laws, when violations are profitable to the firm.” Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel 
R. Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender Offers, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1155, 
1168 n.36, 1177 n.57 (1982) (“[M]anagers not only may but also should violate 
the rules when it is profitable to do so.”). 
12. The fundamental rights of “life, liberty, and property” arise in the due 
process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. 
Those fundamental rights may not be taken without due process of law. See 
JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, Procedural Due Process—Requirement 
for Fair Adjudicative Procedure, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 641, 641 (8th ed. 2010). 
13. “[M]orally, the killing of people for money is not an acceptable role since 
it amounts to murder, which contravenes the principles of universal public 
morality.” EDWARD H. SPENCE ET AL., MEDIA, MARKETS, AND MORALS 18 (2011). 
Whether or not money is involved, the imperative is simple: “Thou shalt not 
kill.” Exodus 20:13; Deuteronomy 5:17. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol33/iss2/2
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expendable if that value is lower than any conflicting property 
right before they die.14  Professors Frank Ackerman and Lisa 
Heinzerling do a stellar job of providing concrete examples in 
their book15 and earlier article.16 
This calculation is more than just a moral problem. Arguably, 
such an implementation could be considered a violation of 
criminal law as well. Taking money in return for taking lives 
certainly has the sound of a criminal violation. The protection of 
life is embedded deeply in the roots of Western law’s Judeo-
Christian heritage.17  The use by neo-classical economics, 
especially cost-benefit analysis (CBA), of the value of statistical 
lives (VSL) provides a clear example that flies in the face of these 
common notions of justice. Money should not matter more than 
life. Neo-classical economics and CBA do that. They are therefore 
immoral, if not illegal, and they need to be discontinued and 
replaced by a system that honors and protects life. 
Neo-classical economics encourages the use of infinite 
resources to maximize profits in a short time frame. This winner-
take-all approach encourages environmental destruction and 
erosion that cumulates in foreseeable risks to the life support 
system of the planet.18  Thus, we find that the human problem of 
 
14. Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Cost-Benefit Analysis: Thirty-Six 
Questions (And Almost as Many Answers), 114 COLUM. L. REV. 167, 181–88 
(2014). See Mixon, supra note 2, at 328, for more on the moral position of neo-
classical economics. 
15. For example, drivers using cell phones are willing to pay more than 
people at risk of being killed are willing to pay to avoid that risk. See FRANK 
ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF 
EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 1–2 (2004).  
16. For example, using standard cost-benefit analysis, smokers’ lives are 
worth less than the savings from reduced expenditures on pensions, housing, 
and health care. See Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: 
Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 
1553–54 (2002). 
17. “Thou shalt not kill.” Exodus 20:13; Deuteronomy 5:17. The imperative 
is both legal and moral.  
18. One counter argument is that prices of rare resources would go up over 
time, such that no depletion would occur. This is wonderful in theory, but the 
fact is that people pay more for the rarer, more precious, commodity. The fewer 
Sumatran rhino horns there are available in the face of great demand, the more 
they are worth, and the more people will pay, even in the face of criminal 
sanctions. See EDWARD O. WILSON, THE FUTURE OF LIFE 79–88 (2002); see also 
JORGE H. MALDONADO & ROCIO DEL PILAR MORENO SÁNCHEZ, CENTRO DE 
ESTUDIOS SOBRE DESARROLLO ECONÓMICO (CEDE), SERIE DOC. CEDE NO. 2009-
5
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the twenty-first century is, in part, rooted in the neoclassical 
economic theory of the late twentieth century and its 
implementation in law. 
Neo-classical economics provides the decision procedures 
commonly used to analyze risk: CBA and discounting. Those 
procedures have deficiencies, and those deficiencies are shared 
with neo-classical economics and at least to a degree, its greater 
theory, utilitarianism. 
We analyze and cope with risks through views that have long 
been developed. Here, I will compare two of the three main views 
of risk: the objective view and the moral view.19 
The objective view is statistical or quantitative. It 
dispassionately attempts to employ a unitary metric to drive a 
mechanical CBA.20  The unitary metric fails in our biological 
world.21  It results in precise numbers that say nothing about the 
moral choices under consideration.22 
 
22, DOES SCARCITY EXACERBATE THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS? EVIDENCE FROM 
FISHERS’ EXPERIMENTAL RESPONSES 5–9 (2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1502899 
[https://perma.cc/SYM5-5ZE9] (discussing the effect of differences in source 
stock on the levels of extraction). See also BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF 
CHOICE: WHY MORE IS LESS 95 (2004), for more on competition for inherently 
scarce goods.  
19. The third, the subjective view, is largely a sociological theory. I will not 
discuss the subjective view of risk which includes sociological risk analysis. It 
considers an increasing feeling of underlying fear in the context of the world risk 
society, see ULRICH BECK, WORLD RISK SOCIETY 19–47 (1999), but its focus on 
subjectivity is not well suited to displace the claims of the objective view. 
20. “Benefit and burden are measured by inquiring into the preferences, as 
expressed in dollars, of those affected by the risk impositions at issue.” Gregory 
C. Keating, Pressing Precaution Beyond the Point of Cost-Justification, 56 VAND. 
L. REV. 653, 681 (2003). 
21. From a biological perspective, selection theory that takes account of 
both altruism and selfishness is known as multilevel selection theory. Arriving 
at a unitary metric is likely to be impossible in the absence of a single statistical 
method of accounting. According to biologists David Sloan Wilson and Edward 
O. Wilson, “there is no single statistical method that captures all aspects of 
multilevel selection theory.” See David Sloan Wilson & Edward O. Wilson, 
Rethinking the Theoretical Foundation of Sociobiology, 82 Q. REV. BIOLOGY 327, 
337 (2007). When one considers altruism toward one’s loved ones and friends, 
it’s easy to envision at least some altruistic behavior. 
22. Keating, supra note 20, at 681. 
The unrestricted use of subjective preference (whether or not it is 
expressed in dollars) is objectionable because it compares harms—
death and inconvenience, for example—which are not comparable 
morally speaking, and permits a sufficient quantity of trivial benefit 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol33/iss2/2
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Instead, in this article, I will rely on a third view of risk, the 
moral view. The morality of protecting lives should prevail over 
claims of right to property or prosperity. 
The deeper problem is our response to risk. This article 
argues that neo-classical economics should be displaced by theory 
and practice that do a better job of protecting all of us from 
significant risk. Humanity should move to eventually ban the use 
of unrestricted neo-classical economics, including cost-benefit 
analysis, in cases of significant risk as well as for insignificant 
risks that cumulate or interact to cause significant risk. 
I.  FORESEEABILITY OF CATASTROPHE 
Generally, we do not want to be negligent. When a risk is 
foreseeable, we tend to avoid negligence by planning ahead or by 
using some kind of risk analysis. The law of negligence protects 
defendants when the result is not foreseeable.23  One cannot be 
found negligent if the risk was not foreseeable. However, if and 
when one can foresee the risk, and the risk to life, liberty, or 
property is significant, a finding of negligence is possible. 
As we will see in the moral view of risk, we should not harm 
others, either through intent or through negligence. 
Foreseeability of catastrophe should be enough to justify having a 
discussion about taking a new course. The ability to talk about 
catastrophe from a cause and effect standpoint would seem to be 
enough to justify discussion, especially in the face of man-made 
irreversible catastrophe. Unfortunately, studies of man-made risk 
show increasing probabilities of catastrophe on many fronts. How 
should we think about this combination of problems? 
We do not think about this combination of problems in order 
to prove negligence. The required decision pertains to how 
humanity will avoid its own negligence, especially that which 
may lead to mass death. 
We, as a species, need a healthy respect for certain types of 
catastrophe. These would not be far-fetched concepts; the 
 
to justify some irreparable injury. Harms must be comparable in 
urgency and in the benefit or injury they work on the lives of those 
they affect before they may be traded against one another.  
Id. 
23. See generally Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). 
7
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catastrophe must be at least foreseeable. Unfortunately, many 
significant risks to the human species are more than foreseeable. 
In many instances, we already see some of their effects. 
II.  FORESEEABLE CAUSES OF CATASTROPHE 
Foreseeable catastrophes are well-documented in Jared 
Diamond’s list of Twelve Causes of Human Collapse and in the 
computer runs described in Limits to Growth: The 30-Year 
Update (LTG30),24 which demonstrate the need for humanity to 
reach sustainable levels of population, consumption, and 
pollution. 
When we consider collapse—and the details of collapse—we 
find a detailed and supported list of causes in Jared Diamond’s 
Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed. Diamond’s 
book constitutes a catalogue of potential scenarios, all based 
largely on historical and archaeological record. 
We should look at the human situation another way as well. 
The latest in-depth quantitative overview of earthly limits, 
environmental overshoot, and consequent significant risk is found 
in LTG30. Although it is past time for replacement by a new 
edition,25 the book has analytic value. 
Through the LTG30 authors’ eyes, we see that each risk is 
dynamic and also part of a larger dynamic. We can quickly find 
ourselves engaging in complex system theory. There are many 
moving parts. We need to slow down and figure out what we’re 
doing—before we break something, run into a wall, or run off a 
cliff. 
Positive feedback loops enhance the possibility that small 
changes in initial conditions can have huge effects as events 
develop.26  Professor of cliodynamics,27 Peter Turchin, explains: 
 
24. DONELLA MEADOWS ET AL., LIMITS TO GROWTH: THE 30-YEAR UPDATE 
(2004). 
25. A 2012 edition was planned. MEADOWS ET AL., supra note 24, at xxii. 
26. See S.H. Schneider, The Changing Climate, SCI. AM., Sept. 1989, at 73, 
for a scenario with strong positive feedback. 
27. See PETER TURCHIN, WAR AND PEACE AND WAR: THE RISE AND FALL OF 
EMPIRES 10–11 (2007), for a description of cliodynamics, “the study of processes 
that change with time.” 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol33/iss2/2
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[N]onlinear interactions between various processes can produce 
internally driven irregular behavior—mathematical chaos. 
Mathematicians have proven that a dynamical system affected by 
two sources of cyclic behaviors will, under certain conditions, 
behave chaotically—in an erratic manner that looks random but 
in reality is completely internally generated.28 
A system’s complexity can force it to evolve to increasingly 
complex states that are increasingly unstable—until the 
equivalent of an avalanche occurs. All it takes is one significant 
discontinuity. Consider the world economy.29  Or one can argue 
that human civilization itself is an unstable system all the more 
subject to avalanche, especially as humanity is deep in 
environmental overshoot. We will examine overshoot shortly. 
We don’t know exactly where we are in relationship to the 
edge of the cliff or to some significant crash. Given the risks, 
enumerated just ahead, it seems reasonable to believe that we 
should slow down, steady ourselves, and find out. Even if we don’t 
find out clearly, it seems rational to take some precaution. Here is 
what humanity is up against. 
A. Diamond’s Twelve Causes of Human Collapse 
Toward the end of Collapse, Jared Diamond distills the dozen 
most serious environmental problems facing past and present 
societies. They fall into four categories: (1) the destruction or loss 
of natural resources, (2) natural resource ceilings, (3) harmful 
things we produce or move around, and (4) human population. 
Let’s briefly review them. As can be seen in LTG30 with the 
World3 model, the problems can combine in any number of ways 
to bring about collapse. 
First, loss of resources can occur in many ways. Humanity is 
destroying natural habitats,30 destroying wild food sources,31 
 
28. Id. at 286. 
29. “The world’s economy is a soft-paste porcelain vase set on a wobbly 
plant stand in the heart of an active earthquake zone.” Jim McTague, Could Fed 
Miscalculations Lead to $10,000 Gold?, BARRON’S (Sept. 17, 2012),  
http://www.barrons.com/articles/SB5000142405311190481960457764361297862
2748 [http://perma.cc/8LE3-J6EY].  
30. See JARED DIAMOND, COLLAPSE: HOW SOCIETIES CHOOSE TO FAIL OR 
SUCCEED 487–88 (2005). This includes deforestation (a major factor in collapses 
of past societies), as well as destruction of wetlands, the ocean bottom, and reefs. 
9
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losing biodiversity,32 and causing soil damage and erosion.33  
Secondly, in regard to resource ceilings or limits,34 there is a 
ceiling or limit on the amount of energy sources, particularly 
fossil fuels, available in the world.35  There is also a limit or 
ceiling on fresh water utilization.36  And there is the 
photosynthetic ceiling, something that Professor Diamond says 
has become serious only recently. By the middle of the twenty-
first century, most of the available sunlight will be used by 
 
For example, at least 30 percent of coral reefs worldwide were in critical 
condition in 1997, and 95 percent of those checked around the world showed 
degradation and species loss. Don Hinrichson, Coral Reefs in Crisis, 47 
BIOSCIENCE 554, 554 (1997). With more trawlers and warmer seas in the last 19 
years, is the situation is unlikely to have improved. 
31. See DIAMOND, supra note 30, at 488. 
32. See id. at 488–89. “A significant fraction of wild species, populations, 
and genetic biodiversity has already been lost, and at present rates a large 
fraction of what remains will be lost within the next half-century.” Id. at 488. 
The costs of wild species extinction and population loss are many. The species 
are irreplaceable. Their loss may bring harmful consequences, for instance, by 
breaking or interfering with the food chain for other species—or our food chain! 
“Elimination of lots of lousy little species regularly causes big harmful 
consequences for humans, just as does randomly knocking out many of the lousy 
little rivets holding together an airplane.” Id. at 489. At least in an airplane, the 
rivets are not connected to each other.  In ecosystems, if one species goes, it may 
take others in a chain reaction. 
33. See id. at 489–90. “Soils of farmlands used for growing crops are being 
carried away by water and wind erosion at rates between 10 and 40 times the 
rates of soil formation, and between 500 and 10,000 times soil erosion rates on 
forested land.” Id. at 489. On top of erosion, salinization, acidification, and 
alkalinization have severely damaged somewhere between 20 and 80 percent of 
the world’s farmland. See id. at 489–90. 
34. To Dana Meadows and the other authors of Limits to Growth, ceilings 
are called limits. In their view, limits can be exceeded, but only for a brief period 
of time called overshoot. If usage is not then carefully reduced, collapse occurs.  
In the language of Jared Diamond, limits are known as ceilings. Id. at 490. 
Diamond does not have the luxury of a computer program to prove the details of 
the collision with ceilings. He employs historical cause and effect. 
35. See id. at 490. With increasing extraction, our current reserves of our 
most valuable fossil fuels will last only a few more decades. Then the fuels will 
be the dirtier, the more expensive to extract, with increasing extraction, 
processing, and environmental costs for each remaining source. Id. We will not 
be the first to face an energy limit. Norse Greenland and Easter Island had their 
energy limits. What wood they had for cooking and heat was used up, and the 
result contributed to their collapse. 
36. See id. We face the depletion of aquifers in the U.S. southwest, in 
China, in the middle east, and in other places all over the world. Also consider 
the increasing costs of the increasing need for desalinization. Already, more 
than a billion of us lack access to safe, reliable drinking water. Id. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol33/iss2/2
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humans and little will be left over for forests or other plant 
species.37  Third, there are the harmful things we produce or 
move around: toxic chemicals, alien or invasive species, and 
atmospheric gases. We have insecticides, pesticides, herbicides, 
PCBs, mercury, and other toxins that we can absorb through our 
skin, our food, our water, or merely through the air.38  
Introduced, alien or invasive species devastate native species that 
have developed no tolerance or defense mechanisms for 
protection.39  And atmospheric gases play a role in global climate 
change contributing at the very least to polar ice melt and a 
projected rise in sea levels.40  Finally, the last two serious 
environmental problems facing past and present societies involve 
population. Consider the vast human population41 and its 
expanding footprint.42 
Our footprint is enormous. As it is, the Earth cannot support 
humanity, and our consumption is overshooting our 
environmental resources. The developed First World consumes 
and wastes thirty-two times more per capita than does the Third 
 
37. See id. at 491. 
38. Id. at 491–92. Prior societies have not faced the challenges of toxic 
chemicals. The results include birth defects, mental retardation, a drop in our 
sperm counts, and 130,000 air pollution deaths annually in the United States 
alone. Even the worst pollution in the United States is mild compared to that of 
China, the former Soviet Union, and many Third World mining sites. Id. at 492. 
39. See id. at 491–92. An invasive species can have a major impact on a 
society. For instance, stowaway rats contributed to the destruction of Easter 
Island’s palms by eating the seeds. TERRY HUNT & CARL LIPO, UNRAVELING THE 
MYSTERY OF EASTER ISLAND: THE STATUES THAT WALKED 29–31 (2011). “There are 
by now literally hundreds of cases in which alien species have caused one-time 
or annually recurring damages of hundreds of millions of dollars or even billions 
of dollars.” DIAMOND, supra note 30, at 492. 
40. See DIAMOND, supra note 30, at 493. This, too, is a challenge not faced 
by prior societies. The gases consist of former refrigerator coolant, carbon 
dioxide (mostly from burning fuels), and methane (from herds of sheep and 
cattle). As a result, global warming and sea level rise occur. “The areas thereby 
threatened include much of the Netherlands, Bangladesh, and the seaboard of 
the eastern U.S., many low-lying Pacific islands, the deltas of the Nile and 
Mekong Rivers, and coastal and riverbank cities of the U.K. (e.g., London), 
India, Japan, and the Philippines.” Id. 
41. See id. at 494. There are over seven billion of us on this cozy planet, and 
a powerful momentum is carrying the number upward. Because a 
disproportionate percentage of the population is young, even with the immediate 
implementation of a two-child policy, Earth’s population will increase for the 
next seventy years. Id. 
42. See id. at 494–96. 
11
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World, but our developing-world kin are moving to increase their 
footprint and impact. If they were to succeed, current 
consumption and waste would be surpassed twelve-fold.43  If 
China alone succeeded, the footprint would double.44 
If China fully modernizes, it will place a strain on the planet 
that is a threat to all of us. They can’t have the same quality of 
life unless we all work to change our technology and standards. 
It’s not just China. And it’s not just the Third World. We’re all in 
this together. 
First World governments do not acknowledge that it is 
impossible for the Third World population to reach current First 
World standards.45  Even now the First World cannot maintain 
its standards due to resource depletion. To attempt to bring 
everyone up to those standards is not only impossible but 
downright dangerous. Diamond asks, “What will happen when it 
finally dawns on all those people in the Third World that current 
First World standards are unreachable for them, and that the 
First World refuses to abandon those standards for itself?”46  
That dawning is already taking place.47  Either they manage to 
move here, or, when they stay there, we look like hypocrites. 
Jared Diamond hits the nail when he explains the ultimate 
conundrum of economic development: “[T]he cruelest trade-off 
that we shall have to resolve: encouraging and helping all people 
to achieve a higher standard of living, without thereby 
 
43. The number is twelve-fold rather than thirty-two-fold probably because 
there are already First World inhabitants with high-impact lifestyles.  
44. Id. at 495 
45. Ted Trainer, Our Unsustainable Society; Basic Causes, 
Interconnections, and Solutions, in THE COMING AGE OF SCARCITY; PREVENTING 
MASS DEATH AND GENOCIDE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 83, 90 (Michael N. 
Dobkowski & Isidor Wallimann eds., 1998).  
Above all, the limits-to-growth analysis makes clear that the 
conventional conception of development is totally mistaken about 
goals. It is not possible for all Third World people to rise to the living 
standards of the rich countries. Yet, that goal is still taken for 
granted in almost all official development theory and practice.  
Id. 
46. DIAMOND, supra note 30, at 496. 
47. See, e.g., Drew Hinshaw, Allure of Wealth Drives Deadly Trek: Young 
Men in Senegal Join Migrant Wave Despite Growing Prosperity at Home, WALL 
ST. J. (June 12, 2015 12:40 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/young-men-in-
senegal-join-migrant-wave-despite-growing-prosperity-at-home-1434127244 
[http://perma.cc/LVH6-NYZM]. 
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undermining that standard through overstressing global 
resources.”48  Human population growth affects and exacerbates 
all the other problems. 
We are currently on a non-sustainable course. Any one of the 
twelve problems Diamond enumerates could limit our lifestyle, to 
say the least, within the next fifty years: “The single most 
important problem is our misguided focus on identifying our 
single most important problem. . . . [T]hey all interact with each 
other. If we solved 11 of the problems, but not the 12th, we would 
still be in trouble, whichever was the problem that remained 
unsolved.”49  Diamond is right. We must solve them all. We don’t 
have twelve single problems. They are connected, and some 
reinforce others. 
B. LTG30’s Three Basic Causes of Human Failure 
The three basic causes of human failure are too much 
consumption, too much pollution, and too much population.50  We, 
especially those of us in the First World, consume much more 
than we need—or than the planet can support. Our systems of 
subsidies encourage the consumption,51 and calls for austerity 
meet with protest.52  So many of us demand too much from such a 
small and over-run planet. 
 
48. DIAMOND, supra note 30, at 496. Somehow, the idea of success must 
come to involve less consumption and less risk. 
49. Id. at 498. 
50. Id. at 487–96; MEADOWS ET AL., supra note 24, at 238–44. Harvard’s 
Pulitzer Prize-winning scientist, Edward O. Wilson explains the challenge of the 
current human situation: 
The race is now on between the technoscientific forces that are 
destroying the living environment and those that can be harnessed 
to save it. We are inside a bottleneck of overpopulation and wasteful 
consumption. If the race is won, humanity can emerge in far better 
condition than when it entered, and with most of the diversity of life 
intact. 
WILSON, supra note 18, at xxiii. 
51. See David P. Coady et al., How Large Are Global Energy Subsidies? 12 
(Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 15/105, 2015), https://www.imf.org/ 
external/pubs/ft/wp/2015/wp15105.pdf [https://perma.cc/VA25-TL6H]. 
52. “[Greeks] have rebelled against the crushing austerity measures that 
Europe has demanded in exchange for bailing out the indebted government.” 
Michael Birnbaum, Greece Fails to Make Key IMF Debt Payment, WASH. POST, 
(June 30, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/european-
leaders-seek-last-ditch-offer-to-bring-greece-from-brink-of-
13
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1. Consumption 
Humanity’s ecological footprint is unsustainable. As Edward 
O. Wilson warns, we ought to worry about permanent 
environmental damage, wherever it is: 
Earth, unlike the other solar planets, is not in physical 
equilibrium. It depends on its living shell to create the special 
conditions on which life is sustainable. The soil, water, and 
atmosphere of its surface have evolved over hundreds of millions 
of years to their present condition by the activity of the 
biosphere, a stupendously complex layer of living creatures 
whose activities are locked together in precise but tenuous global 
cycles of energy and transformed organic matter. The biosphere 
creates our special world anew every day, every minute, and 
holds it in a unique, shimmering physical disequilibrium. On 
that disequilibrium the human species is in total thrall. When we 
alter the biosphere in any direction, we move the environment 
away from the delicate dance of biology. When we destroy 
ecosystems and extinguish species, we degrade the greatest 
heritage this planet has to offer and thereby threaten our own 
existence.53 
Wilson argues that our environmental footprint is too large 
and that the risk is great. The typical economist wants 
quantitative data proving that there is a statistically significant 
risk, more than a background risk, of collapse or extinction soon. 
For such quantitative data, let us look at the position of some 
well-known systems dynamics scholars. The phenomenon of 
limits to growth was explored originally from 1970 to 1972 in the 
System Dynamics Group of the Sloan School of Management at 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Initially, the study 
led to the publication of Donella Meadows et al., The Limits to 
Growth (1972), with twelve internally consistent scenarios of 
world development reaching from 1900 to 2100, all based on 
computer modeling.54  In 1972, there was hope for a gradual 
 
default/2015/06/30/960aded8-1ea2-11e5-a135-935065bc30d0_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/T5ZP-HXZ3]. 
53. WILSON, supra note 18, at 39. 
54. See generally Graham Turner, A Comparison of the Limits to Growth 
with Thirty Years of Reality, 18 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 397 (2008), for a nice 
description of that modeling. 
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downward adjustment in humanity’s footprint. The 1992 update, 
with a slightly updated computer model (World3), yielded the 
second edition, Donella Meadows et al., Beyond the Limits. This 
update contained one major new finding: humanity had already 
overshot the limits of Earth’s carrying capacity.55 
More years passed, and a third edition was published.56  For 
more details of the assumptions and the workings of World3, it is 
best to read the work itself, especially the Authors’ Preface to 
LTG30. 
The numbers help us better understand the size of our 
ecological footprint, its trajectory, and the implications for the 
not-so-distant future, a future that is racing to meet us with 
increasing speed:57 
 
55. MEADOWS ET AL., supra note 24, at ix-xiii. The idea of planetary 
overshoot was introduced in the 1987 report of the U.N.-sanctioned Brundtland 
Commission, Our Common Future, that:  
popularized the idea of sustainability and a narrower concept, 
sustainable development . . . . [T]he report described the extent of 
world poverty and global environmental calamity and articulated, 
for the first time, sustainability’s “Three Es”—environment, 
economics and social equity—arguing how all three realms must be 
optimized, and how, over the long term, a just and truly sustainable 
world cannot have one without the other. 
Robert Eagan, Sense & Sustainability, 133 LIBR. J. 40, 40 (2008). 
56. In addition to updating the earlier works, the authors had other 
purposes behind the preparation of Limits to Growth: The 30-Year Update. 
Among other reasons, they wished to: 
 stress that humanity is in overshoot and that the resulting 
damage and suffering can be greatly reduced through wise 
policy;  
 offer data and analysis to contradict prevailing political 
pronouncements that humanity is on the correct path for its 
twenty-first century; 
 inspire the world’s citizens to think about the long-term 
consequences of their actions and choices—and muster their 
political support for actions that would reduce the damage from 
overshoot . . . . 
MEADOWS ET AL., supra note 24, at xix. 
57. Humanity’s increasing speed—and the effects thereof—have been well 
known for some time: 
We live in a world of accelerating change. The rate of change 
produces pressure upon available procedures of adjustment. A single 
basic statistical projection conveys some sense of the magnitude of 
change in our world: In the 30 years from 1970 to the year 2000 
there will be more construction than came to pass from 3000 bc to 
date. The endangered-planet crisis in part arises because our 
15
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For those who can respect numbers, we can report that the 
highly aggregated scenarios of World3 still appear, after 30 
years, to be surprisingly accurate. The world in the year 2000 
had the same number of people (about 6 billion—up from 3.9 
billion in 1972) that we projected in the 1972 standard run of 
World3. Furthermore, that scenario showed a growth in global 
food production (from 1.8 billion tons of grain equivalent per year 
in 1972 to 3 billion in 2000) that matches history quite well. Does 
this correspondence with history prove that our model was true? 
No, of course not. But it does indicate that World3 was not totally 
absurd; its assumptions and our conclusions still warrant 
consideration today.58 
Certainly, World3 population projections were not absurd. 
And neither were the other projections. For the fortieth 
anniversary of the 1972 Limits to Growth, Australian Physicist 
Graham Turner did a comparison of the 1972 limits to growth 
projections with forty years of real world data, including 
population,59 services per capita,60 food per capita,61 industrial 
output per capita,62 non-renewable resources,63 and persistent 
pollution.64  Using the World3 model as a predictive validation 
technique,65 Turner found that humanity remains on track for 
disaster. It’s getting closer.66  Clearly, we have reached the point 
of foreseeability. 
 
technological abilities are evolving so much more rapidly than are 
our abilities to solve social and political problems. Tensions have 
always resulted from the inability of political man to cope with the 
changes wrought by technological man, but these inabilities now 
threaten irreversible disaster on a planetary scale. 
RICHARD A. FALK, THIS ENDANGERED PLANET: PROSPECTS AND PROPOSALS FOR 
HUMAN SURVIVAL 67 (1971) (internal quotations omitted). 
58. MEADOWS ET AL., supra note 24, at xviii. 
59. Graham Turner, On the Cusp of Global Collapse? Updated Comparison 
of the Limits to Growth with Historical Data, 21 GAIA 116, 116–24 (2012). 
60. Id. at 119. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. at 120. 
64. Id. at 121. 
65. Turner, supra note 59, at 121. 
66. Id. at 123. 
[T]he alignment of data trends with the model’s dynamics indicates 
that the early stages of collapse could occur within a decade, or 
might even be underway. This suggests, from a rational risk-based 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol33/iss2/2
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2. Population 
In light of all the other factors, it is easy to see that getting a 
handle on the population problem is only the beginning. Here is 
World3’s core question: How may the expanding global population 
and material economy interact with and adapt to the earth’s 
limited carrying capacity over the coming decades? 
To be more specific, the carrying capacity is a limit. Any 
population that grows past its carrying capacity, overshooting the 
limit, will not long sustain itself. And while any population is 
above the carrying capacity, it will deteriorate the support 
capacity of the system it depends upon. If regeneration of the 
environment is possible, the deterioration will be temporary. If 
regeneration is not possible, or if it takes place only over 
centuries, the deterioration will be effectively permanent.67 
When we consider Easter Island, especially in light of its 
extinctions,68 we can see that it represents an example of such 
effectively permanent deterioration. The island’s carrying 
capacity has been eroded. 
There are four ways a society can approach its carrying 
capacity. Two of them involve staying beneath the limits. It is 
already too late for the first two options.69  We are now facing the 
LTG30’s choice between option three and option four: 
The third possibility for a growing society is to overshoot its 
carrying capacity without doing massive and permanent damage. 
In that case the ecological footprint would oscillate around the 
limit before leveling off. This behavior . . . is called damped 
oscillation. The fourth possibility is to overshoot the limits, with 
 
perspective, that planning for a collapsing global system could be 
even more important than trying to avoid collapse.  
Id. 
67. MEADOWS ET AL., supra note 24, at 137. 
68. DIAMOND, supra note 30, at 102–09. 
69. MEADOWS ET AL., supra note 24, at 137. 
First it can grow without interruption, as long as its limits are far 
away or are growing faster than the population. Second, it can level 
off smoothly below the carrying capacity, in a behavior that 
ecologists call logistic, or S-shaped, or sigmoid growth . . . .Neither of 
these options is any longer available to global society, because it is 
already above its sustainable limits. 
Id. 
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severe and permanent damage to the resource base. If that were 
to occur, the population and the economy would be forced to 
decline rapidly to achieve a new balance with the recently 
reduced carrying capacity at a much lower level. We use the 
phrase overshoot and collapse to designate this option . . . .70 
When we are led to consider collapse—and the details of 
collapse—we see the tie-in to Jared Diamond’s Collapse: How 
Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed. Diamond’s book contains a 
catalogue of potential scenarios, and the latest full quantitative 
overview is found in LTG30, as updated by Graham Turner.71 
The quantitatively-oriented economist is likely to want 
numbers. There are plenty of quantitative references that could 
be discussed in a longer work. However, the interaction of the 
numbers is not simple. As you might imagine, it takes a computer 
program to draw them all in and consider them all at once. Many 
of the numbers and calculations are implicit in the structure of 
the World3 model.72  The model’s purpose, structure, its growth 
and erosion processes, limits, delays and feedback loops are best 
described in LTG30.73  Read LTG30. For now, let’s get some idea 
of what we might find there. 
 
70. Id. at 137–38. 
71. See GRAHAM TURNER, MELBOURNE SUSTAINABLE SOC’Y INST., RESEARCH 
PAPER NO. 4, IS GLOBAL COLLAPSE IMMINENT? AN UPDATED COMPARISON OF THE 
LIMITS TO GROWTH WITH HISTORICAL DATA 4–5 (Lauren Rickards ed., 2014), 
http://sustainable-dev.unimelb.edu.au/sites/default/files/docs/MSSI-
ResearchPaper-4_Turner_2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/AM7L-J3Y4] [hereinafter 
MSSI RESEARCH PAPER]; Turner, supra note 59, at 116–24 (2012); Graham 
Turner, A Comparison of the Limits to Growth with Thirty Years of Reality, 18 
GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 397, 401–02 (2008). 
72. Other models and simulations have been attempted. See, e.g., Akira 
Onishi, A New Frontier Science of Economics: Global Model Simulation (Ctr. for 
Glob. Modeling, Found. for Fusion of Sci. & Tech., Working Paper, 2008), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1198943 [http://perma.cc/ND4T-TJYQ]. Onishi’s model 
appears to be economic in nature. If a model is based solely on economics and 
does not include natural limits, its predictions will be of limited value. It is 
worth noting that Professor Onishi believes that one needs to use a “cosmic 
mind” of “human solidarity” to be successful at thinking about humanity’s 
future. Id. at pt. 6(9); see also AKIRA ONISHI, GLOBAL MODEL SIMULATION: A 
FRONTIER OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE (2010). 
73. See MEADOWS ET AL., supra note 24, at 129–62, 285–93. 
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3. Overshoot and Collapse 
The process of exceeding limits, going into the red, is called 
overshoot, which “means to go too far, to go beyond limits 
accidentally—without intention.”74  Overshoot can describe 
sliding past a stop sign on an icy road, drinking too much alcohol 
the night before the morning after, building too many fishing 
boats for the fish population to sustain, or creating too many 
chlorinated chemicals for the upper atmosphere to accommodate, 
thereby depleting the ozone layer for decades, until it can recover. 
Overshoot beyond the limits is a reality. We have been living 
it since the early 1990s.75  Humanity is going deeper and deeper 
into trouble. We need to make progress on both fronts, population 
and impact per person, in order to increase our chances of 
survival. We were twenty percent past Earth’s sustainable 
carrying capacity in 2002, and our consumption continues to 
increase.76  We are not paying attention to the signs and the 
studies. We do not have another 30 years to dither.77  We must 
work immediately to begin to change the way we live.78  We need 
 
74. Id. at 1. 
75. As the authors of LTG30 observe: 
It now appears that the global per capita grain production peaked in 
the mid-1980s. The prospects for significant growth in the harvest of 
marine fish are gone. The costs of natural disasters are increasing, 
and there is growing intensity, even conflict, in efforts to allocate 
fresh water resources and fossil fuels among competing demands. 
The United States and other major nations continue to increase their 
greenhouse gas emissions even though scientific consensus and 
meteorological data both suggest that the global climate is being 
altered by human activity. There are already persistent economic 
declines in many localities and regions. Fifty-four nations, with 12 
percent of the world population, experienced declines in per capita 
GDP for more than a decade during the period from 1990 to 2001. 
MEADOWS ET AL., supra note 24, at xiv. 
76. See id. at xiv (citing Mathis Wackernagel et al., Tracking the Ecological 
Overshoot of the Human Economy, 99 PROC. ACAD. SCI. 9266–71 (2002)); MSSI 
RESEARCH PAPER, supra note 71, at 6–8. 
77. “[T]o accommodate sustainably the anticipated increase in population 
and economic output of the next four decades, we would need six to twelve 
additional planets.” MATHIS WACKERNAGEL & WILLIAM REES, OUR ECOLOGICAL 
FOOTPRINT: REDUCING HUMAN IMPACT ON THE EARTH 91 (1996). Two of those four 
decades are gone, humanity has made no major steps toward sustainability or 
population control, and no additional livable planets are in sight. 
78. BECK, supra note 19, at 10–11.  
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to study and ask new questions. We need to care enough to 
discuss and attempt to agree soon on any implementational goals 
to reach sustainability.79 
The local specifics pertaining to exceeding our footprint are 
not limited to economic decline. Donella Meadows et al. note 
examples of how quality of life can be adversely affected at the 
local level.80  These quality of life matters are not limited to only 
some of us. They affect all of us, including the rich. It also 
appears that the problems are increasing at an increasing rate. 
Welcome to overshoot. 
 
People are better adapted to the future than are social institutions 
and their representatives. The decline of values which cultural 
pessimists are so fond of decrying is in fact opening up the possibility 
of an escape from the “bigger, more, better” creed, in a period that is 
living beyond its means both ecologically and economically. Whereas, 
in the old system of values, the self always had to be subordinated to 
patterns of the collective, the new orientations towards the “we” are 
creating something like a cooperative or altruist individualism. 
Thinking of oneself and living for others – once considered by 
definition contradictory – are revealed as internally and 
substantially connected with each other. 
Id. 
 Changing the way we live means slowing down, not speeding up. The 
answer does not lie in hurrying to build new coal-fired power plants in Texas 
ahead of increased restrictions, see Rebecca Smith, Burning Debate: As 
Emissions Restrictions Loom, Texas Utility Bets Big on Coal: Planned TXU 
Plants Raise Global-Warming Concerns, WALL STREET J. (July 21, 2006), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB115344549183413209 [perma.cc/26RP-Z4P3], any 
more than it does in building a new coal-fired power plant weekly in China, see 
Terence Chea, Asia, Particularly China, Shares Pollution with the U.S. – The 
Impact of Breakneck Economic Growth Is Being Felt Across the Pacific, PHILA. 
INQUIRER, July 30, 2006, at A3. 
79. See MEADOWS ET AL., supra note 24, at xv. 
80. Id. at 123.  
Jakarta emits more air pollution than human lungs can bear. The 
forests of the Philippines are nearly gone. The soils of Haiti have 
been worn down in places to bare rock. The cod fisheries off 
Newfoundland have been closed. Parisians have to endure summer 
days of reduced speed limits to cut down pollution from their fuming 
cars. Several European countries saw thousands die prematurely as 
the summer of 2003 set new records for high temperatures. The 
chemical load in the Rhine was for many years so high that dredged 
silt from Dutch harbors now has to be treated as hazardous waste. 
Skiers visiting Oslo in the winter of 2001 found hardly any useful 
snow. 
Id. 
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However, the authors of LTG30 also view overshoot from a 
practical, societal, standpoint. They see overshoot and subsequent 
decline as a failure to prepare for the future: 
Welfare loss will occur, for example, when there is no ready 
replacement for dwindling reserves of oil, for scarcer wild fish, 
and for expensive tropical woods, once these resources start to 
deplete. The problem is worse when the resource base is erodible 
and gets destroyed during overshoot. Then society might 
experience collapse.81 
The authors give an example of collapse in a different 
context. When the dot-com bubble burst in 2000, it took three 
years for the air to come out of the stock market. The erodible 
resource was investor confidence. When it eroded sufficiently, the 
market collapsed.82 
Environmental overshoot is the result of a combination of 
factors. The authors of LTG30 explain the three causes of 
overshoot: (1) growth or acceleration, (2) “some form of limit or 
barrier, beyond which the moving system may not safely go,” and 
(3) a “delay or mistake in the perceptions and the responses that 
strive to keep the system within its limits.”83  All three are 
“necessary and sufficient to produce an overshoot.”84  Ultimately, 
it appears that humanity will need to control its own speed and 
use sensors to keep us from exceeding earthly limits, and employ 
systems of clear signals and responses designed to reduce delays. 
Our survival depends not only on the timing of our response 
to signals, but also on the nature of the actions we take in 
response to those signals. If our response is successful, then after 
overshoot we get oscillation rather than collapse. In Norway, the 
government bought up and retired fishing boats until the fish 
stocks could regenerate.85  In New England, sawmills were 
shuttered after too many were built for sustainability and the 
forests were depleted.86  These are local examples of adjustment 
and recovery. 
 
81. Id. at xxi. 
82. See id. 
83. Id. at 1.  
84. Id.  
85. MEADOWS ET AL., supra note 24, at 163. 
86. Id. 
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Fifteenth-century Norse Greenland is an example of collapse 
when regeneration does not take place in the face of overshoot.87  
According to the authors of LTG30, if the damage is irreversible, 
if there is collapse, it stands to be catastrophic: 
Nothing can bring back an extinct species. Fossil fuels are 
permanently destroyed in the very act of using them. Some 
pollutants, such as radioactive materials, can’t be rendered 
harmless by any natural mechanism. If the climate is 
significantly altered, geological data suggest that temperature 
and precipitation patterns probably will not return to normal 
within a time period meaningful to human society. Even 
renewable resources and pollution absorption processes can be 
permanently destroyed by prolonged or systematic misuse. When 
tropical forests are cut down in ways that preclude their 
regrowth, when the sea infiltrates fresh water aquifers with salt, 
when soils wash away leaving only bedrock, when a soil’s acidity 
is changed sufficiently to flush out the heavy metals it has stored, 
then the earth’s carrying capacity is diminished permanently, or 
at least for a period that appears permanent to human beings.88 
Overshoot and then collapse is a possibility. Combined with 
nonlinearities (thresholds beyond which a system’s behavior 
suddenly changes), erosion, a stress that multiplies itself if it is 
not quickly remedied, converts overshoot to collapse.89  Once past 
the critical threshold, erosion loops turn overshoot and oscillation 
into overshoot and collapse.90  Although erosion loops are 
normally dormant, when overshoot occurs without correction, the 
loops can lead overshoot into a downhill spiral. For example, 
overgrazed grasslands can erode, and erosion can lead to 
desertification and the complete loss of land fertility.91 
4. Erosion Loops and Pollution 
There are several erosion loops in the World3 model. For 
example, when people are hungry, they work the land harder, 
 
87. See DIAMOND, supra note 30, at 248–52. 
88. MEADOWS ET AL., supra note 24, at 163–64. 
89. See id. at 164–67. 
90. See id.  
91. Id. at 165. Consider the land in much of the Middle East, including the 
cradle of civilization. 
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depleting it of its nutrients in the short run in an effort to 
produce more food.92  The result is lower food production from 
increasingly diminished soil fertility. Another example occurs in a 
weakening economy, when services per capita decline. When 
reductions in family planning services occur, the population 
increases, which brings further decline in services per capita. 
There are also erosion loops that can adversely affect the 
industrial capital plant and pollution absorption mechanisms.93  
One example of an erosion loop in a pollution absorption 
mechanism is illustrative. Air pollutants can weaken or kill 
forests. In doing so, they diminish a sink for carbon dioxide, a 
greenhouse gas.94 
Some erosion loops are not included in World3. Social erosion 
is one example. When elites use their power and repression to 
grab wealth, inequality can lead the middle classes to frustration 
and anger. If the elites respond by hiring guards and using 
additional force, the spiral can lead to revolution and social 
breakdown. 
Erosion loops are now beginning to get serious public 
attention. As the authors of LTG30 report, “When we first 
published our results in 1972, the majority of people thought 
human disruption of natural processes on a global scale was 
inconceivable. Now it is the subject of newspaper headlines, the 
focus of scientific meetings, and the object of international 
negotiations.”95 
We are now beginning to see some of these erosion loops in 
action, as they help us increase our speed toward collapse. For 
example, the southern ocean CO2 sink is not only full, between 
1981 and 2004 it has weakened or eroded, releasing carbon 
dioxide, apparently as a result of a warming world. And the 
effects of that erosion help to further reduce the sink’s absorption 
capabilities.96  We need to avoid more environmental overshoot 
and erosion. 
 
92. Id.  at 164. 
93. Id. at 165. 
94. MEADOWS ET AL., supra note 24, at 166. 
95. See id. at 166–67. 
96. Id. at 167. 
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C. More than Mere Foreseeability 
Sadly, we cannot grow our way out of overshoot. Our species 
has gone too far. Quickening our pace will not help when we need 
to slow down. The situation seems sufficiently dire that we should 
consider using law to make positive changes soon. First, though, 
we need to disengage the law that is making matters worse. And 
we need to do it soon. 
Both science and social science predict mass death.97  We are 
far beyond the point of foreseeability. Even the Pope is most 
eloquent with the details of similar concerns.98  As the sciences 
and religion99 see the same problem, it’s time to consider law’s 
alignment with that vision. 
To do that, we will need to think about how law currently 
treats risk. We will find that law does not treat risk with respect 
by protecting life. Instead, we will discover that law attempts to 
treat risk as a short-term money-making opportunity. 
III.  HOW HUMANITY TREATS RISK 
Aside from science, there is another context for the protection 
of humanity. It is the manner in which we treat risk. Some of 
 
97. The business as usual (BAU) approach is on track for disaster in about 
2030. See MSSI RESEARCH PAPER, supra note 71, at 7; see also MARTIN J. REES, 
OUR FINAL HOUR: A SCIENTIST’S WARNING: HOW TERROR, ERROR, AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTER THREATEN HUMANKIND’S FUTURE IN THIS CENTURY—ON 
EARTH AND BEYOND 7–8 (2003) (“I think the odds are no better than fifty-fifty 
that our present civilisation on Earth will survive to the end of the present 
century.”). We are entering what “may well be the most destructive of the 
possible scenarios.” John B. Cobb, Jr., The Threat to the Underclass, in THE 
COMING AGE OF SCARCITY, supra note 45, at 25, 26. 
98. See Francis, Encyclical Letter Laudato Si’ 16–43 (May 24, 2015), 
http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/papa-
francesco_20150524_enciclica-laudato-si.html [https://perma.cc/5YPJ-4KYT] 
99. See Justin Gillis, For Faithful, Social Justice Goals Demand Action on 
Environment, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2015, at A1; David O’Reilly, Rabbis Issue a 
Letter on the Environment, PHILA. INQUIRER (June 15, 2015), 
http://articles.philly.com/2015-06-15/news/63415018_1_climate-change-tikkun-
pope-francis [https://perma.cc/SHN5-WVV6]; Rabbi Arthur Waskow et al., A 
Rabbinic Letter on the Climate Crisis, SHALOM CTR., https://theshalomcenter. 
org/civicrm/petition/sign?sid=17 [https://perma.cc/2NCG-8TSC] (“In Leviticus 26, 
the Torah warns us that if we refuse to let the Earth rest, it will “rest” anyway, 
despite us and upon us – through drought and famine and exile that turn an 
entire people into refugees.”). 
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humanity’s approach to dealing with risk is the product of genetic 
programming and some is learned. 
We have already come a long way. Historically, traditions 
were the justification for action. Traditions have become less 
important and social practices are under continual examination 
and reform.100  Risk has displaced the divine and the magical. In 
a sense, science has grown up. According to sociologist Niklas 
Luhmann, “[society] seeks to comprehend misfortune in the form 
of risk.  And no longer, for example, in the form of magic and 
witchcraft; and hardly any longer in the form of religion, having 
accepted a purely benevolent God and a devil who has forfeited 
his cosmological function if not his very existence.”101  We do not 
accept fate as causation.102  At least these views seem to be held 
by many of us in the West. 
Thoughts of risk occur earlier in our thinking than thoughts 
of doom, and for that reason, risk considerations are important 
for this article. Risk has an option or a choice built into it. There 
is no choice in doom. By the time we think of doom in a given 
situation, we have finished thinking of risk. It’s too late; risk has 
become reality. When it comes to thinking about catastrophic 
collapse, at least there is hope implicit in risk, whereas with 
doom there can be no hope. In that sense, risk is a positive. It 
represents a challenge, even an opportunity. 
Weighing risk is a way of analyzing our place and our 
situation in the world. To some degree, risk analysis is in the 
process of displacing religion in that regard. This change may or 
may not be desirable. There is nothing to stop us from relying on 
both. 
 
100. Consider, for example, the traditional Papal position on birth control 
and its functional irrelevance in light of the negative replacement birthrate in 
modern Italy. 
101. NIKLAS LUHMANN, RISK: A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY, at viii (Walter de 
Gruyter ed., Rhodes Barrett trans., 1993).  
102. British sociologist Anthony Giddens contends that the concepts of risk 
and fate are antithetical. When weighing risk, there is no divine influence, no 
magic, no active cosmic spirit. Fate and destiny may exist, but risk is dominant. 
See ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSEQUENCES OF MODERNITY 111 (1990).  
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A. How We Learn to Approach Risk as Individuals 
At the larger level society is interested in risk. In part, this is 
because we all know risk. It’s part of our normal development. As 
teenagers, we test boundaries. We take risks in order to learn 
about ourselves and the world around us. Taking risks is part of 
finding out what we are capable of doing.103 
Risk, experienced as part of the teen brain’s development, is 
hard-wired into every one of us.104  We are each bio-chemically 
“programmed” to seek risk as part of our development. As teens, 
we seek the new and the edge105 in order to get the thrill of 
anticipation and a reward of dopamine.106  We may desire risk in 
order to keep things interesting.107 
This choice is not so unusual. Keeping life interesting may 
ultimately be an object of concern. When it comes to teens, we 
may need to decide whether it is preferable to busy teens or to 
guide them. Either or both may be preferable to teens staying on 
autopilot. Accidents and death rates tell us that teens do not do a 
good job of selecting the risks to take.108 
On the other hand, once we become adults, our view changes 
as our frontal lobes have become connected to our brains.109  We 
become responsible, responsible for ourselves and then also for 
others. “To take unnecessary risks is commonly seen as foolhardy, 
 
103. See FRANCES E. JENSEN & AMY ELLIS NUTT, THE TEENAGE BRAIN: A 
NEUROSCIENTIST’S SURVIVAL GUIDE TO RAISING ADOLESCENTS AND YOUNG ADULTS 
103–04 (2015). 
104. See id.; BARBARA STRAUCH, THE PRIMAL TEEN: WHAT THE NEW 
DISCOVERIES ABOUT THE TEENAGE BRAIN TELL US ABOUT OUR KIDS 204 (2003). 
105. See STRAUCH, supra note 104, at 96–105. In our modern world, teens 
flirt with death as part of normal maturation. See id. at 188. Those adults who 
bungee jump or engage in other extreme sports have not stopped. See DEBORAH 
LUPTON, RISK 149–50 (1999).  
106. See JENSEN & NUTT, supra note 103, at 105–10. 
107. Overcoming risks can be a most positive experience. Whether bungee 
jumping or smoking cigarettes, engaging in risky behavior is often merely part 
of an escape from everyday life. We don’t want too much predictability, let alone 
boredom. LUPTON, supra note 103, at 149–51 (citing STANLEY COHEN & LAURIE 
TAYLOR, ESCAPE ATTEMPTS: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF RESISTANCE TO 
EVERYDAY LIFE 160 (2d rev. ed., 1992)). 
108. See Teenagers, INS. INST. FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY, HIGHWAY LOSS DATA 
INST. (2013), http://www.iihs.org/iihs/topics/t/teenagers/fatalityfacts/teenagers 
[http://perma.cc/59RB-R8L9]. 
109. See JENSEN & NUTT, supra note 103, at 37. 
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careless, irresponsible, and even ‘deviant’, evidence of an 
individual’s ignorance or lack of ability to regulate self.”110  Our 
view and our behavior tends to change for the significant risks we 
can sense. That is the adult side of risk. 
As we take the adult perspective, and we search, we find 
more and more risks. It would seem that humanity has an 
inherent tendency to run into problems involving risk. But we all 
take risks, and we think that risk taking is not inherently bad. 
We regard taking risks as an important part of human liberty. 
These are our risk assumptions. They color our risk 
perceptions. 
B. How We Perceive Risk 
Some risks are unacceptable—unacceptable to parents, to 
individuals, and to society as a whole. When risks are greater 
than what we’re used to, they get special treatment. At least they 
should. But when we don’t understand new risks, typically we 
find it difficult to know how to act. 
New technology, even if it is just new to one of us, makes this 
easy to see. A child touches a Glock for the first time. The risks 
are unknown. Squirt guns don’t kill family members. Imagine the 
child’s immediate confusion. This is risk. It seems strange, but it 
is within the realm of probability. 
Probability is not always straightforward. As Jason Daley 
points out in Discover Magazine, “our risk perception is often at 
direct odds with reality.”111  Consider the introduction of 
HIV/AIDS. This new disease meant that past behavior with 
certain risks, now has a new, much greater, risk. 
Such great risks have an impact. They cause an adjustment 
to our thinking, sometimes known as reflexivity.112  As 
 
110. LUPTON, supra note 105, at 148. 
111. Jason Daley, What You Don’t Know Can Kill You, DISCOVER: SCIENCE, 
TECHNOLOGY, AND THE FUTURE (Oct. 3, 2011), http://discovermagazine.com/ 
2011/jul-aug/11-what-you-dont-know-can-kill-you [http://perma.cc/69BR-PMZ5]. 
112. “Reflexivity means a response to conditions that arouse fear or anxiety 
that is active rather than passive. Reflexivity is a defining characteristic of all 
human action, involving the continual monitoring of action and its contexts.” 
LUPTON, supra note 105, at 15 (citing GIDDENS, supra note 102, at 36–37); see 
also BECK, supra note 19, at 78–79. 
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technology, science, and our environment change around us, we 
must be vigilant to know about and respond to the risks. 
Our social networks are critical.113  People learn about risk 
either over a lifetime of experiences or through their social 
networks.114  We like to feel safe with what we know. When we do 
not, we may feel that risks are beyond our control and therefore 
more a matter of fate. Social networks may relieve some of these 
feelings and help us gain a deeper understanding. 
Some people and situations, it seems, defy the odds; genetic 
predispositions can override a healthy diet; fate can override 
preventative action.115  Preventative action is not fail-safe. On 
occasion, even preventative action itself has been known to snare 
the risk-averse. 
Risks different from or greater than what we are used to can 
exist beyond our perceptions. It is very possible for there to be a 
lot more risk than what each of us has (or even all of us have) 
experienced (or even learned about) to date. 
Teenagers, because their brains are not fully developed, don’t 
always see the consequences of their actions. That part of the 
brain, known as the pre-frontal cortex has not yet developed or 
engaged.116  At the same time, as we will see, the risks facing all 
of us have increased. Our teens are not exempt from the 
increased risks of modern society. Their risks seem to be greater 
 
113. The genetic endowment of the individual human is unlikely to see 
modern risks as clearly as do connected and educated groups. Jason Daley 
provides support in Discover Magazine: 
Our hardwired gut reactions developed in a world full of hungry 
beasts and warring clans, where they served important functions. 
Letting the amygdala (part of the brain’s emotional core) take over 
at the first sign of danger, milliseconds before the neocortex (the 
thinking part of the brain) was aware a spear was headed for our 
chest was probably a very useful adaptation. Even today, those 
nano-pauses and gut responses save us from getting flattened by 
buses or dropping a brick on our toes. But in a world where risks are 
presented in parts-per-billion statistics or as clicks on a Geiger 
counter, our amygdala is out of its depth. 
Daley, supra note 111. 
114. See LUPTON, supra note 105, at 112. 
115. See id. at 111 (citing Charlie Davison et al., The Limits of Lifestyle: 
Reassessing ‘Fatalism’ in the Popular Culture of Illness Prevention, 34 SOC. SCI. 
& MED. 675 (1992)). 
116. See JENSEN & NUTT, supra note 103, at 107, 269–70. 
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than ever.117  In order to protect teens’ futures, parents 
sometimes need to step in—like a surrogate pre-frontal cortex—to 
provide a measure of foresight. 
In a sense, we are all still teenagers. As adults, we may still 
engage in that same risky behavior we learned earlier. Maybe we 
should listen to that little worry in the back of our mind, the one 
that says, “Slow down.” As with teenagers, not only are the risks 
greater, the environment is more challenging than what our 
forebears experienced. And just like teenagers, we may have 
some trouble seeing it. And it is more complicated than that. 
Seeing the problem, alone, is not enough. 
Science is taking us to new places on the roadmap of risk. If 
we are not flexible enough to modify our views of risk and our 
behavior, we may wind up like the teenager who failed to 
appreciate the risk of catching HIV/AIDS and what it meant. Our 
decision making must become more flexible, and we must become 
more aware of these new risks—and create social and legal 
structures and systems so that we are ready for even more. 
Anthony Giddens writes about risk and modernity. He describes a 
“risk culture” in which the potentially disastrous effects of risks 
are far more wide-reaching than in previous generations.118  
Millions stand to be affected by errors, whether the errors bring 
about economic collapse or a nuclear meltdown.119 
According to Giddens, the notion of risk moves through two 
stages. In the first stage, assessment of risk is seen as a means of 
promoting certainty, with the precision of risk calculations 
“bringing the future under control.”120  However, “[t]he second 
stage is where we are not able to precisely calculate risk, but 
rather develop ‘scenarios’ of risk with various degrees of 
plausibility. One example is global warming, subject [at that 
time] to expert dispute over whether or not it is happening and 
how serious its ramifications are.”121 
 
117. See id. at 104. 
118. Variations in risk perceptions may be cultural as much as they may be 
generational. 
119. ANTHONY GIDDENS, MODERNITY AND SELF-IDENTITY: SELF AND SOCIETY 
IN THE LATE MODERN AGE 4 (1991). 
120. Anthony Giddens, Living in a Post-traditional Society, in REFLEXIVE 
MODERNIZATION: POLITICS, TRADITION, AND AESTHETICS IN THE MODERN SOCIAL 
ORDER 56, 58 (1994). 
121. LUPTON, supra note 105, at 74. 
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There is growing doubt about the validity of knowledge, but 
overall we are not discussing or dealing with that doubt or its 
seriousness directly. As experts increasingly disagree about risks 
and lay people instead are forced to make their own imprecise 
assessments, “people have become increasingly cynical about the 
claims to progress offered by traditional modernity.”122  Cynicism, 
however, does not constitute action. And as “normal accidents” 
increase, we increasingly view government’s failure to provide 
adequate security as scandalous.123 
Our perceptions are critical. We must develop them well and 
with clarity as they shape our responses. Let us organize our 
responses according to our perceptions and our views. 
C. How We Respond to Risk 
There are many factors that contribute to both how we 
perceive and how we respond to risks. Lack of social autonomy, 
lack of autonomy in the workplace, and anxiety about job loss are 
among the factors that influence how we construct, view, and deal 
with risk.124  The choices or lack of choices we face when 
confronted with risk bear greatly on our state of mind and our 
behavior. People may respond habitually rather than rationally to 
the risks they see, by merely including a pattern of risk avoidance 
in their everyday lives.125  Our routine responses, however, may 
not constitute sufficient action when confronted with new risks. 
Consider some of our routine responses. 
 
122. Id. at 75. 
123. BECK, supra note 19, at 56 (citing CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL 
ACCIDENTS: LIVING WITH HIGH-RISK TECHNOLOGIES (1984)). An increase in 
normal accidents is consistent with the act of one painting backwards into a 
corner. Encounters with the wall become more common. 
“Normal accidents” is the name Charles Perrow (1984) gives in his 
book to this predictability with which what was considered 
impossible occurs – and the more emphatically it is denied, the 
sooner, more destructively and shockingly it occurs. In the chain of 
publicly revealed catastrophes, near-catastrophes, whitewashed 
security faults and scandals the technically centred claim to the 
control of governmental and industrial authority shatters – quite 
independently of the established measure of hazards: the number of 
dead, the danger of the contaminations, and so on.” 
Id.  
124. See LUPTON, supra note 105, at 116–17. 
125. See id. at 122. 
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For one, we often blame others. When portraying others as a 
risk, we have represented them as dirty, unhygienic, pathological, 
and contaminating (as vermin). This is what the Nazis did to the 
Jews, to justify extermination.126  The difference in our analysis 
of many of today’s risks is that there is no identifiable single 
source of blame.127  In many instances, as we shall see shortly, we 
have only our forebears and ourselves to blame.  However, blame 
is not productive. It is backward looking and does not contribute 
to problem solving.128 
We sometimes respond to risk with the paralysis of 
confusion, like deer before the headlights of doom.129  We might 
lack the political fortitude to face the risks, even the risks of 
extinction. Or we may simply be “just one person.” There may be 
many reasons—or mere excuses—for our paralysis. Ultimately, if 
there is a real risk, the cause of our inaction does not matter. 
It may help us to differentiate and distinguish danger from 
risk.130  Even after we recognize the risks131—or maybe more 
 
126. See id. at 130. 
127. However, we remain capable of scapegoating. Consider Americans’ 
post-9/11 response of blaming Muslims in general for terrorism. 
128. See Joseph Tainter, Competition, Expansion, and Reaction: The 
Foundations of Contemporary Conflict, in THE COMING AGE OF SCARCITY, supra 
note 45, at 174, 190.  
The identification of historical scapegoats too easily becomes an 
excuse for failures of contemporary action. Moreover, to the extent 
that European colonial expansion was made likely by previous 
events and processes, such as peer polity competition, the search for 
a scapegoat can always be shifted further back in time. A morally 
neutral approach to history must be adopted or else dialogue reduces 
to accusations and defensiveness. 
Id. It may be argued that even torturers may be forgiven. Glen Pettigrove, 
Hume on Forgiveness and the Unforgivable, 19 UTILITAS 447, 455–64 (2007). 
129. Craig A. Rimmerman, Critical Reflections on the Doomsday, 
Apocalyptic Vision, in THE COMING AGE OF SCARCITY, supra note 45, at 283, 293–
94.   
Those who worry that the doomsday perspective paralyzes citizens 
who might otherwise mobilize politically have a legitimate point. We 
should not forget that in the early 1980s the Brown University 
student body voted to have cyanide tablets in every student’s 
dormitory in case of a nuclear holocaust. Much was made at the time 
regarding the resignation, futility, and passivity associated with the 
Brown student body’s response. 
Id. 
130. One deduces a conflictual situation, risk “from a general definition of 
the dangers one wishes to prevent.” Robert Castel, From Dangerousness to Risk, 
31
DRAPER - FINAL 4/28/2016  1:47 PM 
188 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33 
precisely, the dangers inherent in an external situation—the 
omission of prevention can constitute a risk. The decision to take 
or not to take an action, in relation to a danger, can constitute a 
risk. According to sociologist Niklas Luhmann, risk is the 
consequence of decision, whereas danger is caused externally.132  
Some of those risks are manmade, based on decisions. And some 
of those risks are external to human choice, and those really are 
dangers. As dangers are interpreted, decision risks are created. 
We live in a world where mixtures of both risk and danger are 
plentiful. 
Risks can live on both sides of a decision involving a 
danger.133  As dangers are out of human control, a failure to 
respond can seem to be more politically safe than a response that 
turns out as failed or unnecessary. 
The risks of dealing with dangers pose a critical pair of 
questions (reliability and cost) for any risk analysis connected 
with collapse or extinction. Both the reliability of risk prevention 
and its cost must be considered. When it came to global warming, 
the George W. Bush administration decided that it would cost our 
economy too much to do anything about it.134  It did not appear to 
be a matter of reliability of prevention so much as cost. 
 
in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT: STUDIES IN GOVERNMENTALITY 281, 288 (Grahm 
Burchell et al. eds., 1991). 
131. See, e.g., DIRK PROSKE, CATALOGUE OF RISKS: NATURAL, TECHNICAL, 
SOCIAL AND HEALTH RISKS (2009), for a compilation and description of risk 
measures and their interdependence.  
132. See LUHMANN, supra note 101, at 21–22. 
133. Luhmann explains:  
Even if it is only a question of danger in the sense of natural 
disaster, the omission of prevention becomes a risk. It is apparently 
easier to distance oneself politically from dangers than from risks—
even where the probability of loss or the extent of loss is greater in 
the case of danger than in that of risk; and presumably also 
independently of the question (but this would require meticulous 
inquiry) of how reliable prevention in each case would be and what it 
would cost. 
Id. at 31. 
134. See Press Release, The White House, Press Briefing by Ari Fleischer 
(Mar. 28, 2001), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/briefings/ 
20010328.html [https://perma.cc/K5UM-KE6D]; see also Terry Barker & Paul 
Ekins, The Costs of Kyoto for the U.S. Economy, 25 ENERGY J. 53, 53 (2004); 
Charles Wilson, Global Warming Issue Still With Us, BULK TRANSPORTER (Aug. 
1, 2001), http://bulktransporter.com/archive/global-warming-issue-still-us 
[http://perma.cc/Z4Q9-JSL9]. 
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Let’s say you decide you cannot touch that third rail of risk, 
human extinction, and you say, “The risks are too great; I can’t 
get involved. I might make a mistake.” If your existence and your 
way of life are part of the foreseeable cause, there is an obligation 
to respond. A duty is imposed on the humanity who has driven 
and pushed risk out of control to get it back under control before 
catastrophe occurs.135  If that is impossible, we should at least 
minimize the impact. 
When it comes to evaluating collapse or even extinction, the 
concept of risk comes into play. The way we view risk makes a 
difference. Our view frames our response. 
Because perceptions of risk are influenced by our experiences 
and beliefs, assessments of and responses to risk are subjective. 
Yet some risks seem clear cut. When one looks at the risks posed 
by HIV/AIDS or guns, for example, there also seems to be a more 
objective side.136 
The possibility of human extinction may present an objective 
risk, but how we weigh that risk against other concerns depends 
on our perspective, and in that sense, the risk is subjective. It is 
based on the values we hold. 
An objective risk tends to lead us to examine cause and 
effect, scientific causation. When we examine for risks, we tend to 
look for some human intervention as playing a role, and 
sometimes we can track causation to our own behavior.137 
Some of that causation may be a side effect of our own 
technological achievements.138  According to cultural studies 
professor Nico Stehr and technology professor Gotthard 
Bechmann, “Technology and the concomitant awareness of 
capability has occupied nature’s territory, and both surmise and 
experience indicate that this can more easily prove destructive 
than constructive. The fear that things could go wrong is 
 
135. The nature and extent of duty to avoid catastrophe merits deeper 
consideration elsewhere. 
136. That objectivity has holes in it. First, some teenagers (or others) may 
not share adults’ view of objective risk. Secondly, over time, with HIV vaccines 
and gun locks or other technology, risks may change and the views held by 
adults may change. 
137. See generally TED STEINBERG, ACTS OF GOD: THE UNNATURAL HISTORY 
OF NATURAL DISASTER IN AMERICA (2d ed. 2006). 
138. Some causation can also come from ignoring the risks that we have 
created or enhanced. See id. 
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therefore growing rapidly and with it the risk apportioned to 
decision-making.”139  The knowledge that the choices others make 
can have a catastrophic impact on one’s life is unsettling and is 
growing as well.140  Subjectively, we know something is wrong. 
There are two competing approaches to the study of risk in 
the social sciences. One is quantitative, characterized by 
statistical modeling and cost-benefit analysis; the other is 
sociological, characterized by social views, trends and theories. 
The quantitative approach has been referred to as the “objective 
view of risk,” while the sociological approach has been labeled the 
“subjective view of risk.”141  Each attempts to inform social policy. 
How we respond to risk depends on our view. We have 
different views of risk. They fall into at least three main 
categories with the addition of an analysis of the moral view of 
risk, rooted in religion and philosophy. I am concerned with 
building a case against a purely objective view of risk. For the 
purposes of this argument, let us acknowledge but dispense with 
the subjective view. I will start with the objective view and then 
compare it to aspects of the moral view of risk. 
1. The “Objective” View of Risk 
The quantitative type of risk study, the objective view of risk, 
is also known as the technico-scientific approach to 
decisionmaking. It arises from the fields of engineering, statistics, 
actuarialism, psychology, epidemiology, and economics. Debates 
over risk in these fields tend to consider how well a risk has been 
identified or calculated (and to what level of confidence), the 
effects of the risk, the accuracy of the science that has been used 
to measure and calculate risk, and the degree to which predictive 
models are inclusive. 
These days, many in the fields of business, insurance, and 
economics favor the use of the term “uncertainty” over “risk” 
 
139. Nico Stehr & Gotthard Bechmann, Introduction, in NIKLAS LUHMANN, 
RISK: A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY, at xxxii (Rhodes Barrett trans., 2005). 
140. There has been a prompt legislative response to the twenty-first 
century’s most visible cause of this unsettling feeling. The USA Patriot Act, Pub. 
L. No. 107-56, 84 Stat. 1116 (2001), was passed only six weeks after 9/11. And 
the depth of that unsettled feeling, in part, then permitted the pursuit of two 
wars—and yet more unsettled feelings. 
141. See LUPTON, supra note 105, at 19. 
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when considering potential catastrophes. They take the view, 
developed by economist Frank Knight,142 that uncertainty has 
unknown probabilities, but with risk, the probabilities are known. 
Clearly, when it comes to risk of human extinction or collapse, the 
probabilities are unknown.143  Hopefully, they will never become 
known. 
For the purposes of this discussion I will instead use the 
term, “risk,”144 which is widely used in numerous fields, including 
law145 and sociology,146 when the probabilities are unknown. 
When one talks about extinction or collapse, risk makes more 
sense intuitively. It lies somewhere between common notions of 
uncertainty and danger. “Uncertainty” does not begin to convey 
the seriousness of the issue at hand.147  Yet “danger” conveys a 
sense of alarm148 that some people may not accept. “Risk” it is. 
One “objective” method of quantitatively measuring and 
calculating risk is unrestricted cost-benefit analysis (CBA). CBA 
is a decision procedure;149 each implementation weighs and 
compares costs and benefits anew. An estimate of relative 
probability may operate between the costs and the benefits. 
Ultimately, CBA’s design, inter alia, maximizes property rights 
and consequent liberty. 
There are different methods to calculate the “cost” side just 
as there are different methods to arrive at the “benefit” side of the 
 
142. See FRANK KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (1921). 
143. Huge risks with a small probability of coming about can nevertheless 
occur with more frequency than is statistically probable. Daniel A. Farber, 
Probabilities Behaving Badly: Complexity Theory and Environmental 
Uncertainty, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 145, 145–47 (2003). Farber’s arguments add 
credibility to arguments for precaution. 
144. “In everyday language the term ‘risk’ is understood as a pseudonym 
for danger or peril, for some unhappy event which may happen to someone; it 
designates an objective threat.” François Ewald, Insurance and Risk, in THE 
FOUCAULT EFFECT, supra note 130, at 197, 199. 
145. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 
(2004). 
146. See, e.g., BECK, supra note 19; LUHMANN, supra note 101; LUPTON, 
supra note 105. 
147. Some in economics would insist that the term is “uncertainty” in any 
event. 
148. What’s more, danger is outside of human control, whereas risk is 
within human control. 
149. See, e.g., MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF 
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 12, 62–100 (2006). 
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analysis. Some risk measures of costs, as with environmental 
regulations, are done by calculating the number of lives saved. 
Costs can also be calculated as the value, within a single life, of 
the number of years (containing measures of the quality of those 
years) that have been or will be lost or placed at risk. 
Much has been written on the use of cost-benefit analysis to 
solve issues of catastrophic risk. For Judge Richard A. Posner,150 
cost-benefit analysis is indispensable in any rational decision-
making process related to catastrophic risk.151  Since President 
Reagan’s Executive Order 12,291,152 cost-benefit analysis has 
been the manner in which executive agencies of the United States 
government measure the extent and effect of potential 
regulations.153  Cost-benefit analysis continues as the risk 
management tool of the U.S. government.154 
However, theorists of the objective view of risk are moving 
away from CBA, toward well-being analysis (WBA). The failings 
of CBA are well documented—and CBA is scathingly rebuked—
by law professor Lisa Heinzerling and economist Frank 
Ackerman in their fine 2004 work Priceless: On Knowing the Price 
of Everything and the Value of Nothing. University of Chicago law 
professor Jonathan Masur, a one-time proponent of CBA, and his 
co-authors have more recently accepted Heinzerling and 
Ackerman’s position that CBA should no longer be used as a 
decision procedure.155  Instead, Masur and co-authors recommend 
that decisions be made by use of WBA.156 
 
150. Judge Posner sits on the Seventh Circuit of the United States Court of 
Appeals. 
151. See POSNER, supra note 145, at 139. However, Posner’s work has been 
severely criticized. See Pat O’Malley, Catastrophe: Risk and Response, by 
Richard A. Posner, 4 L., PROBABILITY & RISK 187, 187–89 (2005) (book review). 
152. Cost-benefit analysis was adopted as an overriding element of 
regulation, wherever not forbidden by statute. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 
C.F.R. § 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1988) (revoked 1994); Elena 
Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2277–78 (2001). 
153. ADLER & POSNER, supra note 149, at 3–4. 
154. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011). 
155. John Bronsteen, Christopher J. Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, 
Well-Being Analysis vs. Cost-Benefit Analysis, 62 DUKE L.J. 1603, 1689 (2013). 
But see Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Unquantified Benefits and 
Bayesian Cost-Benefit Analysis (Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Working 
Paper No. 730, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2646063 [https://perma.cc/PJU4-
PGYP]. 
156. Bronsteen, Buccafusco, & Masur, supra note 155, at 1615. 
36http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol33/iss2/2
DRAPER - FINAL 4/28/2016  1:47 PM 
2016] NEO-CLASSICAL ECONOMICS 193 
After examining unrestricted cost-benefit analysis and its 
temporal tool, discounting, I will conclude coverage of the 
objective view of risk with a few thoughts on WBA. 
a. Unrestricted Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Economists use cost-benefit analysis as a decision-making 
tool. CBA’s methodology was originally developed as a decision-
making tool for flood management.157  More recently, CBA has 
been used for the same thing in the Netherlands.158  Unrestricted 
CBA159 simply weighs both sides, the cost and the benefit, to help 
governments and businesses make “more efficient” decisions. 
In the business world, CBA holds tremendous appeal; 
efficiency is a good thing. CBA helps businesses make efficient 
decisions that in turn help maximize profits.160  Of course, 
humanity needs business decision-making and at least some 
efficiency to continue. We need our markets to be able to handle 
the trillions of decisions and adjustments in a much more 
efficient manner than that provided by any other model. CBA 
works easily in the market context as it focuses on market 
efficiency and wealth maximization. 
 
157. See JULES DUPUIT, ÉTUDES THÉORIQUES ET PRATIQUES SUR LE 
MOUVEMENT DES EAUX COURANTES: SUIVIES DE CONSIDÉRATIONS RELATIVES AU 
RÉGIME DES GRANDES EAUX, AU DÉBOUCHÉ À LEUR DONNER, ET À LA MARCHE DES 
ALLUVIONS DANS LES RIVIÈRES A FOND MOBILE [STUDIES ON FLOOD MANAGEMENT] 
(1848). Costs of flood control were weighed against the savings with a calculated 
probability of the risk of flood. 
158. David Wolman, Turning the Tides, WIRED, Jan. 2009, at 108, 111. 
Employing the Dutch approach to flood risk analysis, with measurement of 
potential cost of damage helping to determine the amount of protection afforded 
by government action, might violate the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 113. Consider 
the need for equal protection under the law. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
Ultimately, humanity must protect equality and fundamental rights. 
159. Uses of CBA and unrestricted CBA are interchangeable here. Law or 
regulation could impose restrictions on CBA. Instead, CBA is used to restrict or 
limit regulation. 
160. There are two reasons why the entrepreneur is expected to maximize 
profits. One is the evolutionary expectation connected to survival in a 
competitive world; the other involves preferences in the institutional and social 
role of the entrepreneur in the market. Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca, A Preference for 
Selfish Preferences: The Problem of Motivations in Rational Choice Political 
Science, 38 PHIL. SOC. SCI. 361, 365 (2008) (citing A.A. Alchian, Uncertainty, 
Evolution, and Economic Theory, 58 J. POL. ECON. 211 (1950)). The concept of 
profits need not be static; profits can come in many forms. 
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Implicit in CBA is an expression of human preference.161  
CBA considers preference, generally calculated in terms of dollars 
or other unitary metric.162  All human interests, in the eyes of 
those using CBA, may be measured by a common standard, and 
between any two competing interests some quantitative rate of 
exchange can be determined that enables the rational balancing 
of one against the other.163 
i. Three Immediate Problems with CBA 
This sounds straightforward, but CBA has three 
complications worthy of immediate note. By visiting them, we will 
see better the functions and limits of CBA. After that, I will 
review the arguments in favor of the decision procedure. The 
three complications are externalities, the property right in CBA, 
and the problem implicit in CBA’s governmental application. 
a) Externalities 
The notion of externalities relates to preferences in CBA. 
Some things don’t get calculated into costs and benefits when 
employing CBA.164 These additional factors, known as 
externalities in the neoclassical model of economic theory, have 
no direct cost to the entity making the decision (business or 
 
161. ADLER & POSNER, supra note 149, at 12. 
162. Id. at 13; Keating, supra note 20, at 677. 
163. This goes way back, certainly to Nicholas Kaldor’s early efforts in 
welfare economics where income aggregation and distribution was the subject of 
the work. See, e.g., Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and 
Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549, 550–51 (1939). It may go 
back to Bismarck’s economists in late nineteenth-century Germany. 
Risk can work to have considerations of life and death on both sides of a cost-
benefit equation. However, financial considerations tend to be more common. 
The notion of cost is most commonly expressed in financial terms. Thus, 
currency tends to be the unitary metric. 
 When multiple risks are involved, the matter of “risk-risk tradeoffs” arises. 
See RISK VS. RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
(John Graham & Jonathan Weiner eds., 1995), for a more economic analysis of 
this phenomenon. 
164. Costs are weighed against benefits. Probability is factored in, and 
assumptions are made based on those costs and benefits. Inevitably, some 
factors go unmeasured, beyond the realm of consideration. Those are 
externalities. In neo-classical economic theory, costs and benefits do not capture 
them. They may not fit the model, or they may be too difficult to calculate. 
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otherwise), but they do have a cost to others or to society as a 
whole. We can thank economist A.C. Pigou for making the 
concept of externalities part of economic jargon. He viewed them 
largely as market failures.165 
Externalities are side-effects. When we try to fix each with a 
band-aid, it’s like playing whack-a-mole. As side effects ripple 
outward from an event, and in places compound and multiply, we 
are likely to find that chasing externalities is an endless and 
frustrating task.166 
Let’s define externalities. An externality is an imposition of 
harm, cost, or even something positive, that is external to the 
calculations used at the source. Pollution is an easy example. 
Unless the polluter pays for all damage and its consequences 
(some of which may not yet be known), at least some costs would 
be external to the polluter’s activity. 
b) CBA’s Property Right 
Secondly, there is a property right, a fundamental right, 
implicit in CBA. According to economist Harold Demsetz, the 
right of property includes “the right to benefit or harm oneself or 
others.”167  With harms to others, we encounter a problem with 
the economic view: There is an imposition rather than 
cooperation, and that imposition can constitute a negative impact 
on any of our fundamental rights, including life itself. We need to 
think with care when we use our property.168 
 
165. Carl Circo, Does Sustainability Require a New Theory of Property 
Rights? 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 91, 116 (2009) (citing STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS 
OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 108 (2004)). 
166. As Ronald Coase notes, “[I]f I am right, current economic analysis is 
incapable of handling many of the problems to which it purports to give 
answers.” RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 15 (1988) 
(noting that The Problem of Social Cost has not had immense influence on the 
field of economics though he believes, in time, it will). Contrary to conventional 
wisdom, Coase did not call for the internalization of externalities. Pierre Schlag, 
Coase Minus the Coase Theorem—Some Problems with Chicago Transaction 
Cost Analysis, 99 IOWA L. REV. 175, 185 (2013). 
167. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. 
REV. 347, 347 (1967). Demsetz’s theory of economics supports the violation of 
law as long as it is done in the name of maximizing profits. Beware. If anyone is 
above the law, their self-interest could harm the health and safety of all. 
168. Property systems are not oriented toward careful thought. They are 
already quite well established and integrated with economic systems. Law 
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The big problem arises with the implementation of those 
principles, those property rights, when their cumulative 
impositions and consequent risks pose a significant and 
foreseeable risk to statistical lives, or even to all life. When the 
externalities inherent in our economic system (e.g., too much CO2 
based on the imposition of property rights) pose a significant and 
foreseeable risk to the human community, it’s time to reconsider 
our priorities. We can justify this especially for high cost risks.169  
Maybe the issue is how a sound system of life, liberty, and 
property should consider and develop rules to address 
externalities. We shall see. Externalities are part of CBA, and our 
property regime helps enhance them.170 
c) Regulatory Application of CBA 
Finally, we encounter the problem implicit in the 
governmental application of CBA: CBA is used to regulate 
against risks to life, liberty, and property. As the use of CBA is a 
 
professor Carl Circo says Demsetz believed that property must be governed by 
economic principles and community preferences for private ownership: 
“Whatever the property regime, however, he argued that basic economic 
considerations dictate that ‘the emergence of new private or state-owned 
property rights will be in response to changes in technology and relative prices.’” 
Circo, supra note 165, at 118 (quoting Demsetz, supra note 167, at 350). There is 
nothing wrong with Demsetz’s analysis per se, but humanity may also need to 
change its systems of ownership and use in response to catastrophic risk. 
169. Demsetz does not limit himself to a competitive perspective. 
[I]n a much later piece, Demsetz concluded that “communal rights 
are the more efficient social arrangement under some 
circumstances.” Similarly, Robert Ellickson has shown that some 
forms of group ownership of land can be more efficient than 
individual ownership, especially within a close-knit group, for 
certain limited purposes, such as establishing the most efficient land 
boundaries for a particular land use or to spread risks efficiently in 
certain situations involving high-cost risks. 
Circo, supra note 165, at 118 (quoting Harold Demsetz, Frischmann’s View of 
“Toward a Theory of Property Rights,” 4 REV. OF L. & ECON. 127, 130 (2008); 
citing Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1332–35, 
1341–44 (1993)). 
170. Using Demsetz’s approach of internalization via the allocation of 
property rights is not the only means by which externalities may be 
internalized. And in some cases it may not be the most effective. Civil liability, 
regulation, and criminal sanctions are other means to battle externalities. Each 
can limit only certain externalities and can function only as a band-aid applied 
to reduce the effect rather than to get at the cause. 
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norm in governmental risk analysis,171 we cannot talk about the 
way governments address risk without addressing CBA. In the 
interest of efficiency, costs attributable to regulation are carefully 
examined and minimized by advocates and regulators. According 
to philosopher John Rawls, CBA assumes “that all human 
interests are commensurable, and that between any two, there 
always exists some rate of exchange in terms of which it is 
rational to balance the protection of one against the protection of 
the other.”172  Regulations and protection, the benefits, cannot be 
justified using CBA without calculating and considering the costs. 
However, when costs of regulation exceed its benefits there is 
an efficiency problem. According to law professor Gregory 
Keating, “[e]conomic theory is deeply critical of pressing 
precaution beyond the point of cost-justification.” To press 
precaution beyond the point of maximum efficiency is regarded as 
irrational. We are all better off with more dollars and fewer 
precautions. Additional precaution makes us worse off. “Our 
welfare could be improved by retreating back to the point of cost-
justified precaution and by putting the money saved to better use 
elsewhere.”173  This fiscal limitation is imposed on, for example, 
environmental regulations. The U.S. government’s 
implementation of CBA is part and parcel of the regulatory 
system for risk and appears to cross nearly all administrative 
boundaries.174 
Unfortunately, CBA is not designed to regulate risk. It 
cannot measure all risk; it misses externalities. CBA captures the 
financial part of the equation and is part of decision-making. But 
CBA is designed—and used—to maximize efficiency and thus to 
help maximize profits—which maximizes impact. In this way 
 
171. See Sunstein, supra note 14, at 168–78 (demonstrating government 
use of CBA through thirty-six stylized scenarios), for a nice description of 
regulatory implementation of CBA. 
172. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 312 (rev. ed. 1996). 
173. Keating, supra note 20, at 659. Keating notes that it is fundamental to 
the economic analysis of risk that taking more than cost-justified precaution is 
wasteful and irrational. Id. at 659 n.19 (citing LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN 
SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 52 (2002); THOMAS C. SCHELLING, CHOICE 
AND CONSEQUENCE 17 (1984); Herman B. Leonard & Richard J. Zeckhauser, 
Cost-Benefit Analysis Applied to Risks: Its Philosophy and Legitimacy, in 
VALUES AT RISK 31, 35 (Douglas MacClean ed., 1986)).  
174. However, CBA is not used for at least some decisions involving the 
U.S. military. 
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CBA adds to risk, especially when replicated in billions of 
decisions. 
University of Chicago’s Jonathan Masur and Eric Posner, 
recent proponents of CBA, are correct to recognize that CBA is an 
inappropriate tool for certain kinds of decision-making, especially 
political decisions.175  However, politics is often about money,176 
and we have built that translation into our regulatory system 
through the use of CBA, which encourages maximum gain. 
Unfortunately, in certain regulatory contexts CBA is used as a 
politically-palatable substitute for morality, but even then it’s 
still largely about the money. 
In CBA, we encounter numerous problems and 
inconsistencies with valuation. Consider the crafting of 
environmental regulations, which, according to Frank Ackerman 
and Lisa Heinzerling, “has almost always involved consideration 
of economic costs, with or without formal cost-benefit techniques. 
What is unique to cost-benefit analysis, and far more 
problematic,” they argue, “is the other side of the balance, the 
monetary valuation of the benefits of life, health, and nature 
itself.”177  Typically, we do not value these gifts, these ends, in 
dollar terms, but economists do. As a result, we have a limited 
view of our economic benefits in which “analysts often ignore the 
distinction between valuing risk and valuing life, and act as 
though they have produced a valuation of life itself.”178  Our first 
valuation problem is that our view of the benefits of regulation 
has been too limited.179 
 
175. “Cost-benefit analysis cannot cope with inherently political questions 
involving contested normative issues. . . such as abortion, affirmative action, 
and religious accommodation.” Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Climate 
Regulation and the Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1557, 1563 
(2011). These political and policy decisions are not fit for regulatory agencies: 
“Instead of looking to cost-benefit analysis to resolve political questions, in 
certain cases, policymakers must instead make political judgments.” Id. 
176. “[I]n a capitalist society such as the United States a connection 
between money and political power is inevitable.” MICHAEL L. MEZEY, 
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY: LEGISLATORS AND THEIR CONSTITUENTS 191 (2008). 
177. Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 16, at 1557. 
178. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 15, at 68. 
179. An effort to expand the view of benefits should not require us to guess 
at their value. In deference to current law, recent work by Masur and Posner 
claims that it is better to just “guess” at the values of unquantified benefits than 
to try to calculate the unquantifiable. Masur & Posner, supra note 155, at 44. 
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If life, health, or nature receive an artificially low value, less 
regulation and less protection is justified. As life, health, and the 
environment have no natural prices, we need to consider how 
artificial valuations are calculated. Contingent valuation surveys 
represent a kind of opinion poll in which researchers survey a 
cross-section of the affected population for how much, 
hypothetically, they would be willing to pay to preserve or protect 
something that can’t be bought in a store.180  These surveys are 
used to produce prices for things that appear to be priceless: “For 
example, the average American household is supposedly willing 
to pay $257 to prevent the extinction of bald eagles, $208 to 
protect humpback whales, and $80 to protect gray wolves. These 
numbers are quite large[,] since there are about 100 million 
households in the country . . . .”181  We’ll return to regulation. For 
now, let’s stick with pricing. 
ii. Pricing 
One problem with the contingent valuation survey is in the 
manner of survey and tabulation itself. Responses that deviate 
from a range are tossed out, as are responses of protest. “[P]rotest 
rates of 50 percent or more are common.”182  Protests may speak 
to the impropriety of pricing the priceless, but economists 
overcome protests by disregarding them entirely. The result is 
precise data that is blindly inaccurate. 
Another approach to pricing the unpriced offered by 
Ackerman and Heinzerling, “infers what people are willing to pay 
from observation of their behavior in other markets. To assign a 
dollar value to risks to human life, for example, economists 
usually calculate the extra wage—or “wage premium”—that is 
paid to workers who accept riskier jobs.”183 Pay differential for 
the riskier job is used to price the employee’s value of his or her 
 
180. Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 16, at 1557–58. 
181. Id. at 1558. 
182. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 15, at 164 (citing ROBERT C. 
MITCHELL & R.T. CARSON, USING SURVEYS TO VALUE PUBLIC GOODS 34 (1989)). 
According to Ackerman and Heinzerling, “Dismissing these responses creates a 
danger that valuations of health and nature will reflect an ad hoc process of 
censorship by economists, not a true cross-section of popular attitudes.” Id. 
183. Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 16, at 1558. 
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own life.184  By this approach, a life was worth about $6.3 million 
in the year 2000185 and from $7 to $9.1 million in 2013.186 
The value, or price if you will, varies by calculator and by 
geographic location.187  It is not necessarily an average; the 
elderly may be devalued.188  Prospective value may also vary by 
the circumstances of death,189 but, prospectively, the value of a 
 
184. Such wage-risk analysis, although widely accepted, is flawed due to an 
asymmetry of risk information, limited occupational choices, race 
discrimination, and differential values of women and the population outside the 
workforce. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 15, at 76–80. 
185. Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 16, at 1558, 1584 n.20. 
Philosopher John Broome points out the inherent problem with this 
measurement: “[N]o finite amount of money could compensate a person for the 
loss of his life, simply because money is no good to him when he is dead.” John 
Broome, Trying to Value a Life, 9 J. PUB. ECON. 91, 92 (1978). 
186. Sunstein, supra note 14, at 181–82. More recent estimates of value are 
in line with this: “[A] reasonable middle ground between infinity and lifetime 
earning” produces a recent VSL of about $9 million. W. Kip Viscusi, Pricing 
Lives for Corporate and Governmental Risk Decisions, 6 J. BENEFIT-COST 
ANALYSIS 227, 244 (2015). 
187. “In 2008 the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency valued a generic 
American life at $7.22 million, while the Department of Transportation uses a 
figure of $5.8-million.” Differences in value vary greatly. When evaluating the 
cost of lives saved in the prevention of HIV in Africa, the nonprofit group 
Population Services International “calculated a cost of $200 to $700 per infection 
avoided. Bear in mind: In countries where antiretroviral drugs are not available, 
an infection prevented is likely to be a life saved.” Peter Singer, America’s 
Shame, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 13, 2009, at B6, B8–B9, 
http://chronicle.com/article/America-s-Shame/30309 [https://perma.cc/V65X-
7D6L]. 
188. “[I]n 2002, [the U.S. Office of Management and Budget]—for the first 
time ever—put its official stamp of approval on [the conclusion that a seventy-
five-year-old is not worth as much as a forty-year-old] when it estimated that 
people age seventy and older were worth about sixty-three cents on the dollar 
compared to younger people.” ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 15, at 74 
(citing OFFICE OF AIR & RADIATION, EPA, EPA 420-R-02-022, FINAL REGULATORY 
SUPPORT DOCUMENT: CONTROL OF EMISSIONS FROM UNREGULATED NONROAD 
ENGINES, Ch. 10 (2002)). But that’s not the end of the injustice. “The money that 
would have been spent protecting the elderly doesn’t go to protecting the young; 
it stays in the pockets of the people who are endangering the lives of the 
elderly.” Id. at 75.  
189. “[E]qual risks of death may not look equally bad. . . . [E]ven for an 
ultimate value such as life and death, the social context is decisive in our 
evaluation of risks.” Id. at 71 (citing E. J. MISHAN, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: AN 
INFORMAL INTRODUCTION (4th ed. 1988)). 
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life, even if it is just a statistical life, cannot be valued by 
expected future earnings. People won’t stand for it.190 
The value of a statistical life (VSL) is essential to calculate 
the costs and benefits of environmental regulations. Avoided 
deaths are the basis (the benefit) for implementing many such 
regulations. Since the government uses VSL, Kip Viscusi 
advocates that corporations use VSL as a shield, even a safe 
harbor, in decision-making where risk involves the loss of lives.191  
This could immunize corporations from punitive damage 
awards.192 
Let’s not overlook the ex post use of VSL. Value is important 
after loss as part of corrective justice in tort law.193 
Even with a complex system for measuring and valuing risks, 
it may be preferable to avoid strict quantitative analysis and find 
an easier approach that does not rely on explicit valuations, 
valuations of costs or life, health and the environment. There is, 
says Richard Posner, “an argument for ranking risks by their 
expected costs and deliberately disregarding the lowest ranked 
ones.”194  He notes other ways of ranking risks, including “an 
argument for giving attention disproportionate from expected-
costs to those risks that are easier to think about because their 
probability of materializing is greater, or (a related point) because 
they have materialized in the past and so we have actual 
experience with them—we don’t have to imagine them.”195  Thus, 
we are not tied to using measures of the value of life, health and 
nature, especially the lowest ones, which would result in the 
greatest “efficiency” and put us at greater risk. However, 
 
190. “A price list with different values for different lives is difficult to 
reconcile with ideals of democracy and equal treatment under the law, let alone 
the sacredness of every human being.” Id. at 72. 
191. Viscusi, supra note 186, at 242. 
192. See id. 
193. A tort is an injury to person or property. Let’s assume that there are 
regulations that protect life, and that some tortfeasor violates those regulations. 
The law of torts is invoked, and corrective justice steps in. “Corrective justice . . . 
seeks to correct the wrong done to the victim by imposing a comparable evil on 
the tortfeasor.” Carsten Gerner-Beuerle, Calabresi, Posner, and Some Common 
Areas of Confusion: The Value of Life in Law and Economics 3 (Feb. 17, 2009), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1345583 [https://perma.cc/J6MJ-STBR]. 
194. POSNER, supra note 145, at 121. 
195. Id.  
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arguments in favor of maximizing economic efficiency196 have 
been winning the day for decades.197  We are deeply in ecological 
debt, and there is no easy way out. 
iii. Arguments for CBA 
Let us review the arguments in favor of CBA. Over the years, 
there have been a number of them. The arguments tend to fall 
into two broad categories. First, there are economic assertions 
that better results can be achieved through the use of cost-benefit 
analysis. Secondly, there is the transparency argument, those 
legal and political claims that a more objective and open 
government process will come from this kind of analysis.198 
We get better results from CBA through efficiency as 
efficiency is good.199  When efficiency is maximized, profits are 
maximized. When the government minimizes regulatory costs, 
the free market is allowed to boom. Efficiency is the lure.200 
In order to measure most accurately the costs and the 
benefits and arrive at the most efficient result, everything has to 
be placed in dollar terms, even life and health. With life and 
 
196. Ultimately, scientifically, humanity is truly more efficient if it uses 
less. Efficiency in science and efficiency in economics may not have quite the 
same meanings. Currently, the notion of maximizing efficiency in economics 
translates into wringing out every possible dollar in benefit. 
197. “The objective of society is to maximize economic efficiency and thus 
social welfare.” SIMON REICH, THE FRUITS OF FASCISM: POSTWAR PROSPERITY IN 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 32 (1990). Along the same lines, Milton Friedman’s 
view that corporations have an obligation to maximize profits (and thus 
economic efficiency) won a sweeping victory in the 1980s. Leo E. Strine Jr., 
Human Freedom and Two Friedmen: Musings on the Implications of 
Globalization for the Effective Regulation of Corporate Behavior, 58 U. TORONTO 
L.J. 241, 259–62 (2008). 
198. Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 16, at 1560. 
199. “To the economist, the observation that efficiency is good is 
tautological because economics defines efficiency as the course of action that 
maximizes what human behavior recognizes as good.” Circo, supra note 165, at 
125. 
200. Ackerman and Heinzerling explain the lure: “Cost-benefit analysis 
supposedly furthers efficiency by ensuring that regulations are only adopted 
when benefits exceed costs and by helping direct regulators’ attention to those 
problems for which regulatory intervention will yield the greatest net benefits.” 
Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 16, at 1560. 
46http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol33/iss2/2
DRAPER - FINAL 4/28/2016  1:47 PM 
2016] NEO-CLASSICAL ECONOMICS 203 
health on the line, dollars are measured as a substitute for risk 
assessment.201 
Add to this a history of special interest groups—or their 
economists, attorneys, and other lobbyists—appearing before 
congressional committees, commenting on proposed regulations, 
or posting information on their web sites bemoaning their high 
costs, the extravagant costs, of regulation. They push hard; they 
lobby for more favorable numbers and less regulation. They 
manipulate CBA to get their desired results, and they argue that 
the government’s use of it is inaccurate. The notion that the 
current system produces rules that are terribly expensive and 
that better economic analysis would protect us from this harmful 
result remains one of the persistent arguments offered in favor of 
CBA.202  Economists present CBA as a kind of moral 
imperative.203  For them, the notion of better economic analysis 
means more precise CBA rather than consideration of other 
regulatory schemes. 
Proponents argue that CBA leads to more open and objective 
government decision-making. Ackerman and Heinzerling explain 
that agency decision-making based on objective standards is “the 
holy grail of administrative law. . . . The idea is to prevent an 
agency from either making arbitrary decisions or, more 
invidiously, from benefiting politically-favored groups through its 
decisions. Cost-benefit analysis has been offered as a means of 
constraining agency discretion in this way.”204 
CBA seems objective, but using it for regulatory decisions can 
lead to bizarre and risky results. We will see the exercise of 
subjective choice and discretion in what is arguably an objective 
 
201. Gregory Keating describes the implementation: “‘Cost-benefit’ analysis 
requires risks to be reduced to the point where the costs of further precautions 
exceed their benefits. If the marginal costs of eliminating significant risks 
exceed the marginal benefits, significant risks will continue to exist.” Keating, 
supra note 20, at 684–85. 
202. Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 16, at 1560–61. “One widely cited 
study claims that the cost of life-saving interventions can reach as high as $99 
billion for every life-year saved.” Id. at 1561 (citing Tammy O. Tengs et al., Five-
Hundred Life-Saving Interventions and Their Cost-Effectiveness, 15 RISK 
ANALYSIS 369, 377 app. A (1995)). 
203. If CBA is a moral imperative for conservative economists, how come 
CBA has not been applied by those economists to missile defense systems? See 
ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 15, at 216–18. 
204. Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 16, at 1562. 
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approach to decision-making. We will return to CBA after an 
introduction to discounting. 
b. Introduction to Discounting and Valuation of 
the Future 
Because we value something differently now than we do in 
the future, we use discounting. It is the flip side of earning 
interest in a savings account.205  With that savings account, the 
bank pays you interest for saving. Your balance accrues the 
interest and amounts to more later.206  In economics, that 
interest represents something called the “time value of money.” 
Discounting is another way to implement the time value of 
money. Instead of getting paid interest, one receives less up front. 
One gets less by taking her money now as opposed to later (when 
it would include interest). For example, with the lottery, the 
winner can take the smaller lump sum now or a larger amount 
spread over time. When we apply discounting, we are saying that 
something is worth less to us tomorrow than it is today. We 
prefer to have things now.207 
Discounting is necessary in CBA (as most everything is 
reduced to the dollar). Some benefits are not immediate, and 
some costs do not accrue immediately. When, in the course of 
conducting cost-benefit analysis, future benefits or future costs 
are encountered, a discount rate is employed. According to 
 
205. “Discounting is just compound interest in reverse.” ACKERMAN & 
HEINZERLING, supra note 15, at 182. 
206. Certainly, with inflation, that amount would need to be greater later. 
However, adding an inflation rate and a real interest rate in order to take 
inflation into account only complicates the thinking and generally changes 
nothing in the outcome. Unfortunately, the psychology of inflation (the looming 
nature of price increases) serves to increase consumption. 
207. A preference for immediate gratification is implicit in the weighing 
process of discounting. How would Ben Franklin view this? 
Ben Franklin was a person who believed in sensible habits, in 
frugality, in moderation, in discipline. Sometimes he has been 
mocked for his attitudes, but on the whole we think it is fair to say 
that his mindset was one that many people, at least in principle, 
would still find admirable today. Yet discounting discourages all of 
the habits of mind and behavior that Franklin embraced. 
ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 15, at 202. Franklin’s frugality, 
moderation, discipline, and moral weighing are a far cry from the public 
impatience and empty precision of the mechanics of discounting. 
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William R. Cline, senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for 
International Economics, “[c]onventional discounting, even with 
low discount rates, makes present day values of benefits to be 
received far in the future vanishingly small. The reason why we 
discount the value of expected future benefits is that people tend 
to prefer consumption sooner rather than later.”208  Cline 
observes that, when asked to choose between getting $100 today 
or $100 in a year’s time, most of us prefer $100 now: “When 
people save money they forestall consumption today. Generally, 
they are only willing to do that because the savings can be 
invested to yield an interest premium that ensures future 
consumption will be larger.”209  Discounting encourages 
consumption. 
At a basic level, there are two kinds of discounting: financial 
discounting and risk discounting. Financial discounting is dollars 
for dollars. Financial discounting pertains to investment return 
decisions, but financial discounting is purely financial—at least 
until it is applied to something priceless, like life or liberty. 
The second kind of discounting, risk discounting, takes many 
forms, including gambling, destabilizing speculation, and 
stabilizing insurance. Risk discounting includes decisions to risk 
something more precious than money or property. Discounting in 
the area of the fundamental rights210 of life and liberty carries 
special significance. That significance is highlighted in the area of 
life and health, where we encounter the characteristic of 
irreversibility. The meaning may be expressed with the term 
incommensurability, which we will consider shortly. 
The discount rates used by neo-classical economists tend to 
be based on consumption preferences, preferences in favor of 
consumption based upon principles of financial discounting. The 
more we consume, the better. The converse is the less we save, 
the better. In that sense, discounting de-emphasizes the future. It 
provides a justification for us to use, to consume, and to destroy 
 
208. William R. Cline, Meeting the Challenge of Global Warming, in HOW 
TO SPEND $50 BILLION TO MAKE THE WORLD A BETTER PLACE 1, 5 (Bjorn Lomborg 
ed., 2006). 
209. Id. 
210. Fundamental rights are, in a basic Constitutional sense, the rights to 
life, liberty and property granted under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the U.S. Constitution. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.7 (8th ed. 2010). 
49
DRAPER - FINAL 4/28/2016  1:47 PM 
206 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33 
today. Whatever it is, it’s worth less tomorrow. This is the way 
discounting works with CBA—and with risk. 
i. Governmental Discounting 
When discounting is applied to governmental policy, 
especially risk analysis, humanity’s future may be similarly de-
emphasized.211  Richard Posner contends that, “[t]he effect of 
discounting on cost-benefit analyses of responses to catastrophic 
risks tends to be dramatic because the benefits of the responses 
are likely to be spread out over a very long time while many of 
the costs may have to be incurred in the present and near 
future.”212  When the costs and benefits of a policy occur at 
different times, governments monetize and discount future costs 
and benefits and treat them as equivalent to fewer dollars today. 
The resulting sale price effect offers a decreased cost of 
pollution now. We are to use now in the interest of discounting 
those later costs of pollution. With discounting, the present can be 
rewarded at the cost of the future,213 as though the future can 
always absorb costs shifted forward in time. Many neo-classical 
economists foresee no limits,214 but humanity cannot borrow 
infinitely against its resource base.215  Ackerman and Heinzerling 
 
211. Ackerman and Heinzerling see discounting as a subversion of the 
future through a misuse of preferences. The honoring of rights in the protection 
from “workplace hazards and environmental toxins” is lost “when lives saved in 
the future are shrunk to insignificance through discounting.” ACKERMAN & 
HEINZERLING, supra note 15, at 192. Immediate selfishness should not be 
allowed to subvert the public judgement that future harms have significance. Id. 
Humanity, collectively and individually, should not give up the right to a future. 
212. POSNER, supra note 145, at 151. Many of us engage in this kind of 
analysis with retirement savings, so it isn’t entirely foreign to us. 
213. This is not about financial discounting; one can’t just take the cost 
savings and invest them. 
214. Those economists employ no accounting for the physical limits of the 
Earth. For example, there are limits on the amounts of greenhouse gases such 
as carbon that can be sustained in the atmosphere. Humanity is currently 
exceeding the limits of the planet with its behavior. See generally JAMES E. 
HANSEN, STORMS OF MY GRANDCHILDREN, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE COMING 
CLIMATE CATASTROPHE AND OUR LAST CHANCE TO SAVE HUMANITY (2009). It 
seems we have a tendency to ignore the most significant risks until it is too late. 
Once humanity passes the point of irreversibility, it’s too late. We will have 
exceeded the planetary limits too greatly for too long a time. 
215. Economist William Baumol recognized the inability to borrow 
infinitely in an early article on discounting the benefits of public projects: “If we 
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note that discounting employs a worldview of market economics 
that typically assumes stable problems with declining control 
costs. It treats precautionary investment in environmental 
protection as “a needless expense” by ignoring the possibility of 
catastrophic and irreversible harms.216  As a result, over time, we 
increasingly find that we have turned our backs on known 
significant and irreversible risks. 
Yet, Judge Posner says discounting is required for CBA to 
deal with catastrophic risk.217  In order to use CBA in risk 
analysis, we must discount the future. The unspoken reason for 
discounting seems to be that we have limited resources and 
cannot afford infinite costs, even in the future. What’s more, 
discounting is a norm in neo-classical economics. 
Instead of looking at the costs of today, let’s consider the 
benefits, the value of our future. When we consider a large 
number of years, say a few centuries, into the future, discounting 
makes considerations of future costs seem miniscule. Ackerman 
and Heinzerling provide a great example: “At a discount rate of 
five percent, for example, the death of a billion people five 
hundred years from now becomes less serious than the death of 
one person today.”218  In this regard, applying discounting to long 
time frames makes humanity’s future seem meaningless.219  But 
discounting is ordinarily a necessary part of an accurate CBA.220 
 
poison our soil so that never again will it be the same, if we destroy the Grand 
Canyon and turn it into a hydroelectric plant, we give up assets which like 
Goldsmith’s bold peasantry, ‘. . . their country’s pride, when once destroy’d can 
never be supplied.’” William J. Baumol, On the Social Rate of Discount, 58 AM. 
ECON. REV. 788, 801 (1968). Irreversibility has significance. See discussion infra 
Section III.C.2.b. Humanity should be concerned with irreversibility—and limit 
liberty where risks to life are significant. 
216. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 15, at 185–86. 
217. Posner points out that, “as a practical political matter,” it would be 
absurd “not to discount future costs at all.” He observes that “the present value 
of benefits conferred on our remote descendants would approach infinity.” This 
would render CBA unworkable. “Because resources are limited, we couldn’t 
make the expenditures called for by a cost-benefit analysis of catastrophic risks 
that eschewed discounting to present value even if we wanted to.” POSNER, 
supra note 145, at 152–53. 
218. Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 16, at 1571 (citing WILLIAM J. 
BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 386–87 (6th ed. 
1994); DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 357 (1984)). 
219. When Judge Posner considers how to give weight to the welfare of 
future generations, he finds the literature on the subject “immense but 
inconclusive.” POSNER, supra note 145, at 153. This is critical if one agrees to the 
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This calculation applies fairly to the risks to human life. We 
use regulations to save lives and the environment in a much 
shorter time frame. Discounting may then involve placing a value 
on a statistical life.221  Economists’ measurements of that value 
are often based on labor market data.222  What we do with that 
 
application of CBA to risks of human extinction. In the context of using CBA to 
cope with long-term societal risks, Judge Posner finds no best method of valuing 
or weighing the needs of humanity’s future generations. How come? The logic of 
discounting “breaks down when costs or benefits spread over a century or 
longer. No individual will experience both the beginning and the end of the 
transaction; no one is able to make the personal judgment that the trade-off is, 
or is not, worthwhile.” ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 15, at 187. The 
decision-making tool of discounting is lethal in the long term. 
220. If, for some reason, humanity finds that it must use unrestricted CBA 
to test regulations in order to avoid extinction, Richard Posner offers an 
interesting approach that might help us save ourselves: negative discounting. If 
the disaster that we consider is severe enough to make future generations 
poorer than we are, rather than richer, that possibility might argue for using a 
negative discount rate to determine the present value cost of the future disaster. 
See POSNER, supra note 145, at 164–65. Posner assumes that we will make 
future generations richer. Id. at 164. We are not obligated to make future 
generations richer than ours, but we are obligated not to leave the next 
generation starving, impoverished, and poisoned. If we can get to the point 
where each of us leaves the world a better place, it would be wonderful. But that 
is an aspiration, not an obligation.) Negative discounting emphasizes the future 
and the long term over the present and the short term. Negative discounting 
may be morally problematic. Is the cost of the future always too much? It may 
be helpful to consider the circumstances when negative discounting could be 
useful. 
221. There is a substantial literature on the value of a statistical life. See, 
e.g., Orley Ashenfelter, Measuring the Value of a Statistical Life: Problems and 
Prospects, 116 ECON. J. C10 (2006); Georges Dionne & Paul Lanoie, Public 
Choice About the Value of a Statistical Life for Cost-Benefit Analyses: The Case 
of Road Safety, 38 J. TRANSPORT ECON. & POL’Y 247 (2004); Louis R. Eeckhoudt 
& James K. Hammitt, Background Risks and the Value of a Statistical Life, 23 
J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 261 (2001); Per-Olov Johansson, Is There a Meaningful 
Definition of the Value of a Statistical Life?, 20 J. HEALTH ECON. 131 (2001); 
Randall Lutter et al., The Cost-Per-Life-Saved Cutoff for Safety-Enhancing 
Regulations, 37 ECON. INQUIRY 599 (1999); Sujitra Vassanadumrongdee & 
Shunji Matsuoka, Risk Perceptions and Value of a Statistical Life for Air 
Pollution and Traffic Accidents: Evidence from Bangkok, Thailand, 30 J. RISK & 
UNCERTAINTY 261 (2005); Viscusi, supra note 186.  
222. W. KIP VISCUSI, RATIONAL RISK POLICY 46–47 (1998). The use of labor 
market data has problems. “[F]or incurring workplace hazards, white workers 
get far more than African American workers do—a finding that seems to cast 
doubt on government’s use of labor markets to produce a value for life.” Cass R. 
Sunstein, Your Money or Your Life, NEW REPUBLIC (Mar. 15, 2004), 
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/books-and-arts/your-money-or-your-life 
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value in discounting turns out to be problematic. According to law 
professor Cass Sunstein, “human beings cannot be banked, and 
they do not earn interest. In applying the usual discount rate for 
money to human lives and environmental amenities, regulators 
have not been sufficiently reflective.”223  When used in connection 
with law and its regulation, CBA, in effect, discounts future 
humans. This reflects a misalignment between our law and our 
religious, moral, and intellectual heritages. 
ii. Life Years 
With public health considerations, a more complex matter is 
at stake than the mere yes/no question of existence. As a result, 
economists and theoreticians have developed measurements that 
consider length and quality of life. The concept of the life year 
was created to measure changes in average length of life. For 
example, an increase or a decrease in the number of cancer cases 
results in a shorter or a longer average life span. 
These measurements have gotten amazingly precise. Not 
only is there the concept of life years, there have been attempts at 
refinement. One includes an effort at fairness. The notion of 
equity-adjusted years of life saved (EYLS) has been developed.224  
An early refinement in the 1970s involved the concept of quality-
adjusted life years (QALYs).225 
QALYs or other measures of life years are tools used to 
evaluate the level of protection from risk in regulating against it. 
Economists Paul Dolan & Jan Abel Olson explain the basis of the 
QALY in relation to health care: “Since health is a function of 
both length of life and quality of life, the ‘quality-adjusted life-
 
[http://perma.cc/7Y5K-93JY] (reviewing ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 
15) [hereinafter Your Money or Your Life]. 
223. Your Money or Your Life, supra note 222. 
224. See Lars Lindholm et al., How Many Lives Is Equity Worth? A 
Proposal for Equity Adjusted Years of Life Saved, 52 J. EPIDEMIOL COMMUNITY 
HEALTH 808, 808–10 (1998) (“Under certain conditions, the Swedish politicians 
are prepared to sacrifice 15 of 100 preventable deaths to achieve equity.”). 
225. See Matthew D. Adler, QALYs and Policy Evaluation: A New 
Perspective, 6 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 1, 3 n.3 (2006) (citing Robert 
M. Kaplan, Utility Assessment for Estimating Quality-Adjusted Life Years, in 
VALUING HEALTH CARE: COSTS, BENEFITS, AND EFFECTIVENESS OF 
PHARMACEUTICALS AND OTHER MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES 31, 35 (Frank A. Sloan 
ed., 1996)).  
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year’ (QALY) has been developed in an attempt to combine the 
value of these attributes into a single index number.”226  It would 
seem that we can quantify any set of relative characteristics into 
a unitary metric. 
Such quantification may be problematic.227  Once we decide 
what a QALY (or other life year) is worth, on average,228 across 
the board, for humanity, we need to determine how many QALYs 
are at risk. Then we can multiply. How many QALYs is all of 
humanity worth? How much should we expend? To how much 
effort should we go? In order to make those calculations, how 
much should we discount future humans and the entire future of 
life in order to arrive at a number for the benefit side of a cost-
benefit analysis? 
Cambridge University Professor Martin Rees has an answer 
to these questions: “The odds could be so heavily against the 
emergence (and survival) of complex life that Earth is the unique 
abode of conscious intelligence in our entire Galaxy. Our fate 
would then have truly cosmic resonance.”229  In short, no dollar 
value could ever be placed on all future human life. This 
conclusion is consistent with the notion of sacred values,230 a 
topic that merits further investigation elsewhere. 
c. The Deficiencies of CBA 
Even within the objective view of risk, purely economic views 
or purely quantitative measures cannot effectively deal with 
catastrophic risk at a global level. Traditional CBA is 
 
226. Paul Dolan & Jan Abel Olson, Equity in Health: The Importance of 
Different Health Streams, 20 J. HEALTH ECON. 823, 823 (2001). 
227. See ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 15, at 98–102, for a critical 
analysis of the use of QALYs in health care. 
228. In 2004, the common benchmark value was $50,000 per QALY in the 
United States or £30,000 per QALY in the United Kingdom, although based on 
published data those reference points may have been too low. See Christopher 
Evans et al., Use of Quality Adjusted Life Years and Life Years Gained as 
Benchmarks in Economic Evaluations: A Critical Appraisal, 7 HEALTH CARE 
MGMT. SCI. 43, 43 (2004). 
229. REES, supra note 97, at 157.  
230. “Sacred values are ideals so transcendent that they have no equivalent 
in anything material. People in all societies have them.” Sharon Begley, The Key 
to Peace in the Mideast May be ‘Sacred Beliefs’, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 25, 2006), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB115645687096244884 [perma.cc/9AZ7-DJUP] 
(emphasis added). 
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fundamentally flawed and can cause harm when we make 
decisions of significance regarding human life. The deficiencies 
are both practical and moral. 
There are at least two practical inabilities: determining 
probability and measuring benefit. Both the probabilities and 
benefits are necessary to calculate responses to risk within 
unrestricted CBA. Only with these figures can we determine the 
cost we should reasonably incur.231 
We cannot know the probabilities of our collective demise. 
Without estimable probabilities, we cannot use costs to determine 
benefits or vice versa. According to Judge Posner, when one 
cannot assign probabilities and the risk is great, taking 
appropriate action becomes a matter of choosing between two 
extremes. It is like deciding to have surgery, all or nothing.232  
There is no middle ground. When we consider the potential 
tragedy caused by global warming, for example, too many 
possible issues or variables are not subject to quantification or 
measurement to make the necessary calculations using CBA.233  
Humanity is left with what looks like a judgment call. 
Extreme events confound standard methods of coping with 
uncertainty. For example, since 2001 insurance companies have 
terminated coverage for losses due to terrorism. And as “the end 
of the world or the human race is not an insurable loss,” Judge 
Posner correctly observes that insurance practices “[cannot] yield 
useful information about the likelihood of extinction events.”234  
Quantitative risk evaluation fails us in this extreme area.235  
 
231. One would think that costs and benefits should be arrived at 
independently and then compared. However, when we use CBA to protect from 
risk, in simple terms, we place a value on what is being protected (the benefit), 
and we may use a discount rate to discount that value if it is in the future. We 
then calculate the probability of the risk. Finally, we multiply that probability 
against the possibly-discounted value to arrive at the amount to expend to 
protect against the risk (the cost). Ultimately, we need to know three figures: 
cost, benefit and probability. In order to get there, we use the two figures we can 
ascertain to triangulate the third. 
232. POSNER, supra note 145, at 57–58. 
233. As Judge Posner observes, “[N]o probabilities can be attached to the 
catastrophic global warming-scenarios, and without an estimate of probability 
an expected cost cannot be calculated.” Id. at 49–50. 
234. Id. at 176. 
235. Even using a substitute method of analysis known as “inverse cost-
benefit analysis” cannot help here. Inverse CBA calculates probability based on 
government spending to prevent a risk and an estimated benefit. First, as the 
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This consideration and others will force us out of a cost-benefit 
view of risk and into considering other methods. 
We can’t know the benefit of human existence, but for CBA 
we need to arrive at a credible monetary value. Without a 
measure of benefit,236 CBA cannot provide reliable guidance,237 
and it should not be employed to regulate behavior. 
Infinity is the first problem in measuring the benefit. If the 
value of your life is infinite, it is immeasurable.238  To force a 
measurement of value in advance of death is not only immoral, it 
may be illegal. From the standpoint of criminal law, from the 
general view of moral philosophy, and from the Abrahamic 
religious tradition, trading lives for money should be illegal. But, 
according to legal scholar Carsten Gerner-Beuerle, the discipline 
of law and economics neglects this: “The question [is] whether our 
society ought to be committed to preserving life at any cost; 
whether the value of life (for purposes of the law) ought to be 
infinite.”239 
Even if the value of life is not an infinitely large number, it is 
incalculable. The quantitative, techno-scientific approach to risk 
assessment has not, to date, been able to fully calculate and 
 
risk of human extinction is not currently on governmental radar, the amount of 
spending to prevent human extinction does not provide any guidance 
whatsoever. (Using CBA, expected cost (C) is the product of probability (P) and 
loss (L): C=PL. Id. at 176–77. But now, to implement inverse CBA, cost must be 
determined based on current expenditure. With matters of possible human 
extinction, current cost C is either zero or unknown. Probability (P) is unknown. 
The loss (L) is arguably infinite. Either zero C or infinite L will prevent us from 
arriving at a probability. We have both. Thus, this approach to determining risk 
is bound to fail.) Secondly, this approach to calculating probability is also 
problematic in that government spending may not be based on risk at all but 
solely upon politics. 
236. Measuring the benefit is especially a problem in the face of possible 
human extinction. As Richard Posner has observed, a surprisingly common 
reaction to human extinction, if everyone dies all at once without warning, is 
that “there is no loss,” “no ‘conscious pain and suffering’” from the perspective of 
the tort lawyer. POSNER, supra note 145, at 170. This reflects one of the 
limitations of the current economic perspective. It would seem that 
foreseeability is not limited to everyone dying at once—or without warning. 
237. See Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 16, at 1564. 
238. By definition, infinity is unlimited, indefinite and immeasurable. See 
WEBSTER’S II NEW RIVERSIDE DICTIONARY 355 (rev. ed., 1996), for definitions of 
infinity and infinite. 
239. Gerner-Beuerle, supra note 193, at 1. 
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consider the value of all of human life, present and future.240  
Should one be able to place a dollar figure on human extinction? 
How?241  There seems to be no rational decision-making in 
attempting to measure the dollar value of something that is 
morally repugnant. Even the rational secular-humanist 
economist stops in his tracks when faced with these issues. 
Without a quantified benefit or an estimate of probabilities, he 
cannot arrive at a proper cost or amount to expend in order to 
avoid the risk.242 
By the way, there is yet another reason for inaccurate cost 
calculations: Other agendas intrude, and so not even the costs of 
the precautions are known or, maybe, knowable.243  For example, 
 
240. Actually, Judge Posner placed a very rough dollar value on the 
extinction of humanity. We are a bargain at only $600 trillion, a “minimum 
estimate” achieved by doubling the population of the Earth to twelve billion to 
account for at least some future for humanity and by valuing the average 
individual life at a mere $50,000. POSNER, supra note 145, at 141, 165–71. This 
is merely a crude estimate. A complex calculation may not be any more right. 
Religious and moral leaders are likely to insist that money is irrelevant here. 
241. Are we not priceless? See generally ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra 
note 15. If we are priceless, it becomes impossible to measure the benefit when 
lives are at risk. “Because important categories of benefits are priceless, cost-
benefit analysis in practice frequently turns out to be ‘complete cost-incomplete 
benefit analysis.’” Id. at 207; see also GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, 
TRAGIC CHOICES 39 (1978), for the proposition that, to the extent that life is 
beyond price, a refusal to save lives is horribly costly. Again, CBA is flawed for 
the purpose of lifesaving. 
242. “Postmodernism thrives because some are willing to believe that 
where there is uncertainty, where propositions are not mathematically or 
logically demonstrable, there can be no weighing of evidence, there can be no 
truth.” James Gordley, The Science of Conjecture: Evidence and Probability 
Before Pascal, 6 INT’L. J. EVID. & PROOF 191, 193 (2002) (book review). An 
economic description of the “principles underlying postmodernization” includes 
“the appeal to unadorned market relations, the erosion of the state as a source of 
dependence, the weakening of workplace solidarities and the elevation of the 
private over the public in matters of cultural and social provision.” Christopher 
Stanley, Repression and Resistance: Problems of Regulation in Contemporary 
Urban Culture, 21 INT’L. J. SOC. L. 23, 30 (1993). Postmodernism in the form of 
CBA fails in the face of possible human extinction. 
243. The subjectivity of CBA, its limited view, reflects the perspective of the 
economist designing the model. Even though traditional CBA falls within the 
objective view of risk, it invokes subjective preferences. Thus, despite its 
quantitative veneer, CBA is no more transparent than any other subjective way 
of viewing risk. This is because its unitary metric is morally incomparable to the 
loss of life. Keating, supra note 20, at 680–81. Traditional CBA obscures this 
subjective decision-making and lends itself well to reducing public debate. 
Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 16, at 1578. Thus, CBA, which prides itself 
57
DRAPER - FINAL 4/28/2016  1:47 PM 
214 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33 
when industry testifies about the costs of proposed regulations, 
those costs are often inflated; industry has, in some cases, 
estimated costs to be twice the actual costs.244  It is difficult to be 
precise when those who know the most about the inputs may be 
obfuscating. Even when it comes to studies commissioned by the 
government, the costs of regulation may not be accurately 
portrayed.245  Ultimately, even the costs of regulation may not be 
fully calculable, and those costs may not matter as much as the 
significant risks to fundamental rights addressed by regulation. 
Our view of risk informs our decision-making processes and 
helps us analyze choices we face. However, when infinite amounts 
of money cannot begin to compensate for decisions that involve 
enormous downside risks, CBA bares its lack of a moral 
component. CBA is blind to risk, and is thereby rendered not only 
irrelevant but dangerous. 
CBA even fails in the face of moral norms. The mindset of the 
cost-benefit analyst seems foreign to most of us.246  The thinking 
seems foreign because it is morally wrong to hide behind the 
“objectivity” of CBA while turning lives into dollars in an attempt 
to maximize profits or efficiency. Implicit subjectivity in CBA 
reveals to us the little man behind this strange and mystical 
curtain. We will encounter problems of implicit subjectivity with 
discounting as well. 
 
on being scientific, quantifiable, and objective (which should be more 
transparent), not only fails to accurately measure risk, it helps to obscure risk. 
244. Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 16, at 1580 (citing Eban 
Goodstein & Hart Hodges, Polluted Data: Overestimating Environmental Costs, 
35 AMER. PROSPECT 64, 64 (1997)); see also Thomas O. McGarity & Ruth 
Ruttenberg, Counting the Cost of Health, Safety, and Environmental Regulation, 
80 TEX. L. REV. 1997, 1998–99 (2002). 
245. Consider the 2010 study commissioned by the Office of Advocacy of the 
U.S. Small Business Administration which arrived at a $1.75 trillion annual 
cost of regulation. Lisa Heinzerling & Frank Ackerman, The $1.75 Trillion Lie, 1 
MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 127, 128–29 (2012). 
246. Ackerman and Heinzerling compare the thinking behind VSL to 
everyday life: 
Most religions tell us that every human life is sacred; it is obviously 
illegal, as well as immoral, to buy and sell human lives. Most 
parents tell their children to eat their vegetables and do their 
homework, even though the rewards of these onerous activities lie 
far in the future. Monetizing human lives and discounting future 
benefits seem at odds with these common perspectives. 
Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 16, at 1563. 
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There is a deeper issue of moral limits here. Should 
humanity decide to place limits on practices that harm or even 
kill people? What limits should humanity use to protect life? For 
now, let us put three more nails in the coffin of CBA — moral 
unfairness and incommensurability, practical flaws of 
discounting, and the immorality of maximizing income in the face 
of catastrophic risk — and then wrap up the objective view with a 
visit to well-being analysis. 
i. Moral Fairness and 
Incommensurability 
Beyond the problem of infinity and other problems of 
measurement, CBA has a moral fairness problem.247  The 
comparability problem, or more precisely, the commensurability 
problem, underlies unrestricted cost-benefit analysis: Dying is 
different from buying. Gregory Keating explains that the value 
system implicit in CBA “treats all human interests—urgent ones 
like adequate nutrition and physical integrity and luxuries like 
the consumption of fine wines—as fungible at some ratio of 
exchange.”248  What’s more, CBA “insists that the cost-justified 
level of precaution is the only level of precaution that is ever 
justified. More stringent precaution simply squanders 
resources.”249  CBA considers precautions ultimately proven 
unnecessary to have been thrown away or wasted.250  However, 
 
247. When we care about risk, we find that “the economic interpretation [of 
reasonable care] is not innocuous when it comes to fixing the appropriate 
measure of precaution when life itself is at stake.” Keating, supra note 20, at 
656. 
248. Id.  
249. Id. “Our common law of negligence, by contrast, treats the physical 
integrity of the person as an especially urgent interest, and our juries are 
repulsed by the claim that accidental deaths should not be prevented whenever 
the costs of prevention exceed the value—economically conceived—of the lives at 
risk.” Id. at 656. There is a sense of fairness. “Fairness, in the sense that 
concerns us, is inherently relational and interpersonal: What kinds of gains to 
some are sufficiently important to justify inflicting accidental death on others?” 
Id. at 668. For that matter, what kinds of gains to some are sufficiently 
important to justify taking on the significant risk of inflicting accidental death 
on all of us? 
250. Connected with this, assumptions (in neo-classical economics) in favor 
of efficiency and maximization help demand or even require consumption. 
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resources used for precaution are not necessarily squandered; 
there is a special value involved in protecting life. 
Natural resources that are not used are not necessarily 
squandered either. Personal preferences don’t always lean toward 
consumption. As it downgrades the future,251 CBA may not 
comport with the reality of human decision-making. We may 
prefer the future by conserving and saving.252  We have much 
more latitude and choice than CBA permits, and it appears that 
humanity will need the extra range of choice. Assumptions about 
the timing of our needs involve risk and need to involve notions of 
moral fairness. 
CBA and neoclassical economics fail to account for issues of 
fairness (justice or equity). Neo-classical economics may bestow 
the same fairness considerations as employed by typical five-year-
olds,253 but worse, it actually treats humanity as sociopathic.254  
It teaches us to maximize and thus to act unfairly.255  This 
unfairness, due to commercial society’s limited view of the costs, 
benefits, and externalities, is arguably immoral.256  Can 
economics ultimately find a way to account for fairness? This is 
 
251. “Cost-benefit analysis systematically downgrades the importance of 
the future in two ways: through the technique of discounting and through 
predictive methodologies that take inadequate account of the possibility of 
catastrophic and irreversible events.” Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 16, 
at 1571. 
252. Ackerman and Heinzerling find Americans to be very different as 
citizens than as consumers: “The tension between Americans’ personal saving 
habits and their enthusiasm for Social Security implies a sharp divergence 
between the temporal preferences of people as consumers and as citizens.” Id. at 
1573. 
253. See Yoella Bereby-Meyer & Shelly Fiks, Changes in Negative 
Reciprocity as a Function of Age, 26 J. BEHAV. DEC. MAKING 397, 401–02 (2013). 
254. See Mixon, supra note 2, at 329–36 (citing Lynn A. Stout, Taking 
Conscience Seriously, in MORAL MARKETS: THE CRITICAL ROLE OF VALUES IN THE 
ECONOMY 157, 159 (Paul Zak ed., 2008)). “[H]omo economicus is a sociopath. The 
hallmark of sociopathy is extreme selfishness as shown by a willingness ‘to lie, 
cheat, take advantage [and] exploit.’” Stout, supra, at 158–59 (citing BENJAMIN 
J. WOLMAN, THE SOCIOPATHIC PERSONALITY 42 (1987)). Sociopaths, who learn to 
be bad, are to be contrasted with psychopaths, who are born bad. See Mixon, 
supra note 2, at 330–32. 
255. We are taught to maximize the benefit to ourselves without regard to 
effects on others. 
256. See PAUL HEYNE, “ARE ECONOMISTS BASICALLY IMMORAL?” AND OTHER 
ESSAYS ON ECONOMICS AND RELIGION 1 ((Geoffrey Brennan & A.M.C. Waterman 
Eds., 2008). 
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important, for when weighing lives, CBA’s fairness problem runs 
even deeper. 
CBA relies on measuring and weighing. Due to the 
exponential power of discounting, large future risks may appear 
to be quite small—and thus CBA measures merely a tiny benefit 
in precaution. In observing shortsighted choices leading to 
environmental devastation and death from preventable causes, 
Ackerman and Heinzerling ask, “How can bizarre, hypothetical 
calculations about tiny sums of money stand in the way of using 
our knowledge and resources to do the right thing?”257  Beautiful 
question. 
These preferences, upon which we rely to make our decisions 
in CBA, may be transient. We construct them anew each time,258 
either individually, or in groups.259  If we are not careful, we 
could build systems of law upon fleeting values and views using 
CBA.260  If that happens, once the views erode from under it, the 
law is floating on air without foundation. It seems possible that 
the law could contribute to collapse. We must work to find a more 
solid touchstone to help us systematize law and help humanity 
protect itself. 
Moral considerations, not CBA, are more likely to help us 
decide whether to preserve or consume. When I start to develop 
this below,261 we will encounter possible reconnections between 
economics and morality and ultimately between law and 
morality. 
All too easily, humanity can mislead itself by how it frames 
its choices between preservation and consumption. Surveying and 
 
257. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 15, at 223. 
258. See Dan Simon et al., The Transience of Constructed Preferences, 21 J. 
BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 1, 11 (2008). 
259. There is a connection between the way humans act individually and 
the way we act in groups. We each share the same biochemical “wiring,” many of 
the same responses to stimuli. There are probably variants at each end of a bell 
curve reflecting various tendencies, for individuals and for groups, but the bulk 
will be in the same general range. 
260. Paul Heyne considers economists’ view and use of values and 
incentives: “The good economist is often perceived as immoral because he is 
suspicious of what Adam Smith called the ‘man of system’ who in his own 
conceit supposes that the members of a great society can be moved about as 
easily as the hand moves the pieces on a chessboard.” HEYNE, supra note 256, at 
8. 
261. See infra Section III(C)(2). 
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sampling of preferences and economic modeling have blind 
spots.262  Willingness to pay fails to capture the significance of 
the issue of preservation.263  As Cass Sunstein rightly states, in 
the face of functionally irreversible choices, “it is obtuse to think 
that public health, wildlife or pristine areas are valued in the 
same way as their cash equivalents. Anyone who believed in such 
equivalence would have an unrecognizable understanding of how 
health, wildlife and pristine areas are properly appreciated and 
experienced.”264  We place special values on health and life. 
Consider your own. 
To Ackerman and Heinzerling, the prime deficiency of 
unrestricted CBA is that it places no special value on health or 
life.265  By forcing everything to be rendered into comparable 
terms of prices and values, those who support traditional CBA 
come up with astounding notions such as weighing whether it is 
cheaper for citizens to kill themselves than it is to provide them 
with nursing home care and other expensive services related to 
their aging.266  The cost savings represent money, and that 
 
262. For example, the consumption preferences of individuals can be 
misleading: 
In a classic example of this distinction [between valuing the 
environment as a consumer and doing so as an expression of public 
values as a citizen], the philosopher Mark Sagoff found that his 
students, in their role as citizens, opposed commercial ski 
development in a nearby wilderness area, but, in their role as 
consumers, would plan to go skiing there if the development were 
built. There is no contradiction between these two views; as 
individual consumers, the students would have no way to express 
their collective preference for wilderness preservation. Their 
individual willingness to pay for skiing would send a misleading 
signal about their views as citizens. 
Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 16, at 1566–67 (citing MARK SAGOFF, THE 
ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 50–53 (1988)). 
263. The increased production and consumption associated with CBA does 
not necessarily translate into increased welfare. See JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, 
THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 131, 145 (1960). 
264. Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversibility, 9 L., PROBABILITY & RISK 227, 244 
(2010) [hereinafter Irreversibility]. 
265. “[Economic analysts] have blurred the line between risks and actual 
deaths, by calculating the value of the reduced risk while pretending that they 
have produced a valuation of life itself. The paradox of monetizing the infinite or 
immeasurable value of human life has not been resolved; it has only been 
glossed over.” Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 16, at 1565–66. 
266. A study, by then-Harvard economist W. Kip Viscusi, concluded “that 
states, in fact, saved money as a result of smoking by their citizens. Why? 
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money carries with it a right. Someone has a right to it. That 
right is a property right. This is an example of the property right 
in CBA being placed on a par with life itself. 
Senior citizens are not alone in having their lives devalued. 
CBA gives children the same treatment, only worse, by 
measuring the value of the time saved by hurried parents’ failure 
to properly fasten their child’s safety seat. By that estimate, a 
child’s life is worth only $500,000.267  Is a moment of hurried 
inconvenience worth the risk of loss of a child’s life? Unrestricted 
CBA would say so.268  Our accident laws would say not. Criminal 
laws would object with an even stronger statement of our values. 
Why should economists be allowed this latitude? The root of 
Western law is based on moral values, not on economics. 
Treating diverse human needs alike is unfair. It is unfair to 
those who are at risk of death, and all of us seem to bear that risk 
to some degree. CBA’s version of risk analysis weighs risk against 
calculations of maximum efficiency.269  Unrestricted CBA tries to 
 
Because they died early!” Id. at 1553–54. States avoided the expenses of an 
aging population. “So great, under Viscusi’s assumptions, were the financial 
benefits to the states of their citizens’ premature deaths that, he suggested, 
‘cigarette smoking should be subsidized rather than taxed.’” Id. (quoting W. Kip 
Viscusi, Cigarette Taxation and the Social Consequences of Smoking 47 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 4891, 1994), http://papers.nber.org/ 
papers/w4891.pdf [http://perma.cc/8397-LUXK]). 
267. Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 16, at 1555–56 (citing Paul S. 
Carlin & Robert Sandy, Estimating the Implicit Value of a Child’s Life, 58 S. 
ECON. J. 186 (1991)). 
268. For more examples of the strange and risky results of discounting in 
the context of CBA, see ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 15, at 179–203. 
269. Ultimately economists arrive at a single metric, some unit of currency, 
to equate the value of life with principles of efficiency maximization or wealth 
maximization. Per Carsten Gerner-Beuerle: 
[T]he attempt to calculate the value of life constitutes a rather 
dangerous undertaking. It qualifies what should arguably not be 
qualified and calls into question the appropriateness of protective, 
lifesaving measures (because they might be cost-inefficient). Every 
theory to address legal issues should be coherent. A consequent 
application of the principle of wealth maximisation to cases involving 
risks to human life would, however, yield results that are, on their 
face, contradictory to common perceptions of justice. Assume the 
following example: A miner has been trapped after an explosion in a 
mine. To rescue him would necessitate extensive excavation, which 
would cost €2.5 mill. Assuming that life is valued at €2 mill. (as 
scholars in, for example, Germany suggest), it would not be cost-
efficient to rescue the miner. The resources could be put to a better, 
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wring out every last benefit, even the most trivial one, right up to 
the perceived edge of risk, ex ante, before the fact. The competing 
considerations (trivial benefits vs. devastating injury) are not 
comparable.270  The attempt to measure and compare the 
incommensurable leads us to take risk, even for small gain, until 
there is no room for error—no room for normal or foreseeable 
variance. 
Certainly, trivial benefits even spread generously today 
cannot begin to compensate for the loss of millions, or even 
billions of lives tomorrow or even thirty years from now. Although 
in a sense the issue is incommensurability, in another sense the 
issue runs deeper. Look in the mirror. Even if your current 
benefits are not trivial,271 ask yourself: Are significant risks to 
the lives and health of others worth it? Is it fair? Keating points 
out that “[d]evastating injury presents special problems of 
fairness, both because devastating injuries are especially severe 
and because they cannot be repaired ex post.” Consequently, 
“[t]he fair treatment of risks of devastating injury requires that 
we take more than cost-justified precaution against their 
occurrence.”272  If we are all at risk, the solution must also be 
equitable and moral. 
Ackerman and Heinzerling contend that there is an “intrinsic 
conflict between cost-benefit analysis and the principles of 
 
to a wealth-maximising use. Should they, consequently, not be 
invested? The answer is as everybody, presumably also proponents 
of the approach outlined above, would agree: of course they should be 
invested in rescuing the miner. 
Gerner-Beuerle, supra note 193, at 6. 
270. “The mistake [in CBA] lies not in undervaluing life or health. The 
mistake lies in assuming that trivial benefits and devastating losses are 
comparable. They are not, and it is unfair to treat them as if they are.” Keating, 
supra note 20, at 660; see also id. at 664–74. 
271. Keating notes:   
In a world of distinct persons who affirm diverse and 
incommensurable conceptions of the ends worth pursuing over the 
course of a human life, there is no reason to assume that those who 
are put at risk value the ends pursued through the relevant risk 
impositions in a way that those imposing the risks do. The fact that 
you are prepared to run enormous risks for the advancement of 
medical knowledge does not mean that I am prepared to do so. 
Id. at 678. May few insist on exercising liberties reasonably foreseeable to 
impose significant risks on all. 
272. Id. at 746. 
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fairness that animate, or should animate, our national policy 
toward protecting people from being hurt by other people.” 
Therefore, “the results of cost-benefit analysis cannot simply be 
‘given some weight’ along with other factors, without 
undermining the fundamental equality of all citizens — rich and 
poor, young and old, healthy and sick.”273  The subjective view in 
CBA that our efficient economy is worth more than the lives of 
some of our citizens—and many aliens274—is dead wrong. 
ii. Practical Flaws of Discounting 
Although I have discussed theoretical problems implicit in 
discounting above, from a practical standpoint, it is possible to 
also see fatal flaws in the practice of discounting. At best, the 
discount rate is chosen by the economist based on the perceived 
length of time between cost and benefit.275  At worst, the 
economist shoots from the hip—or holds firmly to an arbitrarily-
selected number.276  Then costs, benefits, and probabilities are 
estimated. At best, the numbers get calculated with great 
precision but little if any accuracy as to the underlying issue.277  
 
273. Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 16, at 1584. 
274. The United States routinely values foreign lives at zero, by failing to 
consider them in decisions to regulate. See Arden Rowell & Lesley Wexler, 
Valuing Foreign Lives, 48 GA. L. REV. 499, 526, 528 (2014). That failure 
“massively understates even the domestic benefit of protecting those lives.” Id. 
at 559 (citing David Dana, Valuing Foreign Lives and Settlements, J. BENEFIT-
COST ANALYSIS, July 2010, art 4, at 22). And it even more massively understates 
the justice implicit in protecting them. 
275. See Richard O. Zerbe, Jr., Should Moral Sentiments Be Incorporated 
into Benefit-Cost Analysis? An Example of Long-Term Discounting, 37 POL’Y SCI. 
305 (2004). 
276. In 2004, economists used “a standard ‘discount rate’ (about 7 percent 
annually) to convert future dollars into current equivalents.” Your Money or 
Your Life, supra note 222. “With a 7 percent discount rate . . . $1000 in twenty 
years is worth only $260 today.” Id. The U.S. Office of Management and Budget 
has also embraced a seven percent discount rate as part of its regulatory review. 
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR A-94, 
GUIDELINES AND DISCOUNT RATES FOR BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL 
PROGRAMS 7 (1992). 
277. Precision is only as good as the quality of the inputs. Relevant quality 
data is scarce: 
Often, the only regulatory benefit that can be quantified is the 
prevention of cancer, yet cancer has a latency period of between five 
and forty years. When discounted at five percent, a cancer death 
forty years from now has a ‘present value’ of only one-seventh of a 
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In the face of significant risk, such lack of accuracy could be quite 
harmful. 
Even Judge Richard Posner, a long-time proponent of CBA, 
sees the shortcomings of discounting in protecting against 
catastrophic loss. In considering the diversion of money to solve 
global warming within this century, he observed that 
“discounting future to present values is not a method of helping 
people to decide how to manage their affairs in the way most 
conducive to maximizing their welfare. Rather it is a method of 
maximizing global wealth without regard to its distribution 
among persons.”278  Society maximizes wealth through use and 
consumption, because we make more money when we use 
resources. 
Discounting helps maximize current wealth, but it does not 
protect us from risk. As Ackerman and Heinzerling point out, 
discounting society’s most profound values represents a “new 
mathematics of impatience” which “endorses profligacy and shuns 
discipline.”279  In a way, discounting helps us act more like 
teenagers. 
Discounting itself is asymmetrically skewed. In this article, 
health and environmental losses are the concern. Losses, 
including those to the environment and especially to health, get 
discounted more than gains, financial or otherwise.280  This 
aspect of discounting requires either countervailing measures or 
the abandonment of discounting in favor of an entirely different 
approach. 
Discounting does not give us guidance regarding how to deal 
with risks of possible human extinction. It clouds our view of the 
risks by distracting us with lucre. If, in any way, the death of one 
 
death today. Thus, one of the benefits that most often can be 
quantified—allowing it to be folded into cost-benefit analysis—is also 
one that is heavily discounted, making the benefits of preventative 
regulation seem trivial. 
Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 16, at 1579. If this is one of the best 
examples of what CBA and discounting can do together, imagine the worst. 
Extrapolated from the individual context, we see the problem with using CBA 
together with discounting to protect humanity from extinction or from inflicting 
significant self-harm. 
278. POSNER, supra note 145, at 152. 
279. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 15, at 203. 
280. See David J. Hardisty & Elke U. Weber, Discounting Future Green: 
Money vs. the Environment, 138 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH.: GEN. 329, 329 (2009). 
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person can equate to a billion deaths, even hundreds of years 
from now, in the words of philosopher Derek Parfit, “catastrophes 
in the further future can . . . be regarded as morally trivial.”281  
We lose sight of the risk, and we throw away the future. 
 
iii. Maximizing Income in the Face of 
Catastrophic Risk 
The above title brings to mind the creature that stayed on 
the road, eating, for a second too long. This section is about the 
problems implicit in maximizing income all the way to the edge of 
foreseeable significant risk. 
The assumptions, framing,282 and tools (e.g., discounting) of 
neo-classical economics and cost-benefit analysis are geared to 
help achieve that maximization. 
From the beginning, economists are trained to maximize 
gains in the face of risk. And although they ostensibly attempt to 
avoid ethical and moral judgments,283 law professor John Mixon 
correctly observes a pattern of contrary behavior in the education 
of economists: by teaching students to maximize and thus to act 
unfairly, neoclassical micro-economics courses not only treat 
psychopathic or sociopathic behavior as normal,284 they present 
the underlying assumptions as factual and scientific;285 they 
assume players in the amoral market are amoral;286 they portray 
government as the enemy;287 and ultimately, they encourage 
students to turn their backs on community values.288  As a result 
of this training, students’ moral structures may be altered,289 
such neo-classical fundamentalism may be absorbed by students 
as religion,290 and that may produce sociopaths.291  According to 
 
281. DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 357 (1984). 
282. The emphasis and the framing in neo-classical economics tends to be 
short-term rather than long-term. See infra Section III(C)(1)(b)(i). 
283. See Mixon, supra note 2, at 344–47. 
284. Id. at 342. 
285. Id. at 344–48. 
286. Id. at 348–50. 
287. Id. at 350–52. 
288. Id. at 352–53. 
289. Mixon, supra note 2, at 353–56. 
290. Id. at 356–57. 
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economist Charles Clark, “the problems we face in our economic 
system stem from the values upon which neoclassical economic 
theory is constructed.”292  As Clark sees it, “[t]hese values are 
contrary to the true nature of the person and of the just society, 
and the theories which have been built upon them have become a 
barrier to a better understanding of our economic system.”293 
As a result, humanity has become a means [to income and 
wealth], not an end. In the process, some have become roadkill. 
The direct impact on humanity merely represents a larger 
problem. The failure to protect life holds an ominous message for 
the human future. 
If we were to consider significant risk in science itself,294 in 
biodiversity loss, in land use, in resource depletion, in pollution, 
in climate change, and in a possible environmental avalanche,295 
we would see that many of the problems in our economic systems 
are the same ones we face environmentally. Aside from short-
term oscillations, demand is outstripping supply on our over-
crowded and increasingly competitive Earth. The neo-classical 
economist merely sees the problems from the other side, from the 
standpoint of consumption rather than from the standpoint of 
preservation and long-term need. 
CBA relies on the neo-classical concept of societal income 
maximization: Maximum income is maximum efficiency; anything 
less is irrational.296  By wringing every penny out of a risky 
situation, the exercise of CBA assumes that it is best to maximize 
our collective income (overall efficiency).297  Such maximization is 
 
291. Id. at 357–65. 
292. Charles M.A. Clark, Competing Visions: Equity and Efficiency in the 
Firm, in RETHINKING THE PURPOSE OF BUSINESS: INTERDISCIPLINARY ESSAYS FROM 
THE CATHOLIC SOCIAL TRADITION 81, 83 (S.A. Cortright & Michael J. Naughton 
eds., 2002). 
293. Id. 
294. See REES, supra note 97, at 73–88. 
295. See supra Section II(A). 
296. See supra note 191; see also supra Section III(C)(1)(a)(ii). 
297. Neo-classical economics deludes itself and attempts to do so for the 
rest of us: 
Economists like to believe that their discipline, at least at the 
theoretical level, is a positive science, that it contains no value 
judgments. Whenever values or value judgments are admitted, 
economics becomes normative economics, and here we typically find 
discussions of specific policy goals. But almost all economists would 
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a system of selfishness. It is sufficient to be harmful; harmful 
selfishness is greed, especially if it is intentional.298 CBA is based 
on greed299 in the name of efficiency. Greed is then the basis for 
curtailing precaution at the point of cost-justification.300  
Although some might think that should work for some business 
decisions, it is not a model for conducting life. Using unrestricted 
CBA to make life or death decisions places greed-based efficiency 
on a par with life itself. For that reason, when applying CBA to 
regulatory decisions involving significant risk of death or injury, 
CBA in its pure and most characteristic form, whether formal or 
 
contend that in terms of economic theory itself, values play no role, 
that like the natural sciences, economic theory considers only the 
facts as we find them in nature. This positive-normative distinction 
in economics has never stood up to philosophical scrutiny, for, as 
Gunnar Myrdal has convincingly argued, every aspect of economic 
theory is normative, that is, reflects values and value judgments. 
Clark, supra note 292, at 84 (citing GUNNAR MYRDAL, POLITICAL ELEMENT IN THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC THEORY (1954); GUNNAR MYRDAL, VALUE IN SOCIAL 
THEORY (1958)). The primary value judgment of neo-classical economics seems 
to be greed. Other conceptions include “what human nature entails, and, 
indeed, . . . the real and ideal order of society.” Id.  
298. Gross negligence may be sufficient. 
299. Packaged as prosperity rather than greed, the notion seems much more 
acceptable. Unfortunately, either way, based on humanity’s position, speed, and 
trajectory, the result is excessive consumption, excessive pollution, and 
excessive risk of significant harm. 
300. An example provided by Keating uses a hypothetical accident and 
compares the dollar value of a television technician’s life against the greater 
dollar value of the inconvenience of a billion people who would miss the weekly 
broadcast of Baywatch were the technician’s life to be saved. 
No amount of inconvenience—distributed across a large number of 
distinct persons—sums to the loss of a single life. We therefore 
should not decide how to proceed by measuring the victim’s 
preference for having her life saved in the dollars that she would pay 
to save it and by comparing the sum to the dollars that the views 
would pay to have the broadcast continue. The cost to the technician 
and the benefit to the viewers are not fungible at some ratio of 
exchange. 
Keating, supra note 20, at 666. To equate a life with dollars ex ante, before the 
loss, is as wrong in economics as it is in other modes of thought. This is 
recognized in the moral foundations of our laws. See Hershey H. Friedman & 
Linda Weiser Friedman, Is Greed Good? Lessons About Moral Leadership from 
Psalm 72 (July 16, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2467294 
[https://perma.cc/3QUN-8TK8] (lamenting American political and business 
leaders’ selfishness as being like that of ancient Israel’s King Solomon). 
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informal,301 is morally corrupt. Consider the example of fenced 
elephant herds with no reproductive limits that consume and 
destroy their food source to the point of starvation.302  Greed 
alone can kill. 
CBA is a tool used by humans. However, its effect is to use 
the health or the life of another statistically random human being 
as a means, a means to maximize income, efficiency, and wealth. 
The lives of others become expendable. 
Either way, individually or collectively, as was observed in 
the war crime trials at Nuremburg,303 it is immoral to use human 
life as a means. They can be individuals or statistical groups of 
twenty or 100, but those statistics turn out to be real: they live 
with autism, or they suffer other adverse health effects from the 
selfish decisions we make. Those unconsenting statistical people 
and the beneficiaries of the decisions are unlikely to realize 
exactly what has happened, but the people who pay with life or 
health have been a means for the beneficiaries to accrue their 
gains.304 
This happens through maximization. Maximizing utility, 
maximizing income, maximizing consumption, or maximizing 
 
301. See Amy Sinden, Formality and Informality in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 
2015 UTAH L. REV. 93, 172 (addressing the difference between formal and 
informal CBA). 
302. DAVID P. BARASH, THE SURVIVAL GAME: HOW GAME THEORY EXPLAINS 
THE BIOLOGY OF COOPERATION AND COMPETITION 123 (2003). 
303. 5 Int’l Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the 
International Military Tribunal: Proceedings 9 January 1946 – 21 January 
1946, 408 (Jan. 17, 1946) (statement of M. François de Menthon). 
[The nature of man] is defined in two complementary ideas: The 
dignity of the human being considered in each and every person 
individually, on the one hand; and on the other hand, the 
permanence of the human being considered within the whole of 
humanity. Every juridical organization of the human being in a state 
of civilization proceeds from this essential, two-fold conception of the 
individual, in each and all, the individual and the universal. . . . .It is 
a general conception which imposes itself quite naturally on the 
spirit: It was professed since ancient pre-Christian times; and in 
more recent times, the great German philosopher Kant expressed it 
in one of his most forceful formulas, by saying that a human being 
should always be considered as an end and never a means. 
Id. 
304. To make matters worse, given current foreseeable and significant 
environmental risks, we could all become a means. 
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wealth,305 as assumed by neo-classical economics and CBA, are 
misguided, in that no single person reaps all the benefits or bears 
all of the burdens of a social practice.306  When we cumulate the 
costs and the benefits, according to Gregory Keating, the sum of 
benefits, minus burdens, is “an unreliable guide to the actual 
gains and losses of the persons affected by the practice.”307  This 
is especially the case when loss means death. 
The benefits alone can be problematic. If we sum the 
benefits, with an increasing population, philosopher John Rawls 
observes that we can get an unjustifiable result: 
[W]hen population is subject to change . . . [the principle of 
maximizing total utility] . . . entails that so long as the average 
utility per person falls slowly enough when the number of 
individuals increases, the population should be encouraged to 
grow indefinitely no matter how low the average has fallen . . . 
the sum of utilities added by the greater number of persons is 
sufficiently great to make up for the decline in the share per 
capita. As a matter of justice . . . a very low average of well-being 
may be required.308 
The benefits may be tiny yet the potentially catastrophic 
losses may justify curbing the benefit prior to maximization, 
ahead of the risk. 
If we consider human population and its impact on earth and 
the environment, we would see that the quantitative approach 
based on the sum of utilities,309 may ultimately destroy the 
 
305. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the 
Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487 (1980) 
(advocating a system of wealth maximization). 
306. One might wonder whether some externalities might be inherent in 
CBA. 
307. Keating, supra note 20, at 671. 
308. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 140 (rev. ed. 1999). 
309. “What is the good in a world swarming with people having lives barely 
worth living, even if overall the aggregation of the ‘utility’ of its members 
supersedes that of any alternative, smaller world?” DAVID HEYD, GENETHICS: 
MORAL ISSUES IN THE CREATION OF PEOPLE 57 (1992). The classical utilitarianism 
of Jeremy Bentham is an example of a principle that implies the “repugnant 
conclusion,” PARFIT, supra note 281, by recommending the creation of a large 
population in which each person is poverty-stricken. But Garrett Hardin finds 
that other liberty considerations, qualitative in nature, also rule out the goal: 
If our goal is to maximize population it is obvious what we must do: 
We must make the work calories per person approach as close to zero 
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qualitative approach which looks at the quality of one person’s 
existence. There may be too much quantity (of people) to allow for 
quality (of life)—or for the avoidance of death or even extinction. 
The sum of the benefits is a risky approach to decision making. 
Our greed, our selfish interest in finding, capturing, and 
measuring a maximum quantitative benefit, causes us to lose 
sight of unrestricted CBA’s qualitative impact. Reliance on 
unrestricted CBA, even if done as “risk avoidance,”310 runs us 
into serious problems in the qualitative arena. We need other 
tools for the risks of today and tomorrow. 
The hazards facing humanity are just too great. New risks, 
never before considered await us. CBA cannot measure, value, 
weigh, or otherwise assist with risks of new technology. It lacks 
both a vision of risk and an appropriate weighing mechanism. 
CBA’s purpose is not to protect us. With new hazards, we need 
tools that align properly with risk. By sociologist Ulrich Beck’s 
analysis of the problem,311 the risk calculus of the past, alone, 
 
as possible. No gourmet meals, no vacations, no sports, no music, no 
literature, no art. . . . I think that everyone will grant, without 
argument or proof, that maximizing population does not maximize 
goods. Bentham’s goal is impossible. 
Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1243–44 (1968). 
310. Risk avoidance can be perilous. 
We need as a society to develop a mode of analysis that does not 
obscure what is at stake and for whom. We need to frame the debate 
so that it considers the larger question of whether a given risk and 
its attendant possibilities for avoidance are morally, culturally, and 
socially acceptable. In the end, we need to reflect upon the very basic 
question of whether this is the direction we wish to take 
environmental law and policy: Whether we wish to shape a world in 
which our children can no longer make mud pies. 
Catherine A. O’Neill, No Mud Pies: Risk Avoidance as Risk Regulation, 31 VT. L. 
REV. 273, 354 (2007). 
311. BECK, supra note 19, at 53–54.  
[N]uclear, chemical, genetic, and ecological mega-hazards abolish the 
four pillars of the calculus of risks. First, one is concerned here with 
global, often irreparable, damage that can no longer be limited; the 
concept of monetary compensation therefore fails. Second, 
precautionary after-care is excluded for the worst imaginable 
accident in the case of fatal hazards; the security concept of 
anticipatory monitoring of results fails. Third, the ‘accident’ loses its 
delimitations in time and space, and therefore its meaning. It 
becomes an event with a beginning and no end; an ‘open-ended 
festival’ of creeping, galloping and overlapping waves of destruction. 
But that implies: standards of normality, measuring procedures and 
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cannot begin to reflect the realities and the extreme risks of the 
future. We will need to employ a new flexibility that considers a 
wide view of significant risks. 
However, we face an economic argument “that it is irrational 
to press precaution beyond the point of cost-justification—because 
doing so will make everyone worse off.”312  To Gregory Keating, 
the argument “rests on both an inadequate metric of 
interpersonal comparison and insufficient attention to the actual 
distribution of burdens and benefits.”313  Here is the flaw in the 
metric of comparison: “it treats the devastation of some[, let alone 
all,] as comparable to the receipt of trivial benefits by others—
even though the two are not morally comparable.”314  The 
burdens and the benefits are disconnected,315 and “the economic 
surplus realized by taking only cost-justified precaution cannot be 
used to restore the lives or the health of those devastated by cost-
justified risks. . . . [D]eath and devastation are beyond 
rectification by redistribution.”316  For the weak and unlucky, 
there is no chance of recovery. In effect, our economic system is 
harming and killing people in the interest of gain. We should 
reject the neo-classical economic argument. 
In the view of Professors Ackerman and Heinzerling, for 
purposes of risk regulation, CBA should be rejected in its 
entirety, and we should look elsewhere: “Cost-benefit analysis 
cannot overcome its fatal flaw: it is completely reliant on the 
impossible attempt to price the priceless values of life, health, 
nature, and the future”; instead, they say, “Better public policy 
decisions can be made without cost-benefit analysis, by combining 
the successes of traditional regulation with the best of the 
innovative and flexible approaches that have gained ground in 
recent years.”317  They are correct. We will examine some of those 
 
therefore the basis for calculating the hazards are abolished; 
incomparable entities are compared and calculations turn into 
obfuscation. 
Id.; see id. at 50–52 for a description of the four pillars of the calculus of risks. 
312. Keating, supra note 20, at 673. 
313. Id.  
314. Id.  
315. This disconnection is the cost externalization problem. 
316. Keating, supra note 20, at 673. 
317. Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 16, at 1584. 
73
DRAPER - FINAL 4/28/2016  1:47 PM 
230 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33 
alternative approaches when we consider the Moral View of 
Risk.318 
Enormous risks that go with life and death decisions may be 
better answered with a simple (but appropriate) “better safe than 
sorry.” While flexibility and a variety of views and possible 
responses increase the number and range of tools available to us 
to cope with risk, some risks—and some dangers—rise to the 
level of requiring special treatment. The greater the risk to 
human life, either individually or collectively, the less money 
matters—and the less important are the costs,319 whatever they 
may be, to save us from collapse or extinction. 
d. Well-Being Analysis and its Deficiencies 
Why not use Well-Being Analysis (WBA) to measure 
individual satisfaction instead of using CBA to measure dollars? 
WBA is a decision tool based on measurements of satisfaction or 
happiness using ranking of preferences,320 another unitary 
metric. Some view WBA as the next step in risk analysis and 
decision procedure. As Professors Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and 
Masur tell it, WBA solves many of the problems of CBA.321  In 
many ways they are correct. WBA happens also to be the subject 
of an exhaustively detailed book by Matthew Adler.322  WBA is 
quite a step forward, and it would be a huge advance if humanity 
 
318. See infra Section III(C)(2). 
319. A higher marginal utility of consumption (leading to an increase in 
consumption) at the end of life is replicated at the individual level. Lee A. 
Lillard & Yoram Weiss, Uncertain Health and Survival: Effects on End-of-Life 
Consumption, 15 J. BUS. & ECON. STAT. 254, 254 (1997). Now, let’s say our 
collective risk grows significantly. If there is a statistically significant effect 
from the pending death of one person, imagine if it is magnified by billions. The 
effect of the resultant increase in consumption might be enough to significantly 
increase risk in and of itself. We need to learn to tread more lightly. 
320. MATTHEW D. ADLER, WELL-BEING AND EQUITY: BEYOND COST-BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS 32–36 (2012). 
321. See JOHN BRONSTEEN ET AL., HAPPINESS AND THE LAW 59–92 (2015); 
Bronsteen, Buccafusco, & Masur, supra note 155, at 1689. 
322. ADLER, supra note 320; Daniel M. Hausman, Well-Being and Fair 
Distribution: Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis, 28 ECON. & PHIL. 435 (2012) (book 
review) (providing a general overview of Adler’s book); Mark Sagoff, Matthew D. 
Adler, Well-Being and Fair Distribution: Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis, NOTRE 
DAME PHILOSOPHICAL REV., (Dec. 4, 2012), http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/36051-well-
being-and-fair-distribution-beyond-cost-benefit-analysis/ [http://perma.cc/Y9SJ-
77LG] (book review). 
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was not already in a very difficult situation with too much 
consumption, pollution, and population. 
Unfortunately, WBA does not reach or employ the necessary 
decision tools. Like unrestricted CBA, WBA is utilitarian in 
nature. And as with CBA, the theory focuses with a unitary 
metric,323 measuring the subjective well-being of single 
individuals as reported at a given moment—and then aggregating 
them.324  If humanity stays focused only on the welfare of the 
individual, we, as a species, will be more likely to fail at the 
hands of our own selfishness. WBA takes no account of the 
possibility of too many individuals with too much impact or too 
deep and wide a collective footprint. There are limits, but they are 
not implicit in the measurement of individual well-being. They 
are the Earth’s physical limits. 
Scientifically speaking, well-being analysis is happiness 
analysis, not risk analysis. With WBA, we evaluate brief glimpses 
of satisfaction by having people pick a number out of the air in a 
subjective evaluation ignorant of humanity’s greater situation. 
WBA analysis does not look at risk. It fails to protect us. It is not 
designed to do so.325  Its purpose is to measure happiness. 
Further, as WBA counts only the happiness of the individual, it 
fails to take account of the needs of the larger group or of other 
groups. Both aspects of WBA, a lack of risk analysis and a myopic 
selfish individual analysis, taken together, multiply the risk to 
humanity. 
Unfortunately, WBA takes no special account of death. Death 
is merely a zero on the WBA scale of well-being.326 And, given the 
effect of averaging people’s individual evaluations, death, an 
eventual reality for all of us, can never be predicted with WBA. 
 
323. Both CBA and WBA render life’s decision-making into a series of 
evaluations, each with a unitary metric. However, a unitary metric does an 
inadequate job of describing the complexity of each of our situations, let alone 
humanity’s collective situation. 
324. “The measure of welfare for a period of any duration is the aggregate 
of a person’s moment-by-moment experiences of positive and negative feeling.” 
JOHN BRONSTEEN ET AL., supra note 321, at 157. 
325. WBA fails to interview the people who are dead, especially those who 
have lost their lives by risks imposed by others. 
326. There are other problems with zero well-being. Consider Ori J. 
Herstein, Why ‘Nonexistent People’ Do Not Have Zero Wellbeing but No 
Wellbeing At All, 30 J. APPLIED PHIL. 136 (2013). 
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What’s worse, as with CBA, there is no special protection or 
precaution for the life of others in the WBA decision procedure. 
The lives of those who have not consented to the risk go 
unprotected. As we maximize individual happiness and well-
being in the face of foreseeably-catastrophic risk, WBA merely 
replaces the property interest in CBA with a liberty interest in 
happiness, as the primary interest. Unfortunately, each has the 
fatal deficiency of possibly placing its respective interest higher 
than the lives of other individuals and groups. 
With this, I conclude my analysis of the objective view of risk. 
The objective view fails to protect humanity individually and 
collectively. Let us turn now from the quantitative view to a 
qualitative view. 
2. The Moral View of Risk 
Westerners tend to analyze laws and regulations in view of 
economic costs and benefits. However, economics does not 
consider all motivations. Economics cannot tell us about the 
worth of other people—or the significance of their rights327—but 
economics tries to place a value on those lives. For example, 
Harvard’s Donald Shepard and Richard Zeckhauser use 
“willingness to pay” to place a dollar value on the survival of 
individual lives.328  Through their economic lens, they envision 
and build models to evaluate and make decisions that affect the 
fundamental right to life based purely on economic 
considerations. 
Decision analysis based only on economic considerations is 
problematic. Is there a moral leader who would condone the 
placement of a price on the taking of an innocent human life? 
How do we take into account the rights of those people? When do 
we implement protection of the most fundamental right, the right 
to life—before or after the loss? As you think about your life—and 
your rights—you know the answer. 
 
327. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 15, at 229. 
328. Technically, these are reductions in risk of death at various ages. See 
Donald S. Shepard & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Survival Versus Consumption, 30 
MGMT. SCI. 423, 423 (1984). 
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Human behavior is not based purely on self-interest. Neither 
are human values.329  We have many motivations, and the social 
and scientific natures of our existence show that we cannot be 
entirely self-centered. This is but one of many possible moral 
virtues. If humanity needs moral virtues, so do economists.330 
Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling explain that we 
cannot be entirely mechanical in our approach either: 
“[E]conomists dream of decision rules so precise that no one will 
need to participate.” They should see Kenneth Arrow’s Social 
Choice and Individual Values,331 “a classic work in economic 
theory,” as demonstrating “the impossibility of that dream.”332  
Instead we must allow for the voice of the people: 
In 1951, Kenneth Arrow proved that the results of democratic 
decision making cannot be reproduced by a mathematical 
formula. This crucial result, known as Arrow’s Impossibility 
Theorem, derailed earlier attempts by economists to represent 
society’s choices by a “social welfare function”—a quantitative 
description of what society supposedly prefers. Arrow’s proof has 
 
329. Spanish sociologist and comparative political thinker Ignacio Sánchez-
Cuenca observes: “If people really act out of principles, moral obligations, 
convictions, or sincere concern for others, the methodological virtues of a theory 
that does not take into account these factors are of no avail.” Ignacio Sánchez-
Cuenca, A Preference for Selfish Preferences; The Problem of Motivations in 
Rational Choice Political Science, 38 PHIL. SOC. SCI. 361, 372 (2008). Economic 
theory fails us. “That theory could only aspire to provide very incomplete 
explanations. Common sense, folk psychology, and even simple introspection 
show that the range of motivations that move the agent to act is wider than 
standard self-interest.” Id. Sánchez-Cuenca is correct. Neo-classical economics 
fails to capture all values. Traditional rational choice theory (using models of 
bounded rationality, evolutionary game theory, etc.) does not account for “the 
importance of extreme behavior in politics (from suicide missions to joining 
revolution to volunteering for altruist causes).” Id. at 375. Humanity needs to 
open its eyes to motivations that are not economic. 
330. David Lipka, Do Economists Need Moral Virtues? (June 12, 2014), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2449221 [https://perma.cc/TV5Q-AMD7]. Specifically, 
economists need to honor the moral virtue of the survival of humanity. 
331. KENNETH J. ARROW, COWLES COMM’N FOR RESEARCH IN ECON., SOCIAL 
CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (John Wiley & Sons, 1951), 
http://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/mon/m12-all.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5M4B-WM9B]. 
332. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 15, at 209.  
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not been refuted, though it may have been forgotten, in the rush 
to apply cost-benefit analysis.333 
Decisions cannot be mechanical or mechanically applied. Life 
is bumpy; nature is not smooth or mechanical. When we 
encounter sufficient bumps, we lose control. There is a need for 
humanity to be directly involved in our “human decisions.” 
Humanity should not give up control to machines, to science, or to 
economics. 
At the same time, we should not turn our backs entirely on 
the benefits of measurements or predictions. Providing for a 
future is a matter of great complexity requiring a wide view.334  
Unfortunately, our narrow-beam spotlights also happen to be 
very short-range and near term. We need to look beyond the 
foreseeability of extinction—and we need some faith in that 
vision. 
Too much moral flexibility can reduce our view and add to 
risk. If we attach moral values to the views of certain risks, we 
may be able to reduce the flexibility of some views,335 give 
ourselves some guidance, and change the way we see and 
approach those risks.336  We can do this whether the risks are 
 
333. Id. (citing Frank Ackerman, Utility and Welfare II: Modern Economic 
Alternatives, in HUMAN WELL-BEING AND ECONOMIC GOALS 81-92 (Frank 
Ackerman et al., eds. 1997)). See also Peter Bernholz, A General Constitutional 
Possibility Theorem, 51 PUB. CHOICE 249 (1986); Peter J. Hammond, Social 
Choice: The Science of the Impossible?, in ARROW AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF 
ECONOMIC POLICY 116 (George R. Feiwel, ed. 1987); Kotaro Suzumura & 
Yongsheng Xu, Welfarist-Consequentialism, Similarity of Attitudes, and Arrow’s 
General Impossibility Theorem, 22 SOC. CHOICE 237 (2004), for more on Arrow’s 
Impossibility Theorem. 
334. For Ackerman and Heinzerling, there are subtle considerations: “It is 
of course helpful, when evaluating broad public policies, to quantify everything 
that is measurable, to price everything that can be priced—while remembering 
how many essential values are not illuminated by these narrow-beam numerical 
spotlights.” ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 15, at 212. Not all weighing 
works, and we don’t have to achieve perfect efficiency when contexts may vary. 
“The nature of risks involved, the questions of fairness and distribution of 
burdens, and the importance of providing for the future, all affect the policies 
that should be adopted to protect health and the environment.” Id. at 212–13. 
335. For instance, we may choose to value life and health over convenience, 
property, or even liberty. 
336. Paradoxically, as we shall see, we will need more behavioral flexibility, 
individually and collectively, to avoid issues of life and death. 
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based on behavior that is scientific or social and cultural in origin 
and type. 
Is there anything in objectivity that can help us see the moral 
issues of our existence? How can moral issues ever be objective? 
We can see shades of gray in morality. But there is one place with 
no gray: the boundary of life and death. 
If there is risk in a truly objective sense, it occurs with the 
moral issue of that boundary. Some life and death is beyond our 
control. However, when humans have control over that boundary, 
the risk is moral in nature. For many individual risks, traditional 
CBA may be employed and a rational weighing can take place. 
But if human extinction is within our control, it may be the only 
truly objective societal risk, one that inherently defies someone’s 
special subjective perception or interest: the high power line you 
just don’t touch no matter what the cost. If the risk is real and 
significant, it is the black and white risk, with no shades of gray; 
and with no weighing in making the decision itself. 
Should we attempt to keep humanity alive at all costs? How 
come? Or should we not knowingly further the extinction of 
humanity? The latter certainly sounds right, but we should 
consider all these questions and more. 
Objective views of risk cannot cope with the issue of 
extinction. Objective views involve measuring with numbers and 
quantifying both the costs and the benefits: weighing. Using 
objective risk or otherwise, can there be any weighing involving 
the life and death of our own species? If there is weighing, we 
have degraded ourselves. Human extinction is morally 
repugnant. What benefit, what amount of profit, for example, 
could ever be great enough to justify that cost? This is one of the 
arguments against employing objective views of risk (including 
neo-classical economics), or at least against using cost-benefit 
analysis in its pure form. In light of possible extinction, morality 
and fairness require more than cost-justified precaution. 
Gregory Keating sees everyday application of that fairness as 
he considers risk in the workplace.337  He correctly concludes that 
 
337. Keating, supra note 20, at 699.  
The fact . . . that a particular level of pesticide residue on produce, or 
a particular level of benzene or cotton dust in a workplace, 
maximizes the wealth that society extracts from the activity at issue 
does not supply those who stand to lose their health or their lives 
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great wealth for society does not justify placing lives in harm’s 
way. Fairness requires something more than higher pay for those 
who suffer the risks. Additional precaution is justified. 
a. Basic Moral Law 
We start with the most basic and simple moral law: 
Thou shalt not kill.338 
There it is in gleaming simplicity, without exceptions or 
loopholes. At the largest level, this moral imperative is best noted 
in the unwritten international criminal law of crimes against 
humanity. Let us differentiate here between killing others and 
killing ourselves. 
i. Killing Others 
In this article, we consider combinations of global risks that, 
with reasonable foreseeability, may lead to death for millions. 
The law that was born of the death of millions of Jews is found in 
international criminal law. 
The prosecutions at the Nuremberg trials were for crimes 
against humanity. Arguably, those same rights that were invoked 
in Nuremberg reach out and touch and protect each and every 
one of us. Each of us should be entitled to full and equal 
protection under the law. 
Gross negligence with the entire life support system of the 
planet should be no less culpable than the specific intent required 
to prove a case of genocide in international criminal law. The 
purpose of this expression of international criminal law is not to 
 
with good reason to accept the level of risk that efficiency licenses. 
Society is extracting maximum advantage from the activity by 
putting them in peril of great and readily avoidable harm. If the 
sacrifice demanded of them could be avoided without imposing a 
comparable sacrifice on others, then the risk should be reduced 
Id. Prior consent, whether or not in the course of employment, is not enough to 
justify placing lives or health at significant risk. As Aditi Bagchi explains it, 
“[p]ermission cannot prevent culpability.” Aditi Bagchi, Managing Moral Risk: 
The Case of Contract, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1878, 1902 (2011). For risk-taking 
with significant risks to life or health to be morally acceptable, we reduce risk to 
the extent feasible. 
338. Exodus 20:13; Deuteronomy 5:17. 
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create criminals but to avoid the need for prosecution or the 
results that come from failure. 
If the human imperative is to protect life, we must rank it 
highly. Life is a fundamental right in the due process clauses of 
the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of 
the United States. Life is first, ahead of liberty and property in 
order—and in rank. Property and liberty support life, and 
property supports liberty. The ranking of fundamental rights 
becomes important when property rights come in conflict with 
lives in being. We should work to avoid inversions in order to save 
lives. 
ii. Killing Yourself 
The ancient prohibition applies here as well. Not only do 
most states forbid suicide,339 there are other reasons to avoid 
certain death. One of those reasons is our view of risk. Without 
getting to the matter of intent, we try not to be negligent with our 
own lives. 
Consider the hot third rail of an electric train-line. As 
individuals, we know not to come close. Touching that rail means 
certain death. Such foreseeability requires that we talk about 
other options long before we would get close to that rail. 
Generally, we require a margin of safety. 
Humanity needs that kind of decision-making—as a group. 
In the process, we may need to recognize that there are some 
actions for which we cannot punish. However, it may be to our 
greater benefit if we were to “nudge” against those actions—to 
limit their occurrence and their impact.340 
We, as a species, need to start engineering the human 
future—or, given our direction, our momentum, and our 
 
339. See Scott P. Johnson & Robert M. Alexander, The Rehnquist Court and 
the Devolution of the Right to Privacy, 105 W. VA. L. REV. 621, 642 n.178 (2003); 
David LaValle, Note, Physician-Assisted Suicide: Is There a Right to Die?, 31 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 944, 953 n.73 (1998). 
340. See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING 
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008) (the classic text in 
behavioral economics); Phil Weiser & Gideon Parchomovsky, Beyond Fair Use, 
96 CORNELL L. REV. 91 (2010) (discussing how nudges may be used to increase 
user access and use privileges in the realm of copyright, and showing that 
nudging has a wide range of uses). 
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overshoot, humanity itself will harm the health and the existence 
of many millions of current lives in being. 
There is a spectrum of different methods and manners of 
dealing with risk. At one end, there is unrestricted cost-benefit 
analysis, which allows for greater risk in the name of efficiency 
and greater overall societal profit. CBA has no risk boundaries. 
At the other end there is the precautionary principle,341 a rule 
against risk. 
Any number of stops, gradations, or possibilities may exist in 
between. We will examine irreversibility, the source of the 
precautionary principle. Then we’ll look at the principle itself. 
b. Irreversibility 
In its pure form, the precautionary principle commands: 
“Better safe than sorry.” It is black and white; it is red and green. 
A decision is required. You do it or you don’t. In its pure form, 
there can be no measures. The outcome of the risk is treated as 
irreversible. 
Irreversibility plays a huge role in such domains as public 
health, medical practice, and environmental protection. Each is a 
context involving life and death of some living beings or thing(s) 
(e.g., viruses and plants). Irreversibility is implicit in the 
precautionary principle. 
According to Cass Sunstein, there are “two separate 
conceptions” of how to deal with irreversibility. One involves the 
option value, which “calls for a kind of ‘irreversibility premium,’ 
embodied in a willingness to spend more on precautions or 
preparation.”342  We’ll see more on that shortly. The other 
“emphasizes losses of goods that are incommensurable . . . in the 
 
341. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 15, at 223–29. Ackerman and 
Heinzerling employ four principles to protect the priceless. One is the 
precautionary principle, to be discussed shortly. The other three principles use a 
holistic evaluation of costs and benefits, id. at 210–16, learn from the military 
about the communication and power of moral imperatives without cost 
comparison, and promote fairness toward those who don’t have a say, including 
the poor, the powerless, and the future (our children and theirs), id. at 216–23, 
229–33. 
342. Irreversibility, supra note 264, at 230.  
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sense that they are qualitatively distinctive and in some cases 
unique.”343 
Consider incommensurability. Some things, like life, are not 
fungible with the value of the goods and services necessary to 
sustain them. Compare the value of the food and water necessary 
to sustain a city of 60,000 for a year, or even five years, with the 
value of the future lives of those 60,000 people. Those people are 
irreplaceable. In their uniqueness, their lives are 
incommensurable with the value required to sustain them. 
The loss of the unique is irreversible, and, as each human life 
is unique, special precautions are needed. We know we are not 
replaceable. Incommensurability touches deep emotional and 
religious chords. According to Sunstein, “When people fear or 
deplore certain losses, this kind of irreversibility is often their 
animating concern.”344  Irreversibility invokes questions of 
incommensurability, for example the difference between buying 
and dying. “What is gained by an understanding of 
incommensurability is a more vivid appreciation of why certain 
losses cannot be dismissed as mere ‘costs.’”345  Special 
precautions are required where losses are incommensurable with 
each other. 
But Professor Sunstein sees the problem for the option value 
people in traditional economics: “Economists and economic 
analysts of law often find [the idea of incommensurability] 
puzzling and opaque, in part because it is outside the scope of 
 
343. Id. (emphasis added). 
344. Id. 
345. Id. at 238. Sunstein elaborates: 
To say that a social loss is not commensurate with money, in a moral 
sense, is not to say that human beings can avoid some form of 
monetization. The point is that in the domains of private choice and 
democratic judgement, any monetary assignment should be 
undertaken with an understanding of the nature of the goods at 
stake. As I have emphasized, this point does not provide any 
guidance for resolving the important issue of how the assignment of 
monetary value should occur. But for those concerned about 
irreversibility in the relevant sense, that is not the only issue. We 
need to consider ‘how’ goods are valued, not merely ‘how much’ goods 
are valued. 
Id. at 239. Sunstein’s concept of social loss does not begin to convey the 
significance of human extinction. Despite Sunstein’s interest in monetary 
assignment, we can place no monetary value on human extinction. 
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neoclassical (or behavioral) economics, and because it does not 
offer any guidance for how to assess the costs and benefits of 
social harms.”346  These option value people are often the 
cornucopian economists347 who subscribe to pure cost-benefit 
analysis for all decision making. An additional “option value” is 
the value of irreversibility to them.348  This captures the extra 
value for an investment to be potentially irreversible. The option 
value approach may work well for the loss of property. 
Thus, we have two ways of looking at the problem. Each side 
has difficulties appreciating the other. On one side, there are 
those who identify a value or a price for irreversible losses, or at 
least the risk of such losses.349  On the other, the likes of Frank 
Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling argue, “It is hard to imagine a 
price for an irreversible loss.”350  It can depend on the nature of 
the loss. If I lose my childhood photos to a fire, it is irreversible, 
but not commensurable with other property. There is a special 
emotional value. But instead of worrying about protecting other 
property, this article is concerned with protecting life first. Life, 
and the liberty which supports it, deserve special treatment as 
they are consistently incommensurable with the property right 
inherent in the option value approach. 
Cass Sunstein suggests “that economic analysts will be 
unable to understand important debates, in politics, in law, and 
 
346. Id. at 230. 
347. “The economist is focused on production and consumption. . . . The 
planet, he insists, is perpetually fruitful and still underutilized.” WILSON, supra 
note 18, at 24. On the other hand, “[t]he ecologist . . . is focused on 
unsustainable crop yields, overdrawn aquifers, and threatened ecosystems. . . . 
The planet he insists is exhausted and in trouble.” Id. The “cornucopian view of 
nature” constitutes “the idea that nature is a vast storehouse of good ‘things’ 
waiting only to be grasped and used by man.” RICHARD L. MEANS, THE ETHICAL 
IMPERATIVE: THE CRISIS IN AMERICAN VALUES 126 (1969). Picture a verdant and 
welcoming commons. 
348. The option value of irreversible investments is one of three 
independent literatures in economics pertaining to irreversibility. Beyond 
“irreversible investments” is the literature of irreversibility and hysterisis in the 
study of dynamic systems with multiple equilibria, and the literature of 
entrainment, the phenomenon of lock-in or lock out, based in complex systems 
theory. Charles Perrings & William Brock, Irreversibility in Economics, 1 ANN. 
REV. RESOURCE ECON. 219, 219 (2009). 
349. See Irreversibility, supra note 264, at 231 (citing Richard C. Bishop, 
Option Value: An Exposition and Extension, 58 LAND ECON. 1 (1982)). 
350. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 15, at 185. 
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in ethics, unless they have a sympathetic appreciation of the 
second conception of irreversibility.”351  Further, he notes “that 
economic analysis of some public health and environmental 
problems is, in an important sense, obtuse, if it fails to appreciate 
the animating concern.”352  Sunstein conveys well the significance 
of the limits of the neo-classical economic mind.353  For one thing, 
he recognizes “that an effort to line up all the relevant goods on a 
single metric will make it difficult to understand what is at stake 
in the domains and politics of law.”354  The use of a unitary 
metric obscures risk. 
However, Sunstein builds an option value into his 
“Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle.” Relying on Kenneth 
Arrow and Anthony Fisher’s 1974 economics essay, 
Environmental Preservation, Uncertainty, and Irreversibility,355 
Sunstein gives a purely economic response. 
 
351. Irreversibility, supra note 264, at 230.  
352. Id. 
353. According to Sunstein, here is what neo-classical economists do not 
get: 
[Consider] a claim that natural processes have some kind of intrinsic 
value simply because they are natural. If that idea seems 
implausible or contentious, at least we might be able to agree that 
certain decisions would produce losses that are in a moral sense 
irreversible even if that claim seems mysterious from the standpoint 
of economic theory. 
Id. at 238 (citing ROBERT GOODIN, GREEN POLITICAL THEORY 41 (1992)). 
354. Id. 
355. Id. at 233  
Arrow and Fisher imagine that the question is whether to preserve a 
virgin redwood forest for wilderness recreation or instead to open it 
to clear-cut logging. Assume that if the development option is 
chosen, the destruction of the forest is effectively irreversible. Arrow 
and Fisher argue that it matters whether the authorities cannot yet 
assess the costs or benefits of a proposed development. If 
development produces ‘some irreversible transformation of the 
environment, hence a loss in perpetuity of the benefits from 
preservation’, then it is worth paying something to wait to acquire 
the missing information. Their suggestion is that ‘the expected 
benefits of an irreversible decision should be adjusted to reflect the 
loss of options it entails’. 
Id. (citing Kenneth Arrow & Anthony Fisher, Environmental Preservation, 
Uncertainty, and Irreversibility, 88 Q.J. ECON. 312, 319 (1974)). 
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Interpreting an argument in a later paper by Fisher,356 
Sunstein invokes an insurance payment step-by-step process. 
Here he shows the implementation: 
If an irreversible harm is on one side and a reversible one on the 
other, and if decision-makers are uncertain about future costs 
and benefits of precautions, an understanding of option value 
suggests that it is worthwhile to spend a certain amount to 
preserve future flexibility, by paying a premium to avoid the 
irreversible harm.357 
There is an additional cost to preserve an option. The 
usefulness of the option approach is direct knowledge and 
exercise of flexibility in seeking to protect the irreversible. 
But this does not help us with our values. The option 
approach will not help us decide whether or not to avoid our own 
extinction. While it may help analyze costs, in its unrestricted 
form the option approach is unlikely to help determine the most 
effective approach(es) to take in the interest of safety. When 
liberty or life is placed at risk, the situation calls for a moral 
response. 
It is possible to misinterpret irreversibility in the context of 
human extinction. Considering irreversibility, the focus should be 
on safety first, not cost first. According to the U.N. Framework 
Convention on Climate Change: 
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of 
full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for 
postponing [regulatory] measures, taking into account that 
policies and measures to deal with climate change should be cost-
effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible 
cost.358 
“Global benefits” can come without making any expenditure 
toward security. There is a sufficient safety interest to protect 
 
356. See Anthony C. Fisher, Uncertainty, Irreversibility, and the Timing of 
Climate Change Policy 9 (2001), http://stephenschneider.stanford.edu/ 
Publications/PDF_Papers/timingFfisher.pdf [perma.cc/5YYB-DPAL]. 
357. Irreversibility, supra note 264, at 233. 
358. UNFCCC, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 164, 170; see also INDUR 
GOKLANY, THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL RISK ASSESSMENT 6 (2001) (quoting United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, art. 3(3)). 
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first from the most significant risks. Those risks are not limited 
to climate change. Cost could become a factor once a measure of 
safety has been calculated and established. 
Feasibility may at some point be an issue. However, some 
goals may not appear to be feasible at first. We may decide we 
need to train ourselves to reach. Or maybe we merely need to 
time our jump. We need to begin a conversation on how we, all of 
humanity, need to view significant risk. 
c. The Precautionary Principle 
The risks of contracting HIV/AIDS or playing with guns are 
black and white and do not tend to come in shades of gray. If you 
ask a parent, these are objective risks that any adult can 
recognize. And these are great risks, deserving special treatment. 
Although our treatment of these risks may vary in relation to our 
circumstances and our views,359 we tend to readily accept that 
these represent great risks at one end of the spectrum of risk. 
This black and white view has led to the “better safe than 
sorry” argument that teenagers have heard for years. This is the 
root of a concept called the precautionary principle: The principle 
tells us that, given the risks, there are some boundaries you just 
don’t cross. Even though the risk may be indeterminate, there 
may be a general perception of danger.360  Consider horrific 
 
359. For example, we may lock up the guns, or we may refuse to allow guns 
in our homes. 
360. Law professor Steven Schwarcz describes treatment of catastrophic 
risk created by our systems: 
Perhaps the most relevant example for systemic risk is regulation 
designed to address the risk of catastrophic events or large, 
irreversible effects where the actual level of risk is indeterminate. In 
these cases, regulators often apply a precautionary principle that 
presumes benefits will outweigh costs. In the principle’s most 
utilized form, regulators may decide to regulate an activity 
notwithstanding lack of decisive evidence of the activity’s harm, such 
as controlling low-level exposure to carcinogens notwithstanding 
lack of proof of a causal connection between such exposure and 
adverse effects to human health. 
Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 234-35 (2008) (citing 
JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 
16 (2d ed. 2007); Robert G. Chambers & Tigran A. Melkonyan, Pareto Optimal 
Trade in an Uncertain World: GMOs and the Precautionary Principle, 89 AM. J. 
AGRIC. ECON. 520, 528 (2007); Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic, 
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mortal injury, incurable disease, or death to self or others. These 
are clear boundaries to which any parent—or physician361—
would agree. 
We need to plan for risk in our law and policy so that later we 
do not regrettably discover that we were too late in risk 
assessment and communication. Reactions can be too late. As 
Princeton’s Richard Falk observed 40 years ago, “we tend too 
often to react, rather than to prevent and given the scale of our 
newer undertakings the consequences of error are increasing at a 
fast pace.”362  Finding ourselves lucky enough to be here now does 
not justify continuing to react rather than prevent. The risks in 
science—and the risks seen through science—are increasing 
faster now than ever. Reaction, at some point, will be inadequate. 
The precautionary principle may help us morally. It may help 
us with our thinking. And it may help us with single individual 
simple choices. But life is not so simple. According to Ackerman 
and Heinzerling, “The general idea of the precautionary principle 
is easy enough to describe: we should pay attention to early 
warnings of serious hazards, rather than wait for final proof and 
precise quantification of the expected impacts. The difficulty 
comes in implementation.”363  Practically speaking, how do we 
live? Do we stop eating? Do we stop burning coal? What do we 
change, and to what degree? Here is what we are up against: We 
already know that we can’t lock the teenager in his room all his 
life.364 We must accept some risk. 
If we reject unrestricted cost-benefit analysis entirely, and 
we attempt to deal with risk with the black-or-white banning of 
dangerous activity, at this point, we cannot live.365  We are all 
 
91 CORNELL L. REV. 841, 848 (2006); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary 
Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1006-07, 1017-18 n.266 (2003)). 
361. The precautionary principle “is, essentially, a restatement of a popular 
rendition of the Hippocratic oath, namely, ‘first do no harm.’” GOKLANY, supra 
note 359, at 1–2. 
362. FALK, supra note 57, at 190. 
363. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 15, at 225. 
364. We must at some point be able to take risk. It is part of normal 
individual development. 
365. Keating offers the example of a tanker truck full of gasoline, an 
accident, an explosion, waiting to happen. Although it is a threat to our 
community of risk, it is also a benefit. We need that fuel, and we are willing to 
accept some risk of devastating injury or death to some in our community to get 
it. Losses will be concentrated on an unlucky few. Keating, supra note 20, at 
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together in this larger community of risk, and as we will see when 
we consider the risks in our modern everyday life, some 
stemming from our everyday conveniences, we cannot employ the 
raw dictates of the precautionary principle. We would lose our 
liberty. 
Do we subject all risks to special precaution beyond the point 
of cost justification? Hardly. Professor Keating suggests that it 
behooves us to eliminate or feasibly reduce only significant risks 
of devastating injury: “[A] significance requirement is necessary 
to prevent both safe and feasible risk reduction from inflicting 
harms to our liberty greater than the harms that insignificant 
risks of devastating injury inflict on our security.”366  All risks 
would not qualify for these restrictions.367  “The imposition of 
insignificant—but real—risks of devastating injury is so 
pervasive that the elimination of insignificant risks of 
devastating injury would cripple our freedom of action.”368  One 
could respond that human extinction is significant if anything 
is.369 
Economists and others have attacked the precautionary 
principle, saying that it cannot be employed in its pure form and 
that when it is employed, it is vague, ambiguous, and watered 
down.370  Let’s not allow ourselves to be restricted to an all-or-
 
679. Keating then asks and answers the hard question, “[w]hat can be said by 
way of justification to those who lose?” Id. at 680, 
The only answer is that the relevant practices of risk imposition 
were to their ex ante advantage and that their lives and limbs were 
not, therefore, sacrificed either to the general good, or to the lesser 
interests of others. There was no alternative way of reconciling 
liberty and security which would have improved their life prospects, 
and perhaps have avoided their devastation, without working a 
greater hardship on another class of persons. 
Id. at 680. 
366. Id. at 661.  
367. We need to place life interests over liberty interests, but only where 
risks to life and health are significant. 
368. Keating, supra note 20, at 661. 
369. Significance is not a question of probability but a question of how bad 
it would be if it happened. This then justifies an investigation into probability. 
370. See John S. Applegate, The Taming of the Precautionary Principle, 27 
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 13 (2002); Michael S. Carolan, The 
Precautionary Principle and Traditional Risk Assessment, 20 ORG. & ENV’T 5 
(2007); Giovanni Immordino, Self-Protection, Information and the Precautionary 
Principle, 25 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. THEORY 179 (2000); Derek Turner & 
Lauren Hartzell, The Lack of Clarity in the Precautionary Principle, 13 ENVTL. 
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nothing choice between a norm with excessive risk (CBA) and a 
principle that arguably cannot be implemented as such.371  We 
like safety.372  When confronted with the choice, most people 
choose safety over money.373 
When we choose liberty or property over life, we have 
misplaced our priorities. Look at externalities. When property 
conflicts arise and it comes down to the right to achieve efficiency 
and in doing so, to pollute, versus the right of another to be free of 
pollution, we encounter conflicting priorities. For economist 
Ronald Coase, the issue should not be which interest to protect so 
much as how best “to avoid the more serious harm.”374  This 
 
VALUES 449 (2004); Cass R. Sunstein, The Precautionary Principle as a Basis for 
Decision Making, ECONOMISTS’ VOICE, Apr. 2005. 
371. Consider this attack on the precautionary principle by well-known 
CBA proponent, Judge Posner: 
The “precautionary principle” (“better safe than sorry”) popular in 
Europe and among Greens generally is not a satisfactory alternative 
to cost-benefit analysis, if only because of its sponginess—if it is an 
alternative at all. In its more tempered versions, the principle is 
indistinguishable from cost-benefit analysis with risk aversion 
assumed. Risk aversion, as we know, entails that extra weight be 
given the downside of certain prospects. In effect it magnifies certain 
costs, but it does not thereby overthrow cost-benefit analysis, as 
some advocates of the precautionary principle may believe. 
POSNER, supra note 145, at 140. The thumb on the scale of safety is an 
acknowledgment that CBA fails to adequately account for risk. The long-term 
interest in safety is a countervailing tendency to the interest in short-term gain 
inherent in CBA. The purposes are different. Neither can entirely displace the 
other. 
372. Ackerman and Heinzerling observe that the U.S. military 
establishment successfully avoids CBA based on safety or security 
considerations. See ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 15, at 216–20. When 
safety has mattered most, Americans have not used CBA: 
Advocates of Cold War military spending could have seen the 
situation in terms much like our interpretation of the precautionary 
principle. The actual military risk was uncertain, and the danger of 
being exposed to attack in the high-risk case seemed much greater 
than the danger of spending too much in the low-risk case. Preparing 
for the high-risk case did not bankrupt the nation, but created jobs 
and industries that sustained economic growth. 
Id. at 228. The same could easily be said for the health and environmental risks 
we face today. Consider, e.g., the costs of a catastrophic climate change disaster. 
When we compare it to the cost of preventative safety, we discover that the costs 
are not symmetrical. 
373. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 18, at 125. 
374. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2 
(1960). 
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approach better supports—or at least works better with—
precaution than does CBA. 
When we consider externalities, we often see “market 
failure.” Law professor Carl Circo notes that, “[u]nder 
[circumstances of market failure], economic analysis supports a 
legal rule that ‘avoids the greater harm,’ such as a rule that 
imposes ‘the burden (or duty) of cost avoidance or abatement on 
the party that can do so at the lowest cost.’”375  If we are not 
careful, decisions to avoid harm can all too easily get re-
characterized into issues of cost. When we consider humanity’s 
impact on the life support system of the planet, lowest cost may 
not avoid greater harm. 
For now, we have considered risk, something we all live and 
know. How we perceive risk and how we respond varies in the 
context of “objective” views, subjective views, and moral views. 
Let’s recognize a moral need, even a legal need, to reduce risk 
especially when we encounter the irreversible. And let’s recognize 
that need especially in the context of risk of death and extinction, 
including foreseeable risk of harm to the Earth’s life support 
system. 
Is humanity at any risk of extinction? Are there real dangers 
or just concerns? Are these matters that dollars and cents will 
solve, or do they run deeper?376  The foreseeability of collapse is 
not reassuring. 
 
375. Circo, supra note 165, at 120 (quoting DANIEL H. COLE & PETER Z. 
GROSSMAN, PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 87 (2005)). 
376. Money may not solve the problems discussed herein. How to Spend 
$50 Billion to Make the World a Better Place, examines nine different categories 
of possible options. Of those, only two—climate change and safe and adequate 
water—pertain directly to issues in this article. The options are ranked by 
economists setting economic priorities. Climate change and water do not make it 
into the group of four top priorities (1. control of HIV/AIDS; 2. providing 
micronutrients to fight malnutrition among children; 3, trade liberalization; and 
4. control of malaria). See Jagdish N. Bhagwati et al., Expert Panel Ranking, in 
HOW TO SPEND $50 BILLION TO MAKE THE WORLD A BETTER PLACE 165, 166 (Bjorn 
Lomborg ed., 2006); Bjorn Lomborg, Introduction: What Should We Do First?, in 
HOW TO SPEND $50 BILLION TO MAKE THE WORLD A BETTER PLACE, at xi, xiii, xv 
(Bjorn Lomborg ed., 2006). In some ways, it can be said that the top priorities 
selected are the “easy” issues. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Neo-classical economics and its purely quantitative approach 
to decision making should be replaced by theory and practice that 
do a better job of protecting humanity from significant risk of 
collapse or extinction. Implementation of neo-classical theory 
puts individual lives at risk and when multiplied on a grand 
scale, works against the common welfare of the population. In 
response, sociologists, and the late Ulrich Beck in particular, 
employ a subjective view of risk that is both outspoken and 
wary.377 
The philosophical footing for neo-classical economics is part 
of the problem. The utilitarian theory common to CBA and WBA 
is incompatible with a long future on a limited planet. Humans 
exhibit plenty of self-interest already, without employing 
specialized systems to magnify it. 
The use of utilitarian philosophy causes us to focus on our 
own individual perceptions of need, without regard to the 
physical limits of the planet. As a result, we are selfishly using up 
significant portions of the life support system of the planet—and 
thereby impairing the human future.378 
Our neo-classical economics has become a specialized system 
that is assisting in environmental disaster. It may be true at this 
stage that each effort to use nature harms the biosphere a bit 
more. 
While we lack a perfect understanding of scientific cause and 
effect, we can understand and foresee the possibilities for 
environmental disaster. Requiring proof of cause and effect for a 
disaster is both impossible and immoral. The lessons of 
Chernobyl, Bhopal, and the Deepwater Horizon spill teach us 
that the kinds of life-and-death risk we face require more 
precaution than is currently employed. 
Known foreseeability enhances the duty to act. Arguably, an 
intentional failure to act to save millions of lives could reasonably 
constitute sufficient gross negligence to attract the attention of 
 
377. See, e.g., BECK, supra note 19. 
378. This paves the way for us to consider the question of what approach or 
philosophy to use. We will need to explore and consider ways to think about 
thinking that will further the survival of the human species. 
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criminal authorities. Instead, humanity should embrace a duty to 
act that is rooted in both morality and law. 
With risk to life foreseeable, certain activities should be 
curtailed. A humanity interested in survival will need new limits 
on behavior. And law will need to have a role in setting those 
limits including limiting systems of decision making, such as 
CBA. Law should govern economics rather than the other way 
around. 
The President’s Office of Information and Regulatory 
Analysis (OIRA) needs to scrap its use of CBA immediately. In 
the interest of fairness to all, it needs to be scrapped in all other 
countries simultaneously. We can no longer afford to compete 
against each other without limits. We are killing the planet. 
Given our competitive economic systems, our best approach 
is for all nations to agree to stop the competition. Thus, it seems 
that the time and the situation are right for a new global 
economic system that respects both science and the law. If we can 
use our laws, our choices, and our defaults to encourage human 
survival, we, as a species, stand a better chance of surviving 
longer. And together we can make the world a better place. 
I would stop here, but there remains a final troubling matter 
to address: the matter of economic displacement. If the entire 
international economic system were to move at once to some 
system other than neo-classical economics, there would be 
massive human displacement and suffering. The transition needs 
to be phased in. It needs to start very soon, and we need to 
discuss the required changes even sooner. 
In the face of environmental overshoot, humanity cannot 
continue as we have. Either we will adjust first, or collapse will 
occur. Given our current economic and political systems, a 
sufficient adjustment on the part of our species would require a 
global effort at the highest levels. Given our tendency to continue 
with previous behavior, it is reasonably foreseeable that failure to 
cooperate in making sufficient changes could doom the human 
species. For example, if we do not cooperatively outgrow neo-
classical economics together, the divisions and discontinuities 
from just a few competitors could lead to collapse. An affirmative 
decision on the part of the human species is likely to be required. 
And before that, we need to talk about the problems and the 
possible solutions. Let the conversation begin, please. 
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